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ABSTRACT

THE LOGIC OF THE LAND:
THE AGRARIAN ROOTS OF UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT IN BRAZIL
by
Chris M. Carlson

Advisor: Mauricio Font

This dissertation seeks to explain the highly uneven pattern of economic development in
Brazil during the 20th century. Stark development differences between the northern and southern
regions of the country have long been a problem of concern to scholars and policymakers and
have generated a number of studies over the years. However, none of these have gotten to the
root of the problem, and state policy has never adequately addressed the regional disparities. This
study puts forth a new theory of uneven development based on the different ways that
agricultural production has come to be organized in different parts of the world, and how this has
impacted larger processes of industrialization and economic development. A comparative
examination of the historical development of rural property relations in both the Northeast and
Southeast regions of Brazil reveals how very different rural economies emerged in each place,
and how this created major disparities not only in agriculture, but across much the rest of the
economy. Rural property relations are shaped by historical processes of land appropriation and
class struggle, and these processes are further elucidated through archival research in both
regions. Statistical data on agricultural productivity and manufacturing are used to test the
hypothesis that the regional differences in industrialization are due to fundamental differences in
the rural economy.
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INTRODUCTION

Why are some parts of the world wealthy and prosperous, while others are impoverished
and underdeveloped? What explains the fact that some societies have advanced so much more
than others in terms of industrialization and economic growth? These are questions that have
puzzled scholars for generations and have generated a number of important theories and schools
of thought. Yet, to this day, we have not provided adequate answers, and there remain important
gaps in our understanding.
In the field of development sociology, there is a growing realization that the mainstream
approaches are inadequate (Kiely 1995, Portes 2015, Schrank 2015). The dominant frameworks
struggle to explain the actual contours of uneven development around the world, and this is
especially true when it comes to the vast differences that exist within the developing world
itself. Throughout the Global South, there is enormous variation in terms of per capita income
and levels of industrialization that the mainstream approaches cannot adequately account for,
and this calls into question the validity of their arguments.
The primary purpose of this study is to theorize the causes of divergent processes of
economic development. An in-depth look at Brazil’s regional development divide serves to
demonstrate the inadequacy of existing theoretical frameworks and provides support for an
alternative theory based on agrarian dynamics. After a review and critique of the main
approaches in development sociology, I put forth a theory of development that focuses on the
different ways that agriculture has come to be organized in different parts of the world, and how
this has impacted larger processes of capital accumulation and industrialization.
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How agriculture is organized in a society is shaped by a number of factors, including
historical processes of land appropriation and class struggle. These processes give rise to
specific relationships between rural producers and the land, what are known as rural property
relations (Brenner 1985). Scholars have shown that the rural property relations that develop in a
society can greatly affect productivity growth in agriculture, and, ultimately, have important
consequences for industrialization and the development of the larger economy (Wood 2002,
Post 2011, Isett and Miller 2017). I argue that at the root of today’s vast development
differences around the world are distinct rural property relations, and that these have led to
sharp differences in terms of industrialization and economic growth.
The case of Brazil serves to demonstrate this theory empirically. As one of the largest
economies in the developing world, Brazil is a country that is marked by a very significant
internal divide. The southern states of the country are fairly highly developed by Latin
American standards, with industrialized, diversified economies and among the highest standards
of living in the developing world. However, the northern regions are among the poorest in Latin
America, with underdeveloped, undiversified economies and high levels of poverty. This sharp
regional divide is not easily explained by the dominant frameworks in development theory, as
they tend to focus on national-level variables like state institutions, or a country’s position in the
global economy. This leaves them hard-pressed to explain why such large disparities would
exist within a single country.
My research shows that, in fact, Brazil’s regional development pattern can best be
understood by analyzing key aspects of its rural economy and the different ways that agricultural
production came to be organized from one region of the country to the next. This goes back to
the different ways that land was settled and appropriated in each place, and how this led to
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distinct relationships between producers and the land. Once established, the rural property
relations in each region greatly influenced the pace of agricultural productivity growth, and, in
turn, had larger consequences for industrialization and economic development.
In order to illustrate these processes at work, I focus specifically on the Northeast and
Southeast regions of Brazil—the two extremes in terms of development—and analyze the
historical evolution of agriculture in each place. I use these two regions to illustrate both sides of
the development divide, as Brazil’s Southeast region is by far the most industrialized region in
Latin America, while the Northeast has long been one of the least industrialized. I use a
historical-comparative approach to illustrate why the specific rural economy that developed in
each place is fundamental for understanding their sharp divergences. By tracing the evolution of
rural property relations from the colonial period up to the end of the 20th century, I show that the
productive logic in agriculture has long been a key factor in Brazilian development, and the key
to its stark regional divide.
The chapters of the dissertation are organized as follows. In Chapter 1, I survey the
dominant frameworks in development sociology and argue that these approaches do not offer
adequate explanations for the wide variety of development outcomes around the world. I also
review the major explanations for regional inequality within Brazil and contend that while these
come closer to the mark, they do not get to the root causes. I conclude that an improved
theoretical framework and deeper analysis of local dynamics is necessary for a proper
understanding of the country’s highly uneven development.
In Chapter 2, I lay out an alternate explanation for divergent development that is based on
rural property relations and their impact on industrialization. I give a brief overview of the
historical differences in rural property relations in developed and developing societies, and show
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evidence indicating that the rural property relations prevalent in most developing countries today
are fundamentally distinct from those that spurred economic development in the developed
world. I argue that this can go a long way toward explaining the varying outcomes in terms of
industrialization and economic development around the world. I then briefly lay out how this
applies in the case of Brazil.
In Chapter 3, I turn to an analysis of Brazilian economic history and the rural property
relations that emerged during the colonial period. From the arrival of the first Europeans, land in
Brazil was appropriated in historically specific ways, resulting in certain relationships between
landholders and the land. I show how this has important implications for understanding the
country’s early development process, including the slow rate of technical change and little
growth in per capita income throughout much of the colonial period. This was the primary reason
for Brazil’s relative underdevelopment with respect to much of the industrialized world by the
beginning of the 20th century.
Then, in Chapter 4, I detail the fundamentally distinct evolution of rural property
relations that developed in southeast Brazil in the early 20th century. By the first decades of the
1900s, land appropriation and rural property relations in the state of São Paulo began to resemble
those in the developed world, with dynamic land markets and forms of land appropriation that
were increasingly mediated by market processes and competitive forces. I trace how this
historical process occurred, and why it led to increasing agricultural productivity in this region
from the early 20th century.
Next, Chapter 5 analyzes the northeast region of Brazil and shows that the rural property
relations in this region did not undergo a similar transformation in the 20th century. Instead, they
continued to resemble those of earlier historical periods, and rural producers did not become
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subject to competitive constraints or market pressures to improve productivity. This led to the
continuation of low-risk, low-investment productive strategies in the countryside, which impeded
growth in agricultural productivity and inhibited the diversification of the local economy.
Chapter 6 then looks at the impact of these distinct rural economies on the
industrialization process and attempts to quantify the effects of agriculture on regional levels of
industrialization in the 20th century. To do this, I use quantitative data on agricultural
productivity and manufacturing output to measure what role rural dynamics have played in
conditioning industrial growth, and how this can explain the continued concentration of
economic activity in the southern regions of the country. I argue that key differences in how
agriculture came to be organized in each place explain much of the difference in levels of
industrial growth.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes with a discussion of the implications and potential solutions
to uneven development in Brazil. If the argument presented here is accurate, and the large
regional divergences are due to underlying differences in agriculture, then the potential solutions
would need to focus on producing changes in agriculture. This could be done through various
kinds of interventions in the rural economy by the state and/or market actors. I argue that these
interventions have tended to fail in the past due to a misunderstanding of rural property relations
and how they drive investment in productivity. However, by taking into account the importance
of rural property relations in development, we can provide a new understanding to divergent
processes of economic development around the world and bring more viable solutions to many
of the problems that plague underdeveloped regions.

5

CHAPTER 1:
The Poverty of Development Theory

Few things have shaped the modern world more profoundly than the divergent paths of
economic development in the world’s core and periphery. The growing inequality that emerged
between nations in the 18th and 19th centuries continues to be one of the most salient features of
the world today, and one of the most powerful forces affecting the lives of billions of people
across the globe. Though some studies show the gap between rich and poor countries has now
begun to narrow, if we exclude China and India from the equation the opposite is true. For most
of the developing world, global inequality continues to grow.1
Despite this reality, uneven development is not widely studied by sociologists today, and
the predominant frameworks for understanding it have not evolved much in recent years. Most
sociologists still view the global divide through the lens of one or another of the major
frameworks that were developed several decades ago, such as dependency, world-systems
theory, or state theory (Frank 1967, Wallerstein 1974, Amsden 1989, Evans 1995). Meanwhile,
others have essentially given up on explaining its root causes, focusing more on “what works”
for achieving better development outcomes in the developing world (Portes 2015).
So it is perhaps not surprising that the sociology of development struggles to explain
uneven development around the world today. This has been noted by a number of scholars in
recent years (Kiely 1995, Portes 2015, Schrank 2015), and there is a “growing realization that
mainstream approaches are untenable” (Schrank 2015, 35). These approaches focus on factors

1

Firebaugh and Goesling (2004) show that declining global inequality in the last decades of the
20th century was almost entirely due to growing per capita incomes in China and India, where
almost 40 percent of the world’s population lives.
6

like institutions, culture, or the international division of labor to explain development differences
between countries. Yet these variables can seldom account for the actual contours of inequality
as it exists in the real world and can be seen more as consequences of uneven development rather
than its causes. Though there have been a number of important studies in development in recent
years, these can seldom account for the differing paths and levels of development as they are
measured empirically, especially when it comes to the large differences that exist within the
developing world itself.
In this chapter, I review the major approaches in the sociology of development and argue
that they are inadequate for understanding the global development divide. These approaches can
be loosely organized into three categories: (1) those that emphasize cultural differences between
societies and the impact of cultural factors on economic development; (2) those that emphasize
the workings of the global economy and the exploitation of poor countries by wealthy countries;
and (3) those that emphasize countries’ institutions, including arguments about the role of the
state and the capacity of developmental states.2 While this list is by no means exhaustive, the
major explanations employed in the literature generally fall into one of these three groups. 3 I
argue that when examined closely, none of them provides a convincing explanation for uneven
development.

2

It should be noted that there is also a growing body of literature that rejects the concept of
“development” as a Eurocentric construct. This literature will not be addressed here as it does not
offer an explanation for the empirical differences that exist between developed and developing
countries in terms of industrialization, GDP per capita, labor productivity, which are the
overriding concerns of development theory.
3

The Oxford Bibliographies guide on development sociology divides the existing literature into
the categories of modernization theory, dependency and world-systems, dependent development,
and the developmental state, confirming that the vast majority of the major works can be
organized into these groups. Of course, there are other explanations from outside of sociology
related to climate, geography, and other immutable factors, but for purposes of this chapter we
will limit the discussion to the main approaches within the sociology of development.
7

In the final section, I also review the major explanations for uneven development in
Brazil. These explanations largely parallel the same categories above, but there are also a
number of variations and alternate explanations that give greater treatment to the particular
Brazilian context. Though these come closer to the mark, they still fall short of providing an
adequate account of Brazil’s internal development divide.

The Mainstream Approaches
Culture
The idea that cultural differences are at the root of economic inequalities goes back
hundreds of years and is still today the most common explanation for uneven development
around the world, especially in non-academic settings. From Max Weber and the “Protestant
ethic,” to the development of modernization theory in the 1950s and 1960s, to the so-called
“cultural turn” of post-modernism and post-structuralism, these theories point to aspects of a
society’s culture—religion, values, attitudes, or other ascribed characteristics of the local
population—as causal agents in divergent paths of economic development.
Perhaps the most systematic of these arguments is modernization theory. Dominant
among sociologists in the 1950s and 1960s, modernization theory followed in the Weberian
tradition of focusing on specific cultural attributes that seemed to set the developed world apart
from the rest. Scholars pointed to “value orientations” or “attitudes” like openness to
innovation, democratic orientation, faith in science and technology, and the belief that the world
is calculable (Inkeles 1966). These kinds of traits seemed to differentiate the “modern man” of
Western society from people in poorer countries, and ostensibly were what drove the transition
from “traditional” values, roles, and social norms to the more “modern” values, institutions, and
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legal systems that characterized more developed societies (Parsons 1964). The obvious solution
to the development divide, therefore, was the diffusion of Western “values” and social norms to
the societies of the developing world, which would ostensibly facilitate their economic
transformation.
Though modernization theory lost favor in the 1960s and 1970s, cultural explanations
still abound in the social sciences today (Landes 1998, Harrison and Huntington 2006). Scholars
argue that the reason certain countries have achieved economic success and have risen out of
the third world in recent decades is because they have internalized “Western” values or adopted
Western business culture and practices. Those societies that have been less successful are seen
as having cultures that are more resistant to change, relying too much on familism or
personalism in their business dealings, and not sufficiently adopting more “progressive” values
like individualism, egalitarianism, and human rights.
Meanwhile, in fields like anthropology and sociology, another kind of cultural analysis
has gained popularity in recent years in the form of postcolonial and subaltern studies. Though
these frameworks are not explicitly focused on uneven development, there is an important
current within them that looks at cultural reasons for the developing world’s distinct path. They
point to a distinct “bourgeois culture” in developing countries that did not allow for the full
development of capitalist modernization. The inability of the bourgeoisie to achieve
“hegemony” resulted in an insufficient transformation of the culture and consciousness of the
subaltern classes (Chatterjee 1993, Chakrabarty 2000). This resulted in a fragmented political
culture between a particular kind of bourgeoisie on one hand, and the separate domain of the
subaltern classes of workers and peasants on the other, which prevented the kind of national
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integration and economic transformation that occurred in developed countries (Guha 1997).4
Though the onus of failed development falls on the bourgeoisie, culture is seen as an important
factor in explaining the particular social formations in these societies.
But despite the continued popularity of cultural approaches, there are a number of
problems with using culture as an explanatory variable in economic development. One of these
was pointed out by early critics of modernization theory and has to do with the objective
measurability of cultural traits (Gusfield 1967, Portes 1973). Are things like “modern” values or
consciousness actual measurable social facts of a given society? Or are they the subjective
perceptions of social scientists with little empirical basis? And if they are measurable social
facts, are they actually embedded in a society’s culture? Or are they merely a product of the
very different social conditions that social scientists are seeking to explain in the first place?
Barrington Moore once argued that those that use culture as an explanation for historical
processes risk engaging in circular reasoning. This is because culture and values do not simply,
as Moore put it, “descend from heaven to influence the course of history” (1966, 486). Rather,
they are a product of history and society itself, and are acquired by being a member of a
particular society. Thus, the reproduction of certain cultural traits in a society requires an
explanation, and that explanation will inevitably lie in the specific circumstances and conditions
of that same society. Individuals from different backgrounds would be expected to have distinct
values and world views, not because of some independent variable known as culture that acts
upon them, but because they are products of different economic and social environments. Those
different environments are what social scientists must seek to explain.

4

See Chibber (2013) for a persuasive critique of this argument.
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In fact, our perceptions of different cultures tend to change greatly as economic
conditions change, casting doubt on the validity of this kind of analysis. For example, cultural
explanations were once commonly given for East Asia’s development woes, as certain
traditions, religions, and values were seen as not conducive to economic development (Gong
and Jang 1998). Yet, in the second half of the 20th century, the economic success of countries
like Japan and South Korea presented a major challenge to these theories. By the 1970s, new
theories began to appear that were reversing the argument and now pointing to culture as a
factor promoting these countries’ development (Dore 1973, Vogel 1979). This has happened
again and again where economic fortunes have changed, including places like Scandinavia,
Taiwan, and even today with the explosive growth of China. 5 What was once seen as a barrier
to development now becomes a part of the explanation for success.
In other words, though culture remains a common explanation for uneven development, it
is likely based more on the subjective perceptions of observers than any objective reality. Those
who adopt cultural explanations for today’s development differences are likely making the same
mistake as those who once explained East Asia’s or Scandinavia’s failed development in terms
of cultural factors. Undue influence is given to perceived cultural traits, with little explanation
for the different social and economic conditions that underlie those traits, and without taking
into account how cultures and cultural perceptions change as economic fortunes change.

While “Nordic” values and culture are often seen as crucial to Scandinavia’s successful
development, the region’s lower level of development at earlier periods in history was often
attributed to culture as well. A 1903 history of Europe refers to the “inferior culture” of Northern
Europe, and the “gluttony” and “drunkenness” of Swedish people as an explanation for their
relative underdevelopment at earlier times in history (Helmolt and Bryce 1903, 11, 476).
5

11

The global economy
After culture, the next most common explanation for uneven development has to do with
the global economy and countries’ positions in the world economic system. Since the 1960s and
1970s, various approaches have gained popularity by emphasizing the workings of the
international division of labor as the cause of the global development divide. Approaches like
dependency and world systems theory turned modernization theory on its head by arguing that
development differences were not due to the absence of certain cultural traits in poor countries
that prevented capitalist development, but rather were the very product of capitalist
development itself as it expanded throughout the world. The way in which the capitalist global
economy differentially rewards countries and regions was said to produce wealth and prosperity
in some areas, while simultaneously impoverishing others and impeding their development.
The starting point for these approaches is usually the colonial era, where it is argued that
the modern development divide got its start. The colonization of much of the world by
European powers led to the plunder and exploitation of the nations of the periphery by a handful
of nations in the world’s core, creating a massive transfer of resources and wealth that
facilitated development in the North while impoverishing the South (Frank 1966). Countries’
positions in the international division of labor and their integration into this global system of
production are key variables for explaining their outcomes. Those that were integrated into the
world-system as exporters of primary goods saw their industrialization limited by a dependency
on the core (Cardoso and Faletto 1979). Meanwhile, the nations of the core benefitted from their
relationship to the periphery and sought to maintain the basic structure of this world system
(Wallerstein 1980).
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Different versions of this basic framework are still prevalent throughout the social
sciences (Selwyn 2014, Hickel 2018). Perhaps the most sophisticated is the global commodity
chains approach, which focuses on the 21 st century context of globalized manufacturing (Gereffi
and Korzeniewicz 1994). The international division of labor is still the key variable here, but
instead of focusing on the transfer of wealth between primary exporters and industrial powers,
commodity chains analysis looks at how surpluses are appropriated at different stages of the
globalized production line and how this distributes gains around the world (Dougherty 2008).
One of the primary ways this is said to occur is through differential rates of profit in the core
and periphery. Manufacturing firms in the core tend to concentrate in higher profit activities,
and thereby are able to engage in higher rates of capital accumulation and innovation, while
manufacturing firms in the periphery are concentrated in low profit activities, and therefore can
only engage in limited capital accumulation (Selwyn 2014). Much like the colonial division of
labor, the concentration of certain economic activities in certain regions of the world is seen as
reproducing and perpetuating global inequality.
However, like the cultural arguments before them, these global economy arguments also
have a number of major shortcomings. As early critics of world systems argued, by placing the
international division of labor at the center of the explanation, these theories displace more
important internal factors from their analysis, such as the domestic social structure, relations of
production, and local processes of capital accumulation (Brenner 1977, Skocpol 1977). Many of
the central elements of the development process are taken for granted by the global economy
approaches, such as rapid technical change and rising labor productivity, and little attention is
given to the local factors that underlie these. Indeed, it is assumed that domestic processes of

13

capital accumulation would occur naturally in the countries of the Global South were they not
enmeshed in an exploitative world system.
However, scholars have shown that these processes are not automatic, and actually
depend on specific conditions in a given society. Critics of the global economy approaches
argue that patterns of capital accumulation and technical change are actually greatly impacted
by the domestic social structure and relations of production in a country, and these affect the
functioning of the larger economy (Wood 2002, Brenner 1977). Indeed, important structural
changes such as the transformation of the rural sector have often been seen as central to
explaining why conditions conducive to industrialization and technical change emerged in some
places and not in others in the lead up to the Industrial Revolution (O’Brien 1982). And this
often had little to do with countries’ particular integration into the world economy.
In fact, when examined closely, the focus on colonial plunder and the international
division of labor cannot account for the reality of global inequality that emerged out of the
colonial period. As can be seen in Figure I, by the end of the 19th century major European
colonial powers like Spain and Portugal had not actually benefitted from centuries of colonial
plunder. In fact, they were still as poor or poorer than several of their former colonies in Latin
America and would remain so until well into the 20th century. Likewise, many of those
European countries that had achieved the highest levels of development, such as Switzerland or
Denmark, were engaged in virtually no colonial plunder, and colonial trade played only a very
minor role in their economic growth. 6

6

Even in the case of a major colonial power like England, it is estimated that trade with the
periphery never exceeded even 10 percent of its total economic output, and profits from this
trade never made up even 15 percent of total investment (O’Brien 1982).
14

Figure I: Global inequality at the end of the 19th century (GDP per capita)
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Meanwhile, several former colonies that were initially colonized and integrated into the
global economy as primary exporters, such as Australia, Canada, or Argentina, were able to
achieve considerable industrialization and diversification of their economies by the end of the
19th century. And they often did so on the basis of the same primary exports said to condemn
peripheral countries to underdevelopment, such as agricultural goods and other raw materials.
At the same time, many of those who were never colonized, such as China, Iran, or Ethiopia,
experienced much worse development outcomes than their more colonized neighbors.
In other words, the widely divergent development paths that emerged during this period
can hardly be explained by a focus on colonial plunder and the international division of labor.
Though the global economy certainly played an important role in shaping local processes, it was
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far from a determining factor. As Arthur Lewis (1978) once pointed out, global trade between
the core and periphery was fairly insignificant before the 19th century, when virtually all
countries were still agricultural societies. It was only during the course of the 19th century that
some were able to industrialize and diversify their economies away from primary goods, while
others did not, leading to the international division of labor of the modern era. To understand
why this occurred in some places and not in others requires looking beyond global economic
forces to various internal factors in these societies.
For example, why did core countries like Denmark and Switzerland experience
significant development during the colonial period, while others like Spain and Portugal did
not? We could not possibly explain this by referring to colonialism and the international
division of labor. In fact, the only possible explanation is that it was, as the critics of world
systems argued, factors internal to each society that determined to what extent capital
accumulation and productivity growth occurred in each place. In Spain and Portugal, the
persistence of certain economic structures like semi-feudal agrarian systems and productive
relations in the countryside explain why surpluses were not systematically invested in capital
accumulation, thus limiting their development. On the other hand, in much of Western Europe,
earlier transitions to capitalist agriculture and changes to internal class structures meant
surpluses were systematically reinvested, facilitating capital accumulation and spurring
industrialization (Brenner 1977).
The same could be said for why certain parts of the colonial world achieved significant
development, while others did not. Regardless of their initial integration into the world
economy, internal changes to productive relations and economic structures often led to
drastically different development outcomes among colonial societies. And this frequently
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occurred among those exporting the very same goods, or with very similar starting positions in
the world economy. In other words, a focus on a certain integration into the international
division of labor cannot account for why some of these societies diversified away from primary
dependence, while others remained trapped in a subordinate position in the world economy.
Contemporary approaches that focus on countries’ positions in the global economy are
similarly flawed. Commodity chains analysis, for example, overstates the importance of the
globalized manufacturing system and the differential profit rates within it. Statistics on
industrial production show that export-based manufacturing actually only plays a very minor
role in most developing countries’ economies, accounting for just 10 to 20 percent of total
manufacturing in most cases. 7 The vast majority of manufacturing production is actually
directed to these countries own internal markets and is not enmeshed in externally-controlled
value chains. Moreover, studies have shown that for the manufacturing sector as a whole,
average rates of profit actually tend to be higher in developing countries, whereas higher levels
of development are characterized by progressively lower rates of profit (Schwab and Werker
2014).
In other words, one of the central claims of commodity chains analysis—that lower profit
rates in developing countries are what limit their development—is directly contradicted by the
empirical evidence. Regardless of whether some commodity chains limit profits at the
periphery’s end of the chain, this only applies to a small portion of total manufacturing output in
these countries and is not true for manufacturing as a whole. Lower levels of investment in the
developing world are more likely due to various internal factors, such as narrow domestic

7

In China, for example, only around 13 percent of total manufacturing output is exported to the
developed world, with 83 percent sold domestically. In India, it is 9 percent exported and 84
percent sold domestically (UNIDO 2015).
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markets and highly concentrated ownership structures that inhibit competitive pressures on
firms (Rodrik 1988, Carlin et al 2004).
Therefore, it seems clear that the global economy approaches have a number of problems
when it comes to explaining the empirical reality of the development divide, both during the
colonial period and in the context of today’s globalized economy. In focusing on countries’
positions in the international division of labor as the key causal variable, these approaches
ignore important aspects of the economic and social structures within countries, and how these
impact local processes of capital accumulation and technical change. In fact, the direction of
causality is more likely the reverse of what the global economy approaches posit. It is more
likely the internal economic structures and processes of capital accumulation that explain
countries’ ability or inability to industrialize and diversify their economies away from primary
exports, and this, in turn, determines their ultimate position in the global economy. In this sense,
it could be argued that the international division of labor is more a result, rather than a cause of
uneven development.

Institutions
The last major group of explanations are those that focus on institutional differences
between countries, including the role of the state and the effectiveness of developmental states.
With the debt crisis of the 1980s and the decline of state-led development strategies, much of
the debate began to revolve around the role the state should play in promoting economic
development. The major success of various East Asian economies in the second half of the 20 th
century led many to believe that there were certain institutional factors that had allowed these
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societies to achieve industrialization, whereas in Latin America and much the rest of the
developing world this process was cut short.
The conventional explanation from liberal economics was that the divergent outcomes
were the product of different approaches by the state. Whereas in Latin America the state had
played a large role in controlling and guiding investment, regulating markets, and intervening in
key sectors, in the East Asian success stories the state had steadily liberated and deregulated
markets, and minimized intervention in the economy (Wade 1992). This allowed for a greater
penetration of market forces and market discipline in these countries, which produced greater
productive investment and led to rapid economic growth. In Latin America, on the other hand,
too much state intervention led to greater corruption and unproductive rent seeking.
However, critics of this view soon pointed out that the East Asian countries had in fact
employed much greater state intervention than the liberal economists wanted to admit (Amsden
1989, Wade 1992). Scholars showed that a very involved activist state had been involved in
their success, with the state controlling key sectors of the economy and exercising considerable
discipline over private firms. Rather than focusing on the overall extent of state intervention,
some scholars argued that the focus should be on the specific kind of state intervention,
including the character and capacity of developmental states (Evans 1995, Itzigsohn 2000).
States could be classified within a typology of bureaucracies ranging from “developmental” in
places like South Korea, to “intermediate” in countries like Brazil and India, to “predatory” in
various African and Latin American countries. Those that had more successful development
outcomes were seen as falling more on the “developmental” side of the spectrum, with greater
autonomy from local interest groups to discipline capitalists and facilitate productive
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investment, while those who were less successful were seen as having less effective
developmental states.
More recent approaches have extended this kind of analysis to a wide range of other
political and economic institutions. For example, Portes and Smith (2012) compare a number of
national institutions among Latin American nations, including the tax system, the health service,
and the stock exchange, and evaluate how these institutions may contribute to development in
their respective spheres. Meanwhile, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) categorize the political
and economic institutions in different societies as either “inclusive” or “extractive,” depending
on whether they facilitate or prevent successful development. Societies with political systems
that are “sufficiently centralized and pluralistic” are referred to as having “inclusive”
institutions, whereas those with political systems that concentrate power and extract resources
for the benefit of a narrow elite are referred to as having “extractive” institutions (Acemoglu
and Robinson 2012).
Nevertheless, these institutional explanations also have a number of weaknesses. As even
their advocates admit, arguments about the role of institutions in development often risk being
tautological (Portes 2015). This is because the quality and importance of institutions can be
retroactively inferred by the level of development achieved in a society, without accounting for
whether institutions were really the causal factor. Was it better institutions that led to economic
development, or was it economic development that led to better institutions? And was a certain
kind of developmental state the key to success, or did underlying processes of economic
development lead to more successful state intervention? Chibber (2003) has argued that a key
factor in explaining the success of a developmental state like South Korea’s vis-à-vis that of
India’s was not so much the specific character of the state in each case, but rather the
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disposition of local capitalists to state intervention. Where domestic capital’s economic interests
better coincided with state efforts, the developmental state was more successful in effecting
industrialization.
Moreover, while institutional approaches may help us understand why state intervention
has been more successful in some places than others, they do not adequately account for the
structural conditions that made developmental states necessary in the first place. Why was a
specific kind of institutional capacity needed to facilitate development in developing countries?
The explanation often given is that narrow domestic markets cause firms to take advantage of
oligopolistic markets and weak internal competition instead of investing in productivity and
technical change. This leads to the need for firms to be disciplined by the state to make the
kinds of investments needed for development (Evans 1995, Chibber 2003). But what accounts
for narrow markets and weak internal competition in the first place? And why didn’t the
advanced countries confront this same problem in their development process? The answer to
these questions is to be found in the distinct setting of developing countries, such as their unique
agrarian context. Yet any analysis of this is conspicuously absent from the developmental state
literature (Byers 2003, 2005).
But the most important weakness is the fact that institutional approaches cannot account
for the actual contours of development in the developing world today. When measured
empirically, there are wide divergences between developing countries that are not well-explained
by the character or capacity of their state institutions. For example, Brazil and India have been
said to have relatively comparable developmental states in terms of promoting industrialization. 8

Evans (1995) classifies both Brazil and India as “intermediate” states that fall along the middle
of the spectrum between “predatory” and “developmental”.
8
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Figure II: Per capita manufacturing output in US dollars, 2010
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However, as can be seen in Figure II, when measured in per capita terms, Brazil is vastly more
industrialized than India. In fact, India is only slightly more industrialized than neighboring
Pakistan, a country described as having a “conspicuously weak state” (Paul 2014).
Meanwhile, how do we explain that Argentina and Mexico, both described as having
relatively “low-capacity” states (Davis 2004), are at the head of the pack in the developing
world? Or that Ethiopia remains considerably less industrialized than many of its neighbors,
despite little perceivable difference in the quality of its institutions? Clearly, these are questions
that cannot be answered by focusing on the effectiveness or cohesiveness of state institutions.
Indeed, in many cases the institutional analysis is directly contradicted by the empirical reality.
Thus, it would seem that institutional approaches cannot adequately explain the reality of
uneven development around the world today. Not only do they have a tendency to be
tautological, based on inferences and perceptions about institutions after the fact, but they fail to
provide an adequate analysis of the underlying structural conditions that differentiate
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developing countries from their more developed counterparts. This leaves many of these
scholars focusing more on “what works” for producing development, without actually
accounting for the underlying causes of the divergent paths in the first place (Portes 2015).
To actually explain the widely ranging levels of development that characterize the
modern world, it will require going beyond the institutional, cultural, and global economy
approaches that have dominated development theory over the last half century. To really
understand why economic growth and industrialization have occurred so unevenly in these
countries, other important factors must be analyzed, including internal economic structures.
This becomes even more evident when we analyze specific cases in the developing world, such
as Brazil.

The Brazilian Context
The case of Brazil presents additional challenges to conventional development theory.
This is because, within Brazil, there is a large development divide that is not easily explained by
the dominant frameworks. This divide goes back to the early 20th century, when a clear gap
began to emerge between the northern and southern regions of the country. By the middle of the
20th century, French geographer Jacques Lambert (1967) would describe the country as “two
Brazils”—two very different societies coexisting side by side. On one hand, there was a fairly
developed, dynamic society emerging in southeast Brazil, with advanced industries and
modernized, productive agriculture. Yet, on the other hand, there was still a very poor,
underdeveloped society in northeast Brazil, with an archaic social structure that had
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changed little from the days of slavery. While the Southeast had amassed the largest
concentration of manufacturing in all of Latin America, the Northeast was still a poor agrarian
society with large segments of its population in conditions of virtual servitude.
Though much has changed since then, the regional divide Lambert described is still very
present in Brazil today. The southeast region around the state of São Paulo remains considerably
more developed than much the rest of the country, with a GDP per capita that is more than three
times higher than the poorest states of the Northeast, and a level of industrialization that is as
much as twenty times greater in terms of manufacturing per capita (IBGE 2019). While the state
of São Paulo has a level of development that is on par with some European countries, the nine
states that make up northeastern Brazil are more comparable to Brazil’s poorer neighbors, like
Ecuador or Paraguay. This sharp disparity has caused millions to flee the less developed zones,
leading to the growth of massive slums plagued by poverty, crime, and unemployment on the
outskirts of the country’s major cities.
The dominant frameworks in development sociology struggle to explain this regional
divide. As we have seen, these frameworks tend to focus on national-level variables like state
institutions, or countries’ position in the world economy to explain development differences. But
these variables do not serve well for explaining differences within a single country, as they tend
to be fairly constant from one region of the country to the next. This has resulted in a number of
modifications to the mainstream approaches, and a number of other factors have been put forth
as possible explanations in Brazil.
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With the emergence of the regional disparities in the early 20th century, the most common
explanations were those that pointed to cultural and geographical differences between the various
regions of the country. While the southern regions have more temperate climates, and extensive
amounts of fertile land, the northern regions have tropical climates, and vast semi-arid areas less
suited for intensive cultivation. In addition, the northern regions have long been characterized by
a greater African and Indigenous heritage, while the southern regions have a large population of
European descent due to waves of immigration in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. These
factors have often been evoked as reasons for the disparities, as European immigrants are seen as
having cultural traits that are more conducive to economic development, while the Northeast has
been plagued with problems related to an unsuitable climate and terrain. However, as we will see
in Chapters 4 and 5, these cultural and geographic explanations are largely inadequate for
understanding the regional differences.

Figure III: GDP per capita of Brazil’s major regions in US dollars
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Beyond the more simplistic arguments, other approaches have emphasized factors related
to the local productive structure, or the trade relationships between different regions of the
country. In the mid 20th century, a number of scholars called attention to the particular agrarian
context and what they considered to be “feudal” or “semi-feudal” social relations that persisted
throughout much of the countryside (Sodré 1944, Guimarães 1964). The prevalence of large
estates with repressive and slave-like labor regimes were seen as the root cause of economic
underdevelopment, especially in the poorer northern parts of the country, as they condemned
much of the population to a situation of servitude and prevented the growth of domestic markets
for industrialization. These approaches called for land reform that would eradicate the
unproductive rural estates and their “backward” or “pre-capitalist” labor regimes as a necessary
precursor to development (Guimarães 1964).
This view was soon challenged by the dependency perspective, which became very
influential in Brazil in the second half of the 20th century. Many of the most important theorists
from the dependency school were Brazilian, and their work was largely centered on the Brazilian
context (Furtado 1971, Santos 1970, Cardoso and Faletto 1979). Where earlier theorists had seen
underdevelopment in Brazil as a problem related to the incomplete development of capitalism,
the dependency theorists viewed the problem as being caused by the very workings of global
capitalism itself and negated any suggestions that “semi-feudal” or “pre-capitalist” social
relations were present in the countryside. More important to the dependentistas was the global
division of labor in which Brazil was enmeshed, and its position in the larger world system.
This perspective also became one of the primary ways of viewing the regional
inequalities within Brazil. Just as poor countries were seen as exploited by their wealthier
counterparts through the international division of labor, poorer regions like the Northeast were
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seen as being exploited by the wealthier Southeast region through Brazil’s own internal division
of labor. This became associated with the concept of “internal colonialism” in which Brazil’s
poorer regions were enmeshed in a kind of colonial relationship to the more developed
Southeast, exporting raw materials on the world market, and importing manufactured goods from
the Southeast under unfavorable terms of trade (Furtado 1971). This was said to drain resources
from the Northeast to the Southeast through a variety of mechanisms, including unfavorable
exchange rates, import tariffs, and other financial flows like bank investments and taxes (Leff
1972).9
Dependency theorists also made various arguments about the character of the Brazilian
elite and their relationship to the state. Fernandez (1968) famously argued that the Brazilian
bourgeoisie had failed to carry out a full-fledged “bourgeois revolution” that would transform the
state and economy to achieve capitalist development. Brazilian capitalism was labelled as
“mercantile” or “finance” capitalism, and the capitalist class was seen as associated with and
dependent on foreign investment. The growing penetration of Brazil’s domestic market by
multinational corporations in the second half of the 20th century led many to argue that local
capitalists had built alliances with foreign capital and were manipulating the state to further an
agenda not conducive to national development. This resulted in a kind of “dependent
development” that placed structural limits on industrialization and perpetuated the country’s
subordinate position in the world economy (Cardoso and Faletto 1979, Evans 1979).
By the end of the 20th century, a number of arguments also began to emphasize Brazil’s
institutions as a primary factor in development. These approaches often pointed to the

9

Cano (1985) goes through these arguments one by one and shows why none of them are viable
explanations.
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particularities of the Brazilian state and its inability to facilitate a more sustained
industrialization process. Evans (1995), for example, argued that Brazil has a less rationalized
bureaucracy and administrative apparatus than other more successful developmental states like
South Korea or Taiwan, and, therefore, could not achieve sufficient autonomy from special
interest groups to carry out effective industrial policy. The state’s strong links to the private
sector allowed for some partial successes, which would explain Brazil’s relatively higher level of
industrialization. But its lack of autonomy from powerful economic groups prevented it from
facilitating more comprehensive industrial growth and left the country with a truncated industrial
structure.
Of course, the failure of Brazilian elites to produce a more comprehensive
industrialization is an important factor in understanding the country’s development process. Yet,
focusing on the state and international trade cannot explain the reasons behind Brazil’s large
internal divide between the southern and northern regions. After all, southeast Brazil was
integrated into the world economy much the same as the rest of the country, yet it would
experience a quite impressive process of industrialization in the 20th century that would set it
apart from the rest Brazil. This fact alone seems to contradict much of the discussion about
Brazil’s inherent shortcomings and limitations for development. Instead, it raises the question of
why such a successful development process was confined to only one part of the country.
Indeed, the unique level of development achieved in southeast Brazil in the 20th century
presents a major challenge to the various perspectives discussed above. This is because the
Southeast region began with much the same conditions as the rest of Brazil in terms of its
position in the world economy, its state institutions, and even its social relations of production.
Much like the northern regions of the country, southeast Brazil began as a largely agrarian
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society, dependent on slave labor and various forms of labor tenancy to operate its largely
plantation economy. It was integrated into the world economy as an exporter of primary goods
like sugar and coffee, and its state institutions were largely dominated by a landholding elite with
little interest in promoting industrialization. Yet, despite these similarities to the rest of Brazil,
the Southeast would experience significant industrialization and economic development in the
20th century, while other regions of the country would not.
This divergence simply cannot be accounted for by the various dependency and
institutional arguments laid out up above. A focus on the division of labor, or Brazil’s position in
the world economy, cannot explain why industrialization would occur in the southern regions but
not the northern regions, despite similar starting points. Nor can a focus on institutions or the
development state explain this strong spatial component to Brazilian development. The
emergence of the regional divide long preceded the appearance of a modern development state in
the mid-20th century, and once it did emerge there was considerable state intervention to
promote industrialization in the northern regions of the country, but to little avail.
The inability of the mainstream theories to account for these divergent paths calls into
question the validity of their arguments and suggests that other more underlying factors must be
at play. Rather than focusing on the factors so often emphasized in development theory, it seems
clear that a closer analysis of the internal dynamics of each region is necessary to understand
their divergent paths. Factors related to the distinct evolution of regional economic structures and
their social and historical origins would seem to be more important in explaining the stark
development gap.
Some Brazilian scholars have highlighted important regional differences that may better
explain the internal divide. For example, it is often argued that the larger population in and
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around Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in the Southeast is an important factor in the concentration
of industrialization in this region (Azzoni and Haddad 2018). Larger internal markets allow for
economies of scale and agglomeration in manufacturing, and, therefore, provide a stimulus for
industrial development where local demand is greater. Thus, with the concentration of large
urban centers in the Southeast, it is perhaps unsurprising that the main manufacturing centers
would emerge there near the country’s largest markets.
Another common argument involves regional differences in human capital between the
Northeast and Southeast. In poorer regions like the Northeast there is a large class of unskilled
labor without technical abilities or qualifications, while in wealthier regions like the Southeast
skilled workers and qualified personnel are more abundant and available (Barros 2011). This
difference, it is argued, has important impacts on private investment, labor productivity, and
wages, and therefore could be a principal factor behind the regional disparities.
However, the problem with these kinds of explanations is that they beg the question of
how the regional differences came about in the first place, and whether they might be more
consequences rather than causes of uneven development. For example, the differences in
regional market size in Brazil were actually not very significant until well after the
industrialization process was underway. Throughout most of the 19th century, the total
population of the southeastern states was actually considerably smaller than that of the
northeastern states, and this would not change until the end of the 19th century when the first
waves of immigrants began entering Brazil (IBGE 2019). By the 1920’s, the difference in total
population was still fairly small, with 11.2 million people living in the Northeast region
compared to 13.6 million in the Southeast. Yet there was already a major concentration of
industry in the Southeast by this time.
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The same can be said about the differences in human capital. It should come as no
surprise that poorer regions would have lower quality education and other deficiencies in human
capital. But these are more likely consequences rather than causes of their lower level of
development. With less diversified economies and lower per capita income, these regions would
have difficulty financing and investing in education and would afford fewer opportunities for
upward mobility. Indeed, in attempting to explain the roots of different levels of human capital,
Barros (2011) points to the distinct historical processes in each place, including the differences in
agriculture and the distinct productive structures that emerged in each region. But how and why
such distinct productive structures developed in these regions, and why they translated to such
large differences in economic and human development, is precisely the question that needs to be
answered.
Studies on the industrialization process in the Southeast region offer some additional
clues, but still fail to get to the root of the issue (Dean 1969, Cano 1985, 1990). The most
common explanation has to do with the particular commodities produced in each place, and how
they impact industrial growth. Where world markets were more favorable to the commodity
exports and agriculture was more profitable, it stimulated greater investment and dynamism in
agriculture, thereby spurring the growth of internal markets for industrial goods. Thus, the
lucrative coffee economy of the Southeast is often credited with spurring industrialization in São
Paulo in the first decades of the 20th century. Meanwhile, where world markets were
unfavorable, and agriculture was less profitable, investment was less forthcoming, productivity
stagnated, and there was little stimulus for industrial growth (Cano 1990). This was the case with
sugar and cotton in the Northeast in the 19th and 20th centuries. Thus, the divergence between
regions in Brazil has often been explained largely as a product of their primary exports.
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However, while these arguments recognize the importance of the underlying agricultural
economies, they are still largely unsatisfactory. This is because they focus on specific
commodity exports instead of the particular way those commodities were produced. This is
problematic, because other exporters of these same commodities did not have similar outcomes.
Other major coffee exporters, like Colombia for example, did not experience the kind of
agricultural dynamism that São Paulo did, nor did the coffee boom in the early 20th century lead
to a sustained process of industrialization. Meanwhile, many sugar exporters exhibited much
higher productivity and more rapid modernization than northeast Brazil, despite exporting to the
same world markets. In some cases, sugar production was organized as smallholder farms and
coincided with major processes of industrialization. 10
In other words, missing from the commodity-centered accounts is a more detailed
analysis of the internal functioning of the local economy in each place. Beyond a simple analysis
of the particular commodity exports and world market conditions, what is needed is a more
detailed analysis of how production came to be organized in each place, and how this impacted
local processes of capital accumulation. In other words, it is not so much what was produced in
each place that is important, but rather how it was produced, and how its productive logic
impacted the growth and diversification of other sectors of the economy. Only in this way can it
be explained why societies with similar starting points, including similar state institutions,
similar positions in the global economy, and similar commodity exports, could experience such
divergent paths of economic development.

10

In the Australian state of Queensland, for example, sugar production began with a plantation
system but later transitioned to small-scale farmers (Griggs 2000).
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In the next chapter, I put forth a theory of uneven development that emphasizes the
internal productive logic in a society as the key variable in the development process. Instead of
focusing on particular commodity exports, institutions, or cultural traits, I argue that the focus
should actually be on the different ways that agriculture has come to be organized in different
parts of the world, and how this has led to distinct rural property relations between producers and
the land. These distinct rural property relations are shaped by differences in the how land was
settled and appropriated, and this has resulted in major divergences in agricultural productivity
and industrial growth. This theory can provide a better understanding not only of the great
development divide between developed and developing societies, but also the major differences
that exist within the developing world itself, including between regions of the same country.

33

CHAPTER 2:
Toward an Agrarian Theory of Uneven Development

Robert Brenner once wrote that “economic backwardness cannot be fully comprehended
without an adequate theory of economic development” (1985:18). In other words, to understand
the relative underdevelopment of some parts of the world, we must first understand what led to
economic development in the advanced world in the first place. The great development divide is,
after all, a result of the fact that economic development did not occur in the periphery as it did in
the core, and, therefore, understanding the development process as it occurred in the Global
North can be essential for explaining why this process has unfolded so differently in the Global
South.
Nevertheless, modern development theory has seldom given much treatment to
development processes in the advanced world. The dominant approaches have tended to focus on
the potential causes of underdevelopment in the Global South, without devoting much analysis to
the driving forces behind economic transformations in the Global North. This is an important
omission, as it has deprived us of an essential frame of reference for studying the developing
world. Without a solid understanding of what set economic development in motion in the Global
North, scholars have struggled to identify the key factors that have hindered such transformations
in the Global South.
In recent years, a number of scholars have begun to fill this void. Focusing on the
historical processes leading up to economic transformation in the Global North, these scholars
have pointed to events in agriculture as crucial in spurring economic development (Shin 1998,
Wood 2002, Post 2011, Cohen 2017). In most cases, agrarian transitions to capitalism

34

immediately preceded industrialization, and new forms of class relations and class structures are
argued to have provided the stimulus for industrial growth. Changes in the social relations in the
countryside brought about a new productive logic in agriculture, and this led to continual gains in
labor productivity and per capita income, which drove the transformation from agrarian, peasantbased societies to modern industrial powers.
This analysis has shed important new light on the motor forces behind economic change
in the developed world. Yet, its relevance for understanding development processes in the Global
South is still a subject of debate. Some scholars argue that the kind of agrarian transition that
preceded industrialization in the Global North has already occurred throughout the developing
world, and that capitalist relations have become universal around the globe (Bernstein 1996,
Wood 2003). If true, this would mean that there are no longer any fundamental differences
between developed and developing countries in terms of their agricultural productive logic. In
other words, the historical process of agrarian change in the Global North could not tell us much
about the obstacles to development in the Global South.1
However, others argue that agrarian transitions in many developing countries have yet to
occur, and that this is still an essential ingredient for a more comprehensive industrialization
process (Byres 2003, 2012). Indeed, there are a number of ways in which low-productivity
agriculture can be a limiting factor for economic and industrial growth, and this is due to the

1

These arguments often lack detailed analysis of agrarian dynamics in developing countries and
their wider economic importance. As Byres (2012) has noted, scholars analyzing agrarian
dynamics in the developing world are often guilty of what he calls “world system
determinism”—of drawing broad conclusions about local social forms on the basis of the global
processes in which they are enmeshed, without close analysis of the internal dynamics in
agriculture. This has often led to faulty conclusions about the reality of agrarian dynamics in the
Global South, and the continued relevance of agriculture to processes of economic development.
Also see (Carlson 2018).
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persistence of certain agrarian systems in these countries (Mundle 1985). Thus, further analysis
of agrarian transitions or the lack thereof can provide important keys to understanding the
barriers to development in the Global South and can allow for a better accounting of uneven
development around the world.
In this chapter, I argue that there continue to be fundamental differences between
developed and developing societies in terms of their productive logic in agriculture, and that this
is central to understanding their divergent development paths. A close analysis of rural dynamics
in the Global South reveals that the kind of agrarian transitions that spurred development in the
Global North never occurred throughout much of the developing world, and this is at the root of
their distinct economic evolution. In the developed world, the emergence of highly dynamic,
productive agriculture fueled industrialization and spurred economic diversification. Yet, in
developing societies, low-intensity, low-productivity agriculture continues to be widespread, and
this has hindered industrialization in a number of ways. In what follows, I break this argument
down into three theses.

Three Theses on Uneven Development
Thesis 1: Economic development in the global North was spurred by the emergence of certain
rural property relations that fueled agricultural productivity growth

On the surface, the process of economic development in the advanced world is fairly
straightforward. Beginning in parts of Europe in the early modern period, a number of changes in
production like improved methods, technologies, and techniques began to allow for ever greater
efficiency, and this drove increases in labor productivity. Greater efficiency in production led to
greater economic output per capita, also known as GDP per capita, which is the most basic
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measure of society’s level of economic development. As GDP per capita increased, it led to
rising incomes and improved standards of living for much of the population, and this fueled the
diversification of the larger economy.
Underlying this process was the dynamic of capital accumulation, or the reinvestment of
profits back into production. This is one of the defining characteristics of a capitalist economic
system, and a central factor in the development process. The rate at which economic agents
channel investment back into improvements in production directly impacts upon the rate of
technical change and, thereby, the rate of growth in labor productivity. Understanding the factors
that regulate capital accumulation, therefore, can be essential to understanding a society’s overall
development path.
Though it has often been overlooked by mainstream development theory, this process
was a central focus of much of classical social theory. Adam Smith dedicated large parts of his
work to discussing why “replacing capital” seemed to occur more in rich countries than in poor
ones.2 Meanwhile, Marx (1976) and Weber (2002) each laid out a framework for understanding
the causal mechanisms behind it. For Marx, capital accumulation was the product of a certain
mode of production that compelled capitalists to maximize “relative surplus value” by investing
in and continually “revolutionizing” the means of production (1976, 429-438). For Weber, on the
other hand, it was a certain “work ethic” or “economic ethos” that led some groups to reinvest
profits back into production to maximize gains and achieve economic success (2002, 21-37; 103125).
Perhaps the most convincing explanation for increased capital accumulation comes from
Robert Brenner’s work on early modern Europe (1977, 1985). Brenner explains the advent of

2

See Smith (1986), Book II, chapters III and V, and Book III
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capital accumulation in terms of rural property relations, or the relationships between rural
producers and the land. Systematic reinvestment of profits and increasing labor productivity in
certain parts of Europe in the lead up to the Industrial Revolution were due to the emergence of
certain agrarian systems in which access to the land came to be mediated by market competition.
As possession of the land became contingent on competitive output, producers were forced to
adopt and invest in new and improved methods and technologies in order to maximize their
productivity and compete on the market. The result was widespread, systematic capital
accumulation throughout the agricultural sector.
This was quite different from what occurred in pre-capitalist agrarian societies. As
Brenner explains, in most pre-capitalist societies land was not commodified, and producers had
some form of direct, non-market access to the land. This created a type of rural property relations
in which the most logical production strategy was to minimize risk and avoid market dependence.
Peasants generally used their landholdings for their own subsistence, selling only surpluses on
the market, and avoiding exposure to market fluctuations. Meanwhile, landlords generally
utilized land as a mechanism for extra-economic exploitation of peasants, and generally invested
their surpluses in conspicuous consumption and in maintaining territorial control. In this context,
the specialization of production for the market and systematic investment in improvements in
productivity were not rational economic strategies, and, therefore, productivity growth and the
adoption of new methods in agriculture were slow and episodic.
It was not until the advent of new capitalist property relations in the countryside that this
productive logic would change. This first happened in 17th century England, when peasants were
expropriated from the land and turned into leasing tenants. Similar processes then occurred later
on in parts of Western Europe, Japan, and in the United States, where rural producers became
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subject to competitive land markets that forced them to match the level of output and efficiency
of their peers. These changes were not due to conscious decisions and policy choices by
governments, or the specific economic interests of different groups. 3 Rather, they were the
unintended result of larger historical processes, including demographic and environmental
factors that brought about unforeseen consequences for producers and their relationship to the
land.
For example, in England centuries-long conflict between peasants and landlords coupled
with demographic decline in the wake of the Black Death eventually opened the door to new
forms of tenancy and land appropriation. A diminished rural population in the 14th and 15th
centuries weakened the power of the lords, and an organized peasantry gained the leverage they
needed to free themselves from feudal controls. However, while they succeeded in overthrowing
serfdom, they were unable to wrest property rights from the landlords, and this allowed the lords
to move away from customary tenancy toward various forms of market rentals. Those who could
not produce competitively and pay market rates for the land were now subject to eviction. 4
The result was that most land in England came under commercial leases, and competitive
land markets became the primary form of land appropriation by the 18th century. This
fundamental change in how land was acquired created new property relations in the countryside
and led to a new productive logic in agriculture in the century before the Industrial Revolution.
As rural producers became subject to competitive constraints, it became necessary to reduce
costs, increase efficiency, and maximize the output of the land by adopting and investing in

3

See Brenner (1986) for a more detailed explanation of how these processes have often occurred
as unintended consequences of class struggle.
4

This process is explained in detail by Brenner (1985)
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improved production methods and technologies. Systematic capital accumulation slowly became
the predominant productive logic throughout the countryside.
A similar process would occur later in North America, but under very different
circumstances. Though landlords and colonial governments often tried to control access to land
in the new continent, the availability of abundant unsettled areas on the frontier made it virtually
impossible to prevent various forms of informal and non-market occupation by smallholders and
large cattle ranchers. As a result, low-intensity, subsistence-oriented production strategies were
the norm throughout North America during the colonial period.
This did not change until the 19th century, when demographic influx and growing
demand for land on the frontier led to new struggles around land appropriation and land tenure
(Gates 1973). As explained by Post (2011), small farmers fought for the continuation of nonmarket forms of land appropriation and tenancy on the frontier, while merchants and speculators
in the business of buying and selling land increasingly sought to divide up frontier areas to sell
off to incoming settlers. Various business interests like colonization companies and land
speculators involved in large-scale settlement projects eventually gained the upper hand in the
struggle over land appropriation and began marketing frontier land to newly arriving immigrants.
The result was that as the frontier expanded westward from the mid-19th century, the vast
majority of farmers were forced to acquire land through mortgages or other market mechanisms.
This kind of process also occurred in other settler societies where concentrated waves of
immigration created the incentives to divide up and sell off land. In countries like Canada and
Australia, and to a more limited extent in Argentina and Brazil, land speculators and colonization
companies facilitated the adoption of market-based property relations among immigrant
smallholders by selling land on a piecemeal basis (Lafrance and Post 2019). In each case,
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processes of demographic influx and class struggle shaped the settlement patterns and
mechanisms of land appropriation, and eventually led to the generalization of rural property
relations based on market mechanisms like renting and mortgages. This created what some have
called a “productivity treadmill” in these countries, where farmers were under pressure to
continuously lower their costs and match the competition by continuously channeling investment
back into improvements in production (Cochrane 1993). As a result, the specialization of
production for the market and the maximization of profit became the predominant production
strategies.
These kinds of rural property relations did not emerge everywhere, however, and where
they did not emerge capital accumulation and productivity growth were much less systematic.
Throughout much of the world, producers maintained direct non-market access to the land, or
their economic survival did not depend on maintaining a competitive level of output, and
technical change and agricultural development stagnated. Across large parts of Europe, Brenner
(1985) explains how neither small or large producers found it economically rational to channel
investment back into productivity, and they instead used surpluses for consumption, savings, or
other economic activities. Smallholders prioritized their own subsistence by planting food crops
instead of higher value cash crops, and sought to avoid the risks involved with market
specialization by diversifying their production. Large landowners lived off the rents of their land
through sharecropping or labor tenants, increasing their surpluses by consolidating control over
greater amounts of land and labor rather than improving the productivity of either one.
In other words, the specific property relations that came to govern rural society in
different parts of the world ended up shaping the overall productive logic and investment
patterns in agriculture, and, thereby, the rate of productivity growth. Where access to the land
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came to be mediated by market competition, producers were compelled by market forces to
maximize productivity by engaging in systematic capital accumulation and adopting improved
methods and technologies in order to cut costs and match the competition. However, where
producers’ economic survival was not mediated by market competition, the most rational
production strategy was to minimize risk by channeling investment away from productivity into
savings and consumption, or other economic activities. By influencing what was the most
rational production strategy, the specific rural property relations greatly impacted larger patterns
of capital accumulation and productivity growth.

Thesis 2: In the Global South, distinct rural property relations have impeded capital
accumulation and agricultural productivity growth

As we have seen, rural property relations depend on historical patterns of land
appropriation and settlement, which are shaped by processes of class struggle, environmental and
demographic factors. In any given society, land can be appropriated in a number of different
ways, including through market purchases, land grants, informal occupation, or various forms of
tenancy. Each of these will result in a distinct relationship between producers and the land. The
overall patterns of land appropriation that characterize a society are often focal points of class
struggle, and the outcomes of these struggles will often determine the property relations that
come to govern agriculture over long periods of time.
As explained above, in the advanced capitalist countries a combination of factors
eventually led to the predominance of market-based forms of land acquisition like mortgages and
rentals. This forced producers into a situation in which they needed to maximize the productivity
of the land in order to ensure their economic survival. The result was sustained processes of
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capital accumulation and technical change that, as will be discussed below, eventually drove the
industrialization and the diversification of their economies.
Throughout the Global South, on the other hand, historical processes of land
appropriation have seldom led to the generalization of market-based rural property relations.
Instead, non-market forms of land appropriation and property relations have generally been
preserved with only minor modifications. In most cases, rural producers have maintained direct,
non-market access to the land, or have accessed land in such a way that their possession of it is
not mediated by market competition. This has resulted in the prevalence of low-risk, lowinvestment production strategies throughout the developing world that inhibit agricultural
development and productivity growth. This can be demonstrated with statistics on land
appropriation and production strategies from a wide range of countries.
Though there is enormous variety across the Global South, in most cases the roots of the
rural property relations go back to the colonial period, when elites gained rights to vast tracts of
land through various kinds of land grants or other extra-economic means.5 Throughout much of
Asia, Africa, and Latin America, colonial governments granted massive holdings to local elites
as a way to promote colonization and solidify territorial claims. This land was then used by
landlords as a mechanism for concentrating wealth, controlling labor, and channeling rents into
other sectors of the economy without maximizing productivity or investing in improvements.
The informal or extra-economic appropriation of land was also common in many areas from the
colonial period to the present, leading to highly unequal agrarian structures and vast areas of
unutilized or underutilized land (Moyo 2007, Carlson 2019).

5

See Binswanger et al (1995) for an overview of this form of land appropriation in the Global
South.
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As a result of this early history, peasant struggles in the South have long been about
democratizing access to the land through various forms of land reform. This has often led to
processes of land redistribution in which peasants acquire occupant rights and direct non-market
access to portions of the land. However, this has seldom led to market-based patterns of land
appropriation and the associated rural property relations. The informal and unorganized way that
land has been settled has tended to create unclear boundaries and insecure tenure, making it
difficult for smallholders to use land as collateral on loans, and therefore making land purchases
through mortgages unavailable to all but the wealthy or well-connected (World Bank 2007, 139144).
These are the historical roots of what economists often refer to as “thin” land markets in
the developing world today. Only a relatively small amount of land is exchanged on the market
each year, often through cash purchases by wealthy individuals that do not depend on the output
or productivity of the land (Deininger and Feder 2001). Among smallholders, the use of
mortgages to purchase land is virtually non-existent, and rental markets tend to be weak.
Contentious land relations and insecure tenure make landowners wary of tenant claims to their
land, and therefore they are often hesitant to rent it out. Meanwhile, both tenants and landowners
often prefer sharecropping over fixed rents as a way of reducing risk (Binswanger et al 1995,
World Bank 2007, 141).
As can be seen in Figure IV, in most developing countries less than 20 percent of all
agricultural land is under rental agreements, and these are often sharecropping agreements where
producers pay a proportion of their production instead of a competitive market rent. 6 This means

6

The real extent of rental agreements in developing countries is likely to be less than that
reported by agricultural censuses, as sharecropping agreements are often included as rentals thus
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Figure IV: Percent of farmland area under rental agreements
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Source: FAO (2016)

that for the vast majority of agricultural producers in the developing world, possession of the
land is not contingent on market competition or on maintaining a competitive level of output, as
they are not subject to market rate land payments. Though statistics for land mortgages are not
available, all indications are that they are also uncommon (Deininger and Feder 2001). In the
developed world, on the other hand, anywhere from 40 to 75 percent of all agricultural land is
typically accessed through rental markets.
This has important consequences for the prevailing production strategies in developing
countries. Much as Brenner (1985) explained for large parts of early modern Europe, low-risk,
low-investment production strategies are still widespread throughout the developing world today.
Both large and small producers often find it in their best interests to forgo maximizing the
productivity of their land and labor, and instead ensure their economic survival by minimizing
the risks involved with intensive cultivation. Smallholders often do this by growing lower-value
subsistence goods and avoiding making investments or collateralizing their assets, even when

inflating the percentage. However, in some countries like India it could be the opposite, as it is
well-known that landowners under-report tenancies.
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Figure V: Percent of farms that are market-oriented in developed vs.
developing countries
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Note: Market-oriented farms are those that sell more than 50 percent of their
production on the market. Statistics for developing countries only include households
that earn at least 75 percent of income from farming.
Source: Davidova et al (2013); World Bank (2007)

doing so could greatly increase their output (World Bank 2007, 82-93). Meanwhile, large
landholders often use land as a store of wealth and a source of rents that can be channeled into
other economic activities that are more lucrative or less risky (Binswanger et al 1995, Deininger
and Feder 2001). Low-intensity activities like cattle grazing allow landowners to receive rents
from the land without having to make the kinds of concentrated investments required to improve
productivity, and without risking the vagaries and long gestation periods of more capitalintensive agriculture (Edelman 1992, Carlson 2019).
As can be seen in Figure V, only a small minority of farms in these countries can be
considered “market-oriented,” meaning they specialize their production for the market. While in
the developed countries market-based forms of land appropriation have forced virtually all farms
to specialize production for sale on the market, this has only occurred to a limited extent in most
developing countries, with the majority of farms still prioritizing subsistence production. In other
words, most producers in the developing world are still engaged in low-risk, low-investment
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Table I: Percent of farms that employ various capital inputs

Improved
Varieties

Traditional
Implements*

36%
81%
-6%
44%
7%
17%

Other
Machinery

Irrigation

47%
33%
43%
30%
38%
-12%

Harvesters

Pesticides

84%
71%
88%
33%
71%
-31%

Tractors

Fertilizer
India
Pakistan
Thailand
Brazil
Peru
Venezuela
Mexico

44% 3.4%
-- 57% 76%
92%
1% 26%
--79% 28%
---10% 1.6%
---23% 0.3% 6% 57% 12%
17%
4% 6%
--28%
--- 33% 11%

*hand or animal operated implements
Source: FAO (2016)

production strategies where they do not depend on maintaining a competitive level of output in
order to maintain possession of their land. As a result, they do not need to specialize production,
or continually invest in improvements.
This has important ramifications for capital accumulation and technical change. As can
be seen in Table I, in many developing countries only a small minority of farms employ capital
inputs like pesticides, tractors, or other machinery like harvesters. Even simple improvements
like fertilizer, irrigation, and improved varieties are far from universal. A large portion of rural
producers continue to employ traditional hand or animal-driven implements and make only
limited investments in the kinds of mechanization that could greatly increase productivity.
Among smallholders, this is often due to limited resources and the unavailability of credit. But
studies show that even among wealthier landholders and those with access to credit these kinds
investments are infrequent due to a general aversion to the risks involved (World Bank 2007, 8293, Carlson 2019).
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This distinct productive logic in the Global South can also be demonstrated by looking at
patterns of differentiation among rural producers. When market-based rural property relations
take hold in a society, and possession of the land becomes contingent on market competition,
there are clear processes of differentiation among rural producers as a result of competitive
forces. The smallest and least efficient producers tend to lose out to the competition and decline
in importance, while larger, more efficient producers tend to consolidate their holdings and
increase their share of agricultural land. In the global North, this process occurred in virtually
every country from early on in the development process.
However, when we examine this same process in the developing world, virtually the
opposite has occurred. In most developing countries, it is the smallest and often the least
competitive producers who have increased in both number and share of agricultural land in
recent years, while the larger producers have declined in both respects or have remained
relatively constant. Although long-term data on this is not available for many developing
countries, Figure VI illustrates this key difference with a comparison between the United States,
France, India and the Philippines. Whereas developed countries like France and the US
experienced a clear process of differentiation during their early development, developing
countries like India and the Philippines have experienced the opposite trend. This is strong
evidence that competitive forces and market-based rural property relations are not prevalent in
these countries, and that a fundamentally distinct productive logic governs their agricultural
sectors.7

7

For a more developed version of this argument see Carlson (2018)
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Figure VI: Evolution of agricultural area by farm sizes
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Thus, it seems clear that distinct rural property relations in the developed and developing
worlds have led to fundamentally distinct productive logics in each place. Important historical
differences in terms of land settlement and processes of land appropriation in the Global South
have led to production strategies quite different from those that came to predominate in the
Global North in the lead up to industrialization. Much like the agrarian societies of pre-capitalist
times, agricultural producers in most developing societies still prefer to minimize risk rather than
maximize productivity, and therefore they rarely engage in systematic capital accumulation or
investment in improvements. This has greatly hindered productivity growth in the Global South
and created important barriers to industrialization.
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Thesis 3: The level of industrialization in a society depends, in large part, on its level of
productivity in agriculture

Agriculture is said to fuel industrialization in a number of ways, including through the
supply of surplus labor to industry, the lowering of the cost of food for urban workers, the
increased consumption of industrial goods from the rural sector, and the supply of foreign
exchange from agricultural exports to pay for industrial imports (Gollin 2010). Indeed, Marx
famously argued that it was an “agricultural revolution” in the countryside that created the
conditions for the Industrial Revolution in England, as rising productivity in agriculture created a
“home market” for industrial capital and brought forth the needed labor for industry (1976, 911).
Subsequent studies have shown that this was true not only for England, but for much of the
developed world. Rapid increases in agricultural productivity were crucial for fueling processes
of industrialization in the United States, Japan, and throughout much of Western Europe
(Hayami and Ruttan 1985, Ohkawa and Rosovsky 1960, O’Brien and De La Escosura 1992).
Perhaps the most important factor in this process is the role of agriculture in expanding
domestic markets for manufactured goods (Mundle 1985). This occurs because rising labor
productivity in agriculture allows for higher wages, and therefore greater consumption from the
local population. Greater efficiency in agriculture also leads to lower food costs, and therefore
greater expendable income for both rural and urban workers. Thus, agricultural productivity can
affect household consumption from both ends, as it pushes wages up on the one hand, while also
lowering food costs on the other.
Moreover, as rural producers increasingly invest in capital inputs to raise agricultural
productivity, this also creates linkages to a number of other sectors of the economy, including
finance, transportation, and agricultural inputs like machinery, tools, chemicals, and
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infrastructure. This increased investment and higher output also leads to higher tax revenue for
local and national governments, allowing for greater spending on infrastructure and other public
goods and services. All of this contributes to greater demand for manufactured goods, and
thereby greater possibilities for the growth of local industries.
Indeed, the size of local consumer markets can be a determining factor for local
manufacturing sectors. Given the transport costs of international trade and the difficulties of
exporting to foreign markets, the size of domestic markets has important effects—what are called
“home market effects”—on industrial investment in a country (Krugman 1995). Scholars have
shown that the greater the demand for manufactured goods in the domestic market, the greater
investment there will be in the local production of those goods, as industries tend to set up
production near larger markets in order to minimize trade costs and maximize economies of scale
(Davis and Weinstein 2003).
In the developing world, agriculture has only partially fulfilled these roles. Despite
significant growth in recent decades, agricultural productivity is still drastically lower throughout
the Global South, and this has long been seen as a key factor limiting the growth of local
industries (Lewis 1978, Mundle 1985). This is mostly due to the impact on domestic market size.
Low agricultural productivity leads to low wages and higher food costs, limiting consumers’
ability to purchase manufactured goods. Meanwhile, low investment in capital inputs leads to
weak linkages to upstream industries. Narrow markets for manufactured goods translate to
limited economies of scale for industrial production, causing a truncated industrialization in
which more capital-intensive industries cannot be set up profitably at the local level (Rodrik
1988).
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It is in this context that many see local agriculture as one of the only ways of increasing
demand for manufactured goods and creating the economies of scale needed for a more
comprehensive industrialization process (Byres 2003, Murphy et al 1989). Despite a declining
share of economic output and employment in most developing countries, it has been shown that
agriculture can still have large development impacts through “spillover” or “multiplier effects,”
and through forward and backward linkages to other sectors of the economy (World Bank 2007,
26-49). By significantly raising the current levels of productivity in the countryside, agriculture
can provide a major stimulus for industrial growth up and down the supply chain.
Indeed, the data indicate that agricultural productivity is still a fairly strong predictor of a
country’s overall level of industrialization. When comparing agricultural output per worker
(productivity) and per capita manufacturing (industrialization) across a large sample of countries,
we see there is a strong positive correlation between these two variables (Figure VII). As
productivity in agriculture increases, countries generally move up the scale to higher levels of
industrialization, with the high-income countries far ahead of the rest both in terms of
manufacturing and agricultural productivity. Meanwhile, much of the Global South remains
trapped at the low end of the scale, with far lower levels of agricultural productivity and
industrialization.
To get a better view of this relationship across the Global South, we have plotted the
same data on a logarithmic scale to better visualize the differences at the low end of the scale.
This distorts the true size of the gap between developed and developing countries but allows for
a clearer picture of the differences within the developing world. As can be seen, the only
developing countries on par with the high-income countries in terms of industrialization are in
Eastern Europe, and this is likely due to their relatively higher levels of agricultural productivity
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Figure VII: Agricultural productivity and industrialization in 110 countries
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and proximity to the major consumer markets of Western Europe. Latin America’s higher level
of industrialization relative to much the rest of the developing world also coincides with its
higher level of agricultural productivity, while Africa and much of Asia lag far behind in both
measures. In other words, this strong correlation between agricultural productivity and
industrialization across countries coincides quite well with the larger argument here, and with the
actual contours of uneven development around the world.
However, a strong correlation does not prove causation, nor can it explain the direction of
causality. It could be argued that it is industrialization that leads to rising productivity in
agriculture as surplus labor in the countryside is soaked up by growing industries and new
technologies become available to agricultural producers. Indeed, various scholars have made this
argument (Tiffin and Irz 2006). It could also be the case that some amount of mutual causality is
occurring between agriculture and industry as the development process unfolds. Despite over
fifty years of research on this issue, economists have yet to provide definitive proof one way or
the other (Gollin 2010).
But it should be noted that the reverse causality interpretations have a number of
problems when it comes to explaining the empirical reality of the Global South. Most notably,
they cannot account for the key differences in agriculture between developed and developing
countries that have been laid out up above. The distinct circumstances that impinge on
productivity growth in the developing world, such as weak land markets, low-risk production
strategies, and lack of market orientation among producers, cannot be explained by a focus on
industrialization as the causal variable. These are differences that can only be accounted for by
agriculture’s own internal logic, such as the specific rural property relations and the related
incentives and constraints for rural producers.
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Moreover, these alternative interpretations are not very well supported by the historical
record in the developed world. As noted above, the evidence shows that in most cases it was
rising agricultural productivity that spurred industrialization, not the other way around, and this
was driven by processes of capital accumulation in the countryside (World Bank 2007, 7). As
one study on European development noted, “nowhere has industrial development reached the
state of self-sustaining growth unless an increase in agricultural productivity preceded or
accompanied industrialization” (Senghaas 1985, 47-52, emphasis in original). As capitalist
development unfolded across Europe, there was “a clear correlation between agricultural
modernization and successful industrialization, or else between the lack of agricultural
modernization and the failure of industrialization” (Senghaas 1985, 47-52). And rising
agricultural productivity has typically coincided with important changes in rural property
relations, changes that cannot be accounted for by pointing to growth in industry or other factors
external to the agricultural sector.
In other words, the empirical evidence and historical experience of the global North
would seem to support the notion that it was the emergence of specific rural property relations
that generated systematic capital accumulation in agriculture, leading to agricultural
modernization and, as a result, sustained processes of industrialization. In the Global South, on
the other hand, distinct rural property relations have led to lower rates of capital accumulation
and productivity growth in agriculture, which have resulted in narrow markets for industrial
goods, and, consequently, truncated and oligopolistic industrial sectors. A basic model of this
agrarian theory of uneven development is illustrated in Figure VIII.
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The Case of Brazil
To better illustrate this agrarian theory of uneven development, we will now turn to an
analysis of Brazil, a country marked by a major development divide of its own. Brazil is an
excellent case for this, as the social and economic structures vary significantly from one region
of the country to the next, and this has had major consequences for the historical development of
each region. Indeed, both sides of the above model are clearly represented in the country’s
internal divide between the northern and southern regions of the country. This can be seen both
in terms of the distinct rural economies that developed in each place, as well as the sharp
differences in levels of industrialization and economic growth that occurred over the course of
the 20th century.
Brazil is also an excellent case because the development differences occurred within the
confines of a single nation state. This means that many of the oft-cited variables in development
studies such as culture, trade, and institutions are largely inadequate in this case. Both the
northern and southern regions began with very similar starting points in terms of their integration
into the world economy, their social relations, and their state and local institutions, meaning
these are insufficient to explain the large development differences. By controlling for these
variables, the case of Brazil allows us to demonstrate the importance of other more underlying
factors.
Indeed, when we look closely at the historical processes that occurred in the different
regions of Brazil, we find similarities to the distinct processes in developed and developing
societies that were discussed above. As in much of the Global South, land appropriation in Brazil
throughout the colonial period was characterized by a virtual absence of market mechanisms,
with elites coming to control vast swaths of territory through land grants and various forms of
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informal occupation. Land markets were very slow to develop, and smallholders generally
squatted on unused or unclaimed land in the interstices of the large estates until well into the 20th
century. This led to rural property relations in which market forces were generally absent, and
agricultural producers tended to minimize risk instead of maximizing productivity, channeling
investment away from improvements in production.
As colonization of Brazil’s large interior progressed, distinct rural property relations
began to emerge in southeast Brazil around the turn of the 20th century. Beginning in São Paulo,
the incentives created by the expansion of the coffee economy and massive immigration from
Europe and other parts of Brazil began to change the way land was appropriated on the
agricultural frontier. Much like in the northern United States, waves of immigrants in search of
land generated the incentives to divide up land and sell it off to smallholders, creating a distinct
agrarian structure and stimulating the development of dynamic land markets. New forms of land
appropriation came to dominate much of the countryside and were soon carried into many of the
surrounding states to the south and west. This led to unique market-based rural property relations
throughout much of this region, and agricultural producers were compelled to maximize
productivity by channeling investment back into production. This led to rapid productivity
growth and eventually spurred industrialization.
However, these changes in rural property relations did not occur in much the rest of
Brazil, and this created a fundamental divide within the country. As we will see, in northeast
Brazil much of the agricultural land has remained under the control of the same families from
colonial days to the present, with the rural property relations changing very little over the years.
By the 20th century, most land was bought and sold on the market, but the relationships between
landowners and their landholdings did not change significantly, and low-risk, low-investment
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production strategies have remained predominant to this day. This has greatly affected growth in
agricultural productivity and hindered the industrialization process in this region.
This was, and still is, the primary reason for the divergent regional outcomes in terms of
economic development in Brazil. In the chapters that follow, I will lay out in detail these distinct
historical processes and attempt to show how key differences in the evolution of the rural
economy in southeast and northeast Brazil led to their divergent development outcomes. I argue
that industrialization occurred where agriculture was more dynamic and productive, and this was
a product of the different ways that land was appropriated across both space and time. How and
why this process occurred so unevenly is the focus of the next four chapters.
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CHAPTER 3:
Economic Development in Colonial Brazil

From the beginning of the 16th century until the end of the 19th century, Brazil would
experience very little of what could be called economic development. For almost 400 years, the
economy was based on the export of primary goods like sugar, cotton, rubber, gold, and coffee.
These commodities experienced periodic booms and busts as international markets fluctuated,
but seldom did their production involve dynamic processes of capital accumulation or technical
change, nor did they stimulate industrialization or a diversification of the economy away from
primary goods. Over long periods of time, the technology used in production changed very little,
and growth in labor productivity was slow and episodic.
This relative lack of economic development during the colonial period has been
explained in a number of ways, including a lack of an industrial tradition among colonists, the
mercantilist trade policies imposed by Portugal, the particular institutions that developed out of
colonialism, and the natural endowments favoring plantation agriculture. When discussing the
slow rate of technical change, studies of pre-20th century Brazil often attribute it to the ignorance
of producers, the abundance of land, the institution of slavery, and low profit rates in
agriculture.1 Other factors often cited are a lack of credit, the insecurity of world markets, the
high costs of imported machinery, and ineffectiveness of state institutions. The lack of
investment in improvements has often been seen more as a result of economic underdevelopment
rather than its cause, and, therefore, few in-depth explanations have been offered for the
particular patterns of capital accumulation.

1

See, for example, Furtado (1971), Eisenberg (1974), Mahony (1996), Stein (1985)
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In this chapter, I argue that the particular patterns of capital accumulation and technical
change are actually the cause, not the result, of economic underdevelopment throughout the
colonial period. These patterns should be understood as a product of the specific rural property
relations that emerged in Brazil at this time. Throughout the colonial period, landowners
occupied and took possession of vast swaths of land through various non-market mechanisms.
This explains why they adopted productive strategies that minimized investment in the land and
eschewed technological improvements. The result was slow growth in agricultural productivity
and was the primary factor behind the country’s relative lack of industrialization until the
beginning of the 20th century. Through an analysis of the primary forms of land appropriation
from the 16th through the 19th centuries and the resulting productive strategies adopted by
agricultural producers, a more complete explanation can be provided for why Brazil experienced
limited economic development during this period.

Colonial Land Appropriation
Since the arrival of the Portuguese in the 16th century, land was acquired in Brazil in a
number of different ways. At first, this took place primarily through land grants from colonial
and local authorities, through the informal occupation and laying claim to unoccupied land, and,
eventually, through cash purchases. Like most colonial powers, it was in Portugal’s interest to
solidify control over its territorial claims in the new continent, and the primary way this could be
done was through the physical occupation and settlement of those areas by colonists. Therefore,
the Portuguese crown was willing to give out generous land grants to its agents and allow
colonists to claim large areas of land as a way to encourage permanent settlements in the new
world.
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In order to better facilitate this, the Portuguese devised a system of colonial land
distribution that was to govern how land was appropriated in the colony. All land in Brazil would
be divided into hereditary fiefs known as capitanias, and land within each capitania would be
distributed to potential settlers by land grants knowns as sesmarias. These sesmarias would be
granted by local administrators—usually Portuguese nobles—to anyone who possessed the
necessary capital to cultivate and settle the land and were often given as payment to explorers
and soldiers in exchange for their services. Lacking the financial and administrative capacity to
oversee it themselves, the crown used this system to delegate the task of colonization to private
individuals and entrepreneurs (Borges 2011, 259-281).
Though many of the original capitanias did not last, the territorial divisions they
established continued as the administrative units of the colony. Initially there were fifteen such
units, each consisting of a long strip of territory beginning at the east coast and extending inland
all the way to the Tordesillas line in the middle of the continent (Mueller 1994, 38). Within each
of these territories, royal governors and private administrators were responsible for granting the
land to those willing to invest in setting up sugar production or other activities like cattle
ranching, and this was the primary requirement for recipients to maintain possession of their
land.
However, despite the crown’s intention of encouraging settlement and cultivation of the
land, the land grant system often had the opposite effect. Land grantees often left their grants
largely unused, failing to cultivate or settle them, and large areas under their possession remained
completely abandoned (Porto 1979, 50-105). In addition, the sesmarias often overlapped with
each other, with unclear dimensions and boundaries dividing one from the other, creating
frequent disputes and uncertainty about who owned what land. These were problems that
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Brazilian authorities would deal with for many years to come, and a good solution would never
be found. Even when threatened with various land taxes or revocation of their grants, land
recipients were often reluctant to invest in cultivation (Borges 2011, 259-281).
Instead of settling and cultivating the land, grantees often preferred to remain in the cities
along the coast, involving themselves more lucrative activities like colonial trade and other urban
businesses. Only a small portion of the land grants would be used for agricultural purposes, with
the rest eventually returning back to crown or state authorities as terras devolutas, public land
that could be sold or granted to another person. In reality, whether regranted or not, this land
often became the object of the other common form of land appropriation: informal occupation.
The informal occupation and de facto possession of vacant lands, known as posse, was
perhaps the most common way of acquiring land in Brazil throughout the colonial period
(Mueller 1994, 43-56). Both large and small producers appropriated vast areas of the countryside
in this way by simply clearing sections of unused land and setting up a farm. Those with
resources to invest and the means to enforce their claims would occupy large areas and engage in
cash crop production for export or cattle ranching, while those with few resources would squat
on small sections of land and engage in subsistence production. This was the beginning of the
latifundia-minifundia agrarian structure that would come to dominate throughout much of Latin
America, with large plantations occupying the vast majority of the land, while smallholder
subsistence producers eked out a living on the margins.
In general, those who occupied land informally had more incentive than the land grantees
to engage in cultivation, since they had invested time and energy in clearing the land, and it was
their primary way of establishing claim to it. Yet, at the same time, these producers seldom
engaged in intensive agriculture or utilized their land to its full potential. Along the coast, sugar
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cane producers occupied river valleys and more fertile areas where their production could be
easily exported to European markets. They also typically invested in slaves to work the fields
and a rudimentary sugar mill to process the raw cane. However, only a very small portion of the
land would be used for cultivation. Hills and less fertile areas were left as forest or for slaves’
subsistence plots, while much the rest of the land was left unused or to graze animals. Even by
the 19th century, various observers noted that sugar plantations tended to use only a very small
percent of their land for planting sugar cane (Rogers 2010, 36).
Meanwhile, beyond the humid coast cattle ranchers slowly occupied the vast plains of the
drier interior, using the land for extensive grazing while more fertile areas were occupied by
cotton and coffee producers. Following river valleys and natural pathways inland from the coast,
these producers laid claim to vast tracts of land that were often validated after the fact by
sesmaria grants from local authorities. Cattle production was destined to providing meat, leather,
and work animals to the coastal sugar plantations, while cotton and coffee were sold in both
domestic and international markets. Smallholders fleeing the repressive conditions of the coastal
sugar plantations also frequently squatted on vacant land in the interior and engaged in
production of beans, corn, and other subsistence crops (Andrade 1961, 52-61).
This basic pattern of land appropriation would continue virtually unchanged in Brazil
throughout the colonial period. Non-market mechanisms like land grants and simple occupation
would continue to be the primary forms of acquiring land until well into the 19th century. With
Brazilian independence in the 1820s, the sesmaria system was officially ended, but posse claims
to land would continue unabated for much the rest of the century (Mueller 1994, 54-69).
By mid-century, various attempts were made to control the appropriation of public land.
The Land Law of 1850 called for all lands to be surveyed and demarcated to distinguish between
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public and private holdings, and all land belonging to the state was to be sold in public auctions.
However, the newly formed Brazilian state did not have the capacity to enforce this law, and the
surveying and validation of landholdings proved to be too costly to be carried out (Mueller 1994,
62-69).
Therefore, though it was now illegal to informally occupy vacant land, posse claims
would continue to be widespread throughout the 19th century, and numerous forms of falsifying
titles and legalizing encroachments on public land were developed in order to bypass the
regulations. Though lawmakers had attempted to create an institutional framework for land
markets and the buying and selling of land, the administrative weakness of the state and the sheer
abundance of unoccupied land in the interior of the country made it nearly impossible to enforce
a shift to market forms of land appropriation. Instead, non-market land appropriation continued
to be the primary way of acquiring land.
Despite the state’s failures, however, a market in land did slowly begin to emerge. This
occurred around mid-century when the decreasing availability of well-located land began making
cash purchases a more common form of acquiring property in various parts of the country
(Mahony 1996, 220-359; Clay 1979, 101). Instead of venturing out onto the frontier to claim
vacant areas, those with capital to invest often preferred to purchase well-located land already
granted or claimed by others. Particularly, those who intended on engaging in cash crop
production needed to be close to transport networks and urban centers, as it made bringing crops
to market more feasible and less costly. For this reason, market purchases slowly became one of
the primary forms of land appropriation in the more settled areas of the country, even as nonmarket appropriation continued to be widespread in more remote areas.
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As market purchases became more common, there were still a number of factors limiting
the functioning of land markets, such as a lack of credit, and the insecurity of tenure. Most
landowners did not have legal title to their land, and boundaries between landholdings were often
unclear or disputed. This meant that creditors were hesitant to accept land as collateral on loans,
and foreclosure against landowners was expensive and difficult. Only those with considerable
resources such as large landowners and business owners could generally afford to purchase land
on the market. Those without wealth or connections would not be able to obtain a mortgage, and
therefore would find it virtually impossible to buy land. This only further accentuated the
latifundio-minifundio agrarian structure and the concentration of land in the hands of the elite. 2
By the end of the 19th century, much of the land up and down the Brazilian coastal plains
had been appropriated in the various ways described above. Sugar plantations dotted the
landscape of the humid coast and were characterized by extensive land use and the cultivation of
only a small percentage of their land. More inland beyond the coast, cotton, cattle, and coffee
production was organized in much the same way, occupying vast tracts of land, but effectively
using very little of it. Squeezed in between was a peasantry on small plots of land engaged in
subsistence production, and often forced into seasonal labor on the plantations.
Little changed in the overall structure and functioning of this system for hundreds of
years. With the decline of the slave trade in the 19th century, there was a slow shift away from
slavery to various forms of labor tenancy and sharecropping, but the technology and patterns of
land use on the plantations would change very little. Even with abolition of slavery in the 1880s,
most former slaves remained on the plantations as live-in laborers known as moradores, and
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Descriptions of these dynamics in different regions of the country throughout the 19th century
can be found in Mahony (1996, 359-414), Clay (1979, 117-134), and Stein (1985, 240)
66

production continued much as before. To understand why so little changed, we have to look at
the specific relationships between landowners and the land, and how they led to certain
production strategies.

Production Strategies
As we have seen, throughout the colonial period the primary ways of acquiring land in
Brazil were through various non-market mechanisms. Vast tracts of land were granted by local
authorities to private individuals through the sesmaria system, while those who did not receive
land grants occupied vacant areas and laid claim to them by simply clearing the land and setting
up farms. With the end of the sesmarias in the early 19th century, the informal appropriation of
public land continued unabated for many years to come and would be the primary form of
acquiring property throughout the 19th century. Though market purchases were becoming
increasingly common, there were a number of limiting factors on land markets, and mortgages
were still fairly uncommon.
Given this history of land appropriation, agricultural producers in Brazil had a certain
relationship to the land that caused them to minimize risk instead of maximizing the output of
their landholdings. This has been noted by a number of studies on early Brazilian production
systems and has often been attributed to the abundance of land, a lack of legal titles, or a certain
mentality among planters (Eisenberg 1974, Mahony 1996, Stein 1985). However, the best
explanation can be found by looking at the specific rural property relations that had developed
historically.
Since landowners generally did not acquire their land on the market, much less on credit
or with mortgages, they did not need to obtain a competitive level of output from the land in
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order to pay for it, nor did they need to specialize production for sale on the market. With their
possession of the land secured outside the market, it was more rational for agricultural producers
to engage in production strategies that were different from what would be expected under
conditions of market competition. Rather than maximizing output, they would prioritize selfsufficiency and economic independence, and shield themselves from market forces. They did this
by minimizing their monetary expenses, and by producing many of their own basic necessities.
As one French historian explained:
The sugar plantation lives in large part in a closed economy… [The sugar planter] only
buys from abroad certain manufactured goods and, when the harvest is good, luxury
products for his own personal consumption… He can always sustain himself and his
workers with the production of subsistence goods... If he experiences a bad harvest he
can always wait for a good year, when going through a bad period he can wait for a good
period, and even after a great depression he can sometimes have a long period of
prosperity…(Mauro 1964, cited in Diamanti 1972).
By producing many of their own basic necessities, the plantations freed themselves of having to
purchase many goods on the market, and, therefore, from depending on market sales or a
minimum level of marketable production for their economic survival. This was permitted by
their unrestrained possession of the land, which allowed them to use the land for non-market
purposes. As recalled by one Pernambucan sugar planter:
Possession of the most important means of production, land, allowed the sugar planter
during periods of crisis to produce subsistence crops like manioc, corn, beans, sweet
potato, and to pick fruit in the orchard. This allowed them to await better times, free from
the threat of hunger (Maranhão 2001, 197).
In other words, the colonial plantations were able to implement production strategies that
made them largely immune to external market conditions. Regardless of what happened to the
prices of export commodities like sugar, coffee, or cotton, the plantations could survive long
periods of crisis without succumbing to market pressures to increase output or lower production
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costs. Independent of how much monetary income they received from their agricultural
production, landowners were unlikely to lose possession or be forced into bankruptcy due to
poor yields or inefficient production, and thus their economic survival did not depend on
maintaining a certain level of productivity. As Celso Furtado explained in his classic work:
Even if the production unit were to cease operation, the entrepreneur would not undergo
great losses, inasmuch as maintenance costs were dependent mainly on the utilization of
the slave labor force itself. Further, the major part of the entrepreneur’s consumption
costs were met by the utilization of that same labor force. Hence, the slave enterprise had
a tendency to grow in size only—that is, without undergoing any structural changes
(Furtado 1971, 56).
Though Furtado attributes the invulnerable nature of colonial plantations to the slave
economy, its deeper cause is the particular relationship of landowners to the land. Landowners
could only afford to leave much of their land outside of market production because their
possession of it did not depend on producing a competitive level of output. That is, they did not
need to obtain a certain minimum level of income from the land in order to pay for it, and,
therefore, they did not need to concentrate on maximizing market sales. Instead, they could use
large portions of their land for workers’ subsistence plots, as pasture for work animals, and as
forest for lumber and fuel. It was only through non-market possession of land that the
prioritization of self-sufficiency was a feasible production strategy in the first place.
In fact, the purchase of slaves would have represented a significant liability for the
typical plantation, one that often required taking out loans and mortgages. While land was
seldom purchased on credit, slaves often were, and it was not uncommon for landowners to use
them as collateral for loans.3 Short-term credit against future harvests was another common way

For a detailed description of slaves purchased on credit on Rio de Janeiro’s coffee plantations
see Stein (1985, 213-249).
3
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for landowners to access capital when needed. However, neither of these kinds of debts could
generate enough pressure to force planters to change their production strategies. When loan
payments could not be made, slaves could simply be forced to work harder and longer, or a few
could be sold off in order to meet obligations. Indeed, the periodic selling of slaves was common
throughout the 19th century as natural population growth gradually led slave labor to be replaced
with live-in tenants (Eisenberg 1974, 180; Mahony 1996, 317).
With the increase in market purchases of land in the second half of the 19th century, there
was still little change in the overall productive logic or the relationship of landowners to their
land. Though the buying and selling of land was becoming more common, this was seldom done
on credit or through land mortgages and was generally limited to individuals with considerable
wealth (Mahoney 1996, 363). This meant that even in these cases of land purchases, landowners
would not have to go into debt or make regular payments on the land, and, therefore, their
continued possession of it did not depend on a certain minimum level of output. Indeed,
purchases of land for purely speculative reasons or investment purposes were fairly common
among those with surplus capital (Eisenberg 1974, 128).
Free from the need to raise output or invest in improvements to the land, landowners
instead channeled their profits out of agriculture into savings, consumption, or other less risky
enterprises. Furtado estimates that by the 17th century the colonial sugar sector was highly
profitable, with an annual surplus of at least £600,000 per year (1971, 47-50). Yet he concludes
that very little of this was used productively within the colony. Much of it was either spent on
luxury imports, such as French wines and housewares, or directed into other economic activities
like commerce or the slave trade. Though many planters lived rather simply, the wealthy sugar
oligarchy was well-known for its ostentatious lifestyle and lavish spending.
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By the 19th century, it was also common for landowners to invest in a number of
emerging opportunities in the growing urban centers. This included new businesses like
commercial banks, real estate, mining, and railroads. Many of them also used their savings to
buy state and national bonds, to purchase additional land, or to lend to other planters in need of
short-term credit. Most of these investments would be more secure than channeling profits back
into improvements in agriculture, which often required large sunk costs with no guaranteed
returns. They would also allow planters to diversify their assets away from a single economic
activity like cash crop production into a variety of different businesses.
In other words, the colonial history of land appropriation in Brazil led to rural property
relations in which specialization for the market, the maximization of output, and regular
investment in agricultural productivity were not the most rational production strategies. Since
possession of the land was secure without maximizing its output or increasing efficiency, it was
more logical for landowners to prioritize self-sufficiency, invest their surpluses into other less
risky activities, and diversify their assets away from agriculture. This way they could reduce
their dependence on unpredictable world markets and the vagaries of nature, while still receiving
regular income from the land. Regardless of the external market conditions, they could minimize
risk and ensure the long-term viability of their enterprises. An important consequence of this
strategy, however, was a slow process of technical change.

Technical change
Given the prevailing production strategies and investment patterns on the plantations,
there would be only very minimal investment toward new technologies or methods of production
in agriculture. In virtually all sectors, and across every region of the country, technical change

71

was exceedingly slow, with only occasional innovations or improvements in production, and
very little growth in the productivity of either land or labor. Even when compared to other
colonial and slave societies of the time, Brazil seems to stand out in terms of its slow pace of
technical progress. This has been documented by numerous scholars of 19th century Brazilian
history, but it is worth briefly summarizing here.
In sugar cultivation, numerous observers from the 19 th century noted how production
methods changed very little for hundreds of years. The same variety of cane brought over by the
Portuguese in the 1500s was still being used three centuries later in the 1800s, even though
superior varieties existed in other parts of the world (Eisenberg 1974, 32; Santos-Gareis 2003).
Virtually no innovations in cane species would occur in Brazil until the end of the 19th century,
and even then were not widely adopted by sugar planters. The use of the plow and other
cultivation equipment was virtually unknown throughout this period, even though they had been
used in places like Louisiana and Cuba since the 1840s (Eisenberg 1974, 32-36). On most
plantations, little was done in terms of weeding, terracing, fertilization, or irrigation, and harvest
would be done entirely by hand until well into the 20th century. The only mechanization adopted
was in transport, with some of the larger plantations building private railroads, often subsidized
by the state.
The processing of the cane would also remain very primitive until the end of the 19th
century, and on most plantations until well into the 20th century. The sugar mills, known as
engenhos, functioned in much the same way for over 300 years, with animal or waterpower
turning the rollers that crushed the cane, and the extracted juice being boiled in large copper or
iron kettles. Steam-powered mills did not begin to appear in Brazil until the second half of the
19th century, and even then were only adopted by the wealthiest planters (Eisenberg 1974, 37-
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39). By the 1870s, only about six percent of engenhos in northeast Brazil were using steam,
whereas in Louisiana and Cuba a majority of mills had been doing so since the 1840s. By 1914,
still only a third of the engenhos had adopted steam mills, and other innovations such as vacuum
pans or diffusion extraction were only sporadically adopted despite their clear benefits in terms
of lowering costs and improving quality (Santos-Gareis 2003).
The situation was much the same in other sectors like coffee. As its cultivation spread
into the highlands around Rio de Janeiro and beyond in the early 1800s, few advances were
adopted in cultivation, harvest, or processing. For generations, observers complained about how
“routinism” and the continued use of primitive methods was quickly exhausting and eroding the
soil (Stein 1985, 29-54, 214). Planters continued to advance onto new lands without any change
in the basic methods or technology. A lack of fertilizer, and careless hoeing, weeding, and
harvesting by slaves was said to greatly reduce yields. But little changed even with the transition
to free labor in the second half of the century. A number of innovations in steam-powered
pulping, hulling, and drying of coffee beans began to appear in the 1850s, but were not adopted
by planters (Stein 1985, 230-238). By the 1880s, water-powered mills were still the most widely
used, and those planters that updated to improved milling technology seldom made changes to
the basic handling of the coffee bush or the soil (Stein 1985, 236).
In cotton production, rudimentary techniques persisted in cultivation, ginning, and baling
until well in the 20th century (Stein 1957, 44-49). Slash and burn techniques were generally used
to clear the land, without removing stumps, plowing, furrowing, or weeding. Low-quality strains
of long staple cotton were planted and picked by hand over long periods of time, causing damage
and soiling to the ripe bolls. Ginning was generally done by hand with portable roller gins until
well into the 1860s, when planters began upgrading to American and British saw gins (Stein
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1957, 48). The saw gins were not fit for the long staple fibers, which they tended to damage, but
they continued in use through the 1920s even though long-staple gins had existed in the United
States since the 1840s. The cotton was then pressed into bails with crude wooden presses
operated by hand, with the first steam-powered presses not appearing until the 1890s (Stein
1957, 48).
In the vast interior beyond the plantation zone, cattle production was the epitome of low
investment agriculture. For hundreds of years, there was little to no investment at all in
improvements to pasture lands or cattle herds. Free range grazing was practiced across vast tracts
of land, with the size of herds expanding and contracting naturally according to the capacity of
the existing vegetation. Lacking transportation networks, the animals were generally driven to
market by foot, crossing vast distances and losing much of their body weight before reaching the
cities along the coast. Not until the 20th century would there be any investment in selective
breeding or imported breeds of cattle, and only then because government subsidies encouraged
them. Improved grass varieties, fertilization, and irrigation of pastures were uncommon until the
second half of the 20th century, and basic improvements like cattle feed, vaccines, and improved
hygiene were virtually unknown (Andrade 1961, 55-70).
The various reasons given for this lack of technical change in Brazilian agriculture do not
adequately explain it. The most common explanation is that landowners simply did not have the
resources to invest in new technologies due to low profits in agriculture. However, as noted
above, it has been estimated that the plantations actually had fairly sizable annual profits that
could have been used to invest in improvements. Indeed, the wealthier landowners were known
for their elaborate lifestyles and large investments in other endeavors and businesses outside of
agriculture, even while their landholdings remained underutilized. Moreover, as noted by
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Eisenberg (1974, 44), by investing in modern machinery planters could have increased profits
enough to pay for the additional expense while still increasing their income. In other words, low
profits alone cannot explain the lack of investment. Eisenberg (1974) concludes that one of the
primary reasons was that planters simply preferred to avoid the risk involved with new
investments.
Other common explanations such as a lack of credit and an abundance of land are also
insufficient and can actually be related back to the history of land appropriation. One of the
primary reasons for landowners’ inability to access credit was that land was not accepted as
collateral on loans, a product of the fact that property boundaries were unclear and disputed, and
often did not have legal title. These are both the result of the way land was appropriated
historically, informally and outside of any market mechanisms. Meanwhile, the mere abundance
of land is not as important as the fact that landowners paid little to nothing for the land. In other
cases, such as in the United States, there was also an abundance of land on the agricultural
frontier, yet, as discussed in Chapter 2, the emergence of market forms of land appropriation
meant that landowners generally paid market prices for land and therefore were under pressure to
produce it effectively. As we will see, the same became true for much of southeast Brazil in the
early 20th century.
Arguments about slavery and the low cost of labor are also problematic. As we have
seen, other slave societies such as Cuba and the southern United States did not exhibit as great of
an aversion to new technologies as Brazilian planters did. Also, the phasing out of slave labor in
the 19th century did not lead to major changes in the pace of technical change. Even as slaves
became more expensive, and planters were forced to shift to labor tenants and immigrant labor,
we did not see major changes to the low-productivity production strategies. As we will see in
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Chapter 4, the transition to new productive strategies in southeastern Brazil would appear to
align more with changing patterns of land appropriation than changes in labor regimes or the cost
of labor.
In other words, in virtually every case the key underlying cause for the slow pace of
technical change in colonial Brazil can be traced back to the rural property relations and the
primary ways that land was acquired. Non-market rural property relations led to a situation in
which the most rational productive strategies were ones that prioritized self-sufficiency over the
maximization of profits, and the channeling of investment away from productivity toward other
activities as a way to minimize risk and ensure long-term economic survival. This meant that
landowners often eschewed new technologies and innovations that could have raised
productivity as a way to avoid concentrating investment in agriculture, and to minimize their
exposure to market forces. This not only led to very slow technical change, but also would have
important consequences for larger processes of industrialization.

Industrialization
During the colonial period and throughout most of the 19th century, Brazil would
experience very little industrialization. Though there was significant growth in some sectors of
domestic manufacture in the final decades of the 19th century, the industrial sector as a whole
would remain a minor sector of the economy, mostly dependent for its growth on agricultural
exports until well into the 20th century (Baer and Villela 1973). It was not until the 1920s and
1930s that a more self-sustaining process of industrialization would finally take off, and this
would be concentrated in the Southeast region around São Paulo. Much the rest of the country
would see little industrial growth until the second half of the 20th century.
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Scholars have generally attributed this lack of industrialization throughout the 19th
century to weak domestic markets for manufactured goods, a product of a slave-based
agricultural economy with a very small middle class. Other reasons often given are colonial trade
policies and high production costs for local industries that inhibited domestic manufacturing. But
while slavery and mercantilist trade policies certainly played a role during the colonial years,
they cannot explain the relative lack of industrialization through the 19th century when slavery
was in decline and trade policy became more favorable to domestic industry. Here the more
plausible explanation is the lack of sufficient domestic demand to make domestic manufacturing
feasible, and this can be explained, in large part, by the situation in agriculture.
Given the fact that the vast majority of agricultural enterprises in Brazil throughout this
period operated on the basis of self-sufficiency and limited market dependence, it greatly limited
the development of a consumer market. The sugar and coffee plantations often produced their
own food, tools, housing, and clothes, and, as we have seen, generally invested very little in
agricultural equipment or machinery. Meanwhile, the cotton and cattle farms in the interior of the
country also produced virtually all of their own tools, clothing, and housing, and would have
required very few inputs for production. The only major consumption expenditures during this
time would have come from the small class of landowners and wealthy urban traders who
generally purchased imported goods. The slaves, labor tenants, and smallholder peasants who
made up the vast majority of the population would have had very little ability to purchase
consumer or manufactured goods.
Even with the decline of slavery and the transition to a free labor force in the second half
of the 19th century, this situation would not greatly change. The condition of former slaves and
rural laborers did not improve much, as landowners still organized production in much the same
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way, providing workers with subsistence plots in exchange for their labor, and minimizing
investment. Indeed, Furtado estimates that during the second half of the 19th century per capita
income actually declined by 0.6 percent per year in the Northeast region of the country, where
almost half the population lived (1971, 163). For the country as a whole, per capita income
growth was minimal, estimated at less than 0.2 percent per year between 1870 and 1890 (Fausto
and Devoto 2005, 60). Thus, there could only have been a very marginal increase in consumption
from the rural population even after the decline of slavery.
Thus, most of the domestic manufacturing that existed in the 19th century were small
workshops engaged in the production of basic goods like soap, candles, food, yarn, and wool. Of
77 manufacturing businesses registered in Rio de Janeiro between 1808 and 1840, 56 were
classified as workshops, while only 20 were actual factories (Szmrecsányi and Lapa 1996, 282).
These would have been small operations dedicated to the production of items like hats, combs,
horseshoes, rugs, and oil. The narrow local market placed clear limits on what could be produced
domestically, both in terms of the range and volume of goods that were consumed. Economies of
scale meant that many of the locally produced industrial goods were those whose weight-to-cost
ratio made their transport from Europe more expensive than producing them locally (Dean 1969,
9). This included those whose raw materials could be locally sourced for much cheaper than
imports, such as lumber, metals, bricks, glass, leather, and cotton clothing.
In the last three decades of the 19th century, the expansion of European immigration and
growing urbanization would lead to a growing consumer market in the Southeast region. This is
one of the primary reasons for the nascent industrial growth in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo that
began in the 1870s. Whereas in 1866 there were only 9 cotton mills in the whole country, by
1875 that number had increased to 30, and ten years later in 1885 there were 48 (Stein 1957, 21).
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Of those, 33 were located in the three southeastern states of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and
Minas Gerais, and virtually all those founded between 1875 and 1885 were in these three states.
By the 1880s, there was significant industrial growth in other sectors as well, mostly
concentrated around the major cities of the Southeast. Of the roughly 13,000 industrial
enterprises surveyed in the census of 1920, over 95 percent of them had been founded in the
period after 1880, and over 55 percent of them in the southeastern states of Sao Paulo, Rio de
Janeiro, and Minas Gerais (MAIC 1927b, 37).
However, even in this context of industrial growth, the productive logic in agriculture
would continue to affect the possibilities for a more comprehensive industrialization process.
The lack of technical change and slow growth in agricultural productivity made it almost
impossible to raise per capita output faster than the rate of population growth, and thereby
increase per capita income. Indeed, this is one of the primary reasons for stagnant and declining
income in the rural areas of the country in the second half of the 19th century. Total agricultural
production simply could not keep pace with population growth due to the fact that productivity
increased at such a slow pace. This would put downward pressure on wages in both rural and
urban zones, including those of immigrant laborers entering the cities and rural areas of the
Southeast, and would contribute to the impoverishment of the laboring classes that made up the
majority of the population.
The low investment logic of landowners and lack of technical change would have also
had a major impact on the demand for capital goods from the agricultural sector. As late as 1920,
the agricultural census reported that only 15 percent of all farms in Brazil had any agricultural
instruments or machinery (MAIC 1927a, VI). Only 14 percent had plows, 7 percent possessed
some type of harrow for breaking up and smoothing the soil, while less than 2 percent had

79

planters, harvesters, or reapers. This meant there would have been little stimulus for the domestic
manufacture of capital inputs for the agricultural sector. The main goods supplied from domestic
industries to the rural population would have been simple goods like cotton clothing for workers,
bagging for transporting coffee and sugar, simple foodstuffs like tobacco and liquor, and some
basic construction materials. The rest of the capital inputs and consumption needs would have
been met either with imports or produced on the farm.
The result was that industry still played a very small role in the national economy at the
end of the 19th century. According to the 1920 census, in 1907 there were still less than 3,000
industrial enterprises across the country, with only around 150,000 total workers (MAIC 1927b,
V). This represented less than one percent of a total population of around 20 million. According
to the more general classification of the population census, around 5 percent of the population
was involved in some sort of industrial occupation, and in terms of GDP, industry made up about
10 percent of the economy (Amann et al 2018, 43). The industrial sector was dominated by light
consumer goods, with very little production of intermediate or capital goods. Of the total capital
employed in industry, 49 percent was in textiles, 30 percent in food, 9 percent in chemicals, 5
percent in construction materials, 4 percent in metallurgy, and 3 percent in clothing (MAIC
1927b, XIII).
Compared to much of the developed world at this time, this was a very lackluster
industrialization. In the United States, for example, the industrial labor force already made up
nearly 30 percent of the labor force by the end of the 19th century, and over 40 percent of the
national economy. Heavy industries and capital goods like iron, steel, and machinery were
already the largest segments of that country’s industrial sector, making up nearly a third of the
total value of production, and rapidly expanding to supply the growing transportation,
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agricultural and consumer sectors. While per capita income was stagnant and even declining
throughout much of Brazil at this time, in the United States it doubled over the last third of the
19th century, greatly expanding domestic demand for a wide range of manufactured goods.
As noted in Chapter 2, this was at least in part due to the fact that the underlying
dynamics in agriculture in the United States were quite distinct to Brazil’s at this time. Whereas
market-based land appropriation and rural property relations were driving rapid productivity
growth and rising per capita output in US agriculture in the 19th century, Brazil’s agriculture was
still dominated by non-market forms of land appropriation and rural property relations based on a
lack of market constraints. This led to productive strategies among agricultural producers that
were characterized by minimal investment in the land, and weak capital accumulation, causing
slow productivity growth and greatly limiting the possibilities for industrialization. Fundamental
differences in the organization and functioning of agriculture in each place had far reaching
consequences throughout the whole economy.
But if Brazil experienced a lackluster industrialization in the 19th century, this would not
be the case in the 20th century. Over the next fifty years, the country would undergo a major
transformation that would turn it into one of the most industrialized countries in the developing
world, and one of the largest economies on the planet. This transformation was concentrated in
the Southeast region around the state of São Paulo, and, in fact, failed to occur throughout much
the rest of the country. In the next chapter, I argue that this was due to important changes in the
rural property relations in this region and the changing production strategies among agricultural
producers.
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CHAPTER 4:
The Agrarian Roots of Economic Development in Southeast Brazil

At the end of the 19th century, Brazil was a poor, largely agrarian society on the margins
of the world economy. Though some industrial growth had begun in and around the major cities,
the majority of the population still lived in the countryside, eking out a living as labor tenants on
the large plantations along the coast or as subsistence farmers in the vast interior. Brazil’s
economy at this time was similar in size to other Latin American countries like Mexico and
Argentina, but in per capita terms it was considerably poorer, more on par with neighboring
countries like Colombia and Peru.
Over the next few decades, however, the country would undergo a truly impressive
transformation, converting itself from an agricultural backwater to an industrial powerhouse and
one of the largest economies on the planet. Over the course of the 20th century, Brazil’s economy
would grow to nearly twice the size of Mexico’s, and about three times that of Argentina. By the
end of the century, it had the second largest manufacturing sector in the Western Hemisphere,
second only to the United States, and accounted for about three-fifths of all South America’s
industrial production.
This incredible transformation was largely a product of the rapid economic and industrial
growth that concentrated around the southeastern state of São Paulo from the early 20th century.
Beginning as a simple coffee exporter dependent on the production of a single commodity, by
the 1940s São Paulo transformed itself into the largest agglomeration of manufacturing capacity
in all of Latin America. By the 1980s, the state was by itself a larger economy than any other
South American country, and in per capita terms had surpassed even the highest income
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countries in the region. Its dynamic and diversified economy was clearly the engine behind
Brazil’s transformation, accounting for over a third of the country’s GDP and more than 40
percent of all industry at the end of the 20th century. By contrast, the nine states that make up
Brazil’s Northeast region all together accounted for only about 14 percent of GDP, and 10
percent of all industry (IBGE 2019).
This raises the question of what accounts for São Paulo’s uniqueness. How do we explain
that such an important process of economic development and industrialization took place in this
region of Brazil, while in the rest of the country, and in much the rest of Latin America, it did
not? What was it that made this economy so much more conducive for development than others
in the region? And why did other primary exporting economies in the developing world,
including other coffee exporters, not experience the same kind of economic growth?
Scholars have not provided very compelling answers to these questions. The factors most
commonly cited are the social and cultural impacts of European immigration to southeast Brazil,
the high profits of the coffee economy, the entrepreneurialism of the coffee elite, and the early
transition to capitalistic labor regimes. However, these explanations cannot adequately account
for what made São Paulo so unique. Other parts of Latin America also received large waves of
immigrants, also exported coffee or other lucrative goods, and also underwent similar transitions
to wage labor around the turn of the century. Yet nowhere did it lead to such economic
dynamism.
In this chapter, I argue that a crucial factor lies in what has been described as an
“alternative agrarian economy” that developed in São Paulo in the first decades of the 20th
century (Font 2010). Made up of diversified smallholder agriculture, this alternative economy
came to dominate large regions of the state as the frontier expanded westward, and eventually
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replaced the traditional plantation economy that had long predominated in the state. I argue that a
central feature of this distinct rural economy was the emergence of unique rural property
relations in the early 20th century. These property relations led producers to adopt new
production strategies in the countryside, and this fueled the state’s development process by
spurring the growth of agricultural productivity and creating a growing internal market for
domestic manufacture. Through an analysis of archival sources from the early 20th century, I
show that important changes occurred in the countryside prior to industrialization, and these
were crucial to the larger transformation of southeast Brazil’s economy.

Explaining São Paulo’s uniqueness
São Paulo’s unique development experience and its divergence from much the rest of the
region have generated a number of important studies over the years. Many of these point to
cultural factors and the influence of European immigration as central to the state’s
transformation, while others highlight more structural factors like the coffee economy. Indeed,
central to any understanding of São Paulo in the early 20th century is the large influx of European
immigrants that began in the 19th century, and the various social changes that occurred as a
result. As slavery was slowly phased out in the second half of the 19th century, coffee planters
began searching for alternative sources of labor to work on the plantations, developing various
schemes for bringing in workers from abroad. With the state subsidizing transport costs, these
schemes eventually helped expand immigration from places like Italy, Portugal, Spain, and
Japan, and between 1880 and 1930 an estimated four million immigrants entered Brazil, with
seventy percent of them going to the state of São Paulo.
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This large influx is said to have had a number of effects that aided economic
development, such as increased urbanization, improved human capital, and various cultural
factors like entrepreneurship, work ethic, and a greater “capitalist spirit” (Deutsch 1994, 81-178).
It has often been noted, for example, that incoming Europeans had higher levels of education
than Brazilian natives, and that first or second-generation immigrants often invested in industries
and became important business owners. Thus, it has often been assumed that certain cultural
traits and entrepreneurial abilities that concentrated in the São Paulo region were a major reason
for its economic success. As French geographer Jacques Lambert described in the 1950s:
The influx of European immigrants, uprooted from their original environment and
bringing new techniques and ways of life, the development of new forms of agriculture,
the creation of large industry, the concentration of national and foreign capital, the
development of transport, all contributed to unite a large population in a vast society in
constant evolution. Southern Brazil is a new country, or at least it is becoming a new and
developed country (Lambert 1967, 102).
But while the influx of immigrants certainly had important impacts on Paulista society,
São Paulo was not the only place in Latin America to receive large waves of European
immigrants, nor even the largest recipient. Argentina, for example, is estimated to have received
even more immigrants than Brazil during the 19th and early 20th centuries, while other countries
like Uruguay and Cuba also received large contingents. Yet none of these countries would
experience anything like the economic transformation of São Paulo in the first half of the 20 th
century.
Nor is it entirely true that European immigrants would bring new forms of agriculture and
industry to Brazil. In fact, the first colonies Europeans set up in the 19th century generally failed
to prosper and had a level of poverty that surprised subsequent visitors from Europe (Furtado
1971, 136). Lacking familiarity with local conditions and with limited infrastructure and markets
for their production, the first Europeans often reverted back to a subsistence economy and ways
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of life very similar to Brazilian peasants. It was not until they began working on the large coffee
plantations that they would generally learn the agricultural techniques and methods adapted to
the local context and climate.
The argument that Europeans brought certain cultural traits more conducive to
development also seems dubious. The vast majority of the immigrants to southern Brazil in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries came from among the poorest classes of Italy, Spain, and
Portugal, countries whose low level of development at the time was often blamed on a supposed
lack of certain cultural traits. The fourth largest immigrant group to São Paulo during this time,
the Japanese, were seen by many as undesirable and culturally inferior to both Europeans and
native Brazilians. It was not until their relative economic success in the 20 th century that the
Japanese would gain a certain cultural prestige in Brazil, reversing common perceptions about
their cultural impact.
In his classic study on São Paulo’s industrialization, Warren Dean rejects the various
cultural explanations and argues that the concentration of entrepreneurial activity in São Paulo
was more the result of economic dynamism rather than its cause (Dean 1969). He points out that
immigrants from other parts of Brazil also flooded into São Paulo to participate in the coffee
boom, and many of these would become important coffee planters and industrialists. For Dean,
the real basis for industrial growth was the dynamic coffee economy, which was driven by high
prices and massive profits for coffee planters. This led to greater investment, a “more intense
operation of the market economy,” and, therefore, more capitalistic behavior among the coffee
elite (Dean 1969, 39). The adoption of free labor on the plantations was also important, as it
allowed for the wealth to trickle down to the masses and create a domestic market for industry.
Dean argued that if there was more of a “capitalist spirit” in São Paulo than in other parts of the
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country, it was due to “historical circumstances more favorable to its wider employment” (Dean
1969, 38).
A number of subsequent studies would also place the dynamic coffee economy at the
center of their explanations (Silva 1976, Cano 1990). According to these accounts, industrial
capital in São Paulo could be traced back to the capital accumulated by the large coffee planters
around the turn of the century. With historically high coffee prices, wealthy planters invested
their profits in other sectors of the economy like industry and finance, and this facilitated the
diversification and industrialization of the local economy. Coffee production in São Paulo also
had a number of key characteristics that were more conducive to industrialization, which explain
why it concentrated in this region. These included a larger internal market, “advanced
commercial agriculture,” and a greater “development of capitalist relations” (Cano 1990, 15).
Central to all of these was the greater use of wage labor on the plantations, which occurred
earlier in São Paulo than in much the rest of the country.
The evolution of the various labor systems on the coffee plantations after the end of
slavery has also been a major focus of much of the literature (Dean 1976, Halloway 1980,
Stolcke 1988, Faleiros 2010). By the late 19th century, alternative labor systems were being
utilized by coffee planters in place of slave labor, including various combinations of labor
tenancy, sharecropping, piecework, and wage labor. Upon arrival in São Paulo, immigrant
laborers, or colonos, would typically enter into labor contracts with the owners of coffee
plantations, and these usually included certain perks to attract workers such as access to
subsistence plots, housing, and a share of the profits from coffee sales. As a result, conditions
would slowly begin to improve for the colonos, and this would play an important role in the
upward mobility of much of the immigrant labor force.
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Scholars have often linked these improved working conditions to larger processes of
economic development and industrial growth in São Paulo. With access to subsistence plots in
addition to their wages, plantation workers increasingly participated in cash crop production and
market sales, and this afforded them greater purchasing power and possibilities for consumption.
This is said to have stimulated the economic diversification of small towns and cities throughout
the countryside and generated a process of urbanization and the creation of an urban middle class
as coffee workers abandoned the plantations to set up businesses in the growing cities (Dean
1976, 161-162, 197). In other words, the dynamic coffee economy not only generated increased
investment from the top down, but also created consumer markets and a growing middle class
from the bottom up.
However, while there is little doubt about the dynamism of São Paulo’s early coffee
economy and the upward mobility of its largely immigrant labor force, questions remain about
what exactly the source of this dynamism was. After all, São Paulo was not the only coffee
exporter in Latin America, nor was it the only place where agricultural exports had been highly
lucrative. If high prices and windfall profits were enough to stimulate investment and generate
the diversification of the local economy, why had this not occurred in other places during similar
commodity booms? Other countries like Colombia, Venezuela, and Costa Rica also exported
coffee at this time, while Argentina and Brazilian Amazon were also experiencing major export
booms around the turn of the century. In virtually all of these cases, local elites invested much of
their profits in a range of economic activities, including industry and finance. Yet, seldom did it
lead to major processes of industrialization.
And while São Paulo may have been one of the first places to transition to more
capitalistic labor regimes, it was certainly not the only place to do so around this time.
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Throughout Latin America there was a “long-run trend towards proletarianization in the rural
sector since the mid-nineteenth century” (Duncan and Rutledge 1977, 12). And this included
other coffee economies like Colombia and Costa Rica who were utilizing various forms of wage
labor and labor tenancy in their coffee sectors by the end of the 19th century (Duncan and
Rutledge 1977, 165-202, 269-298). Similar kinds of transitions would also occur throughout the
rest of Latin America over the next half century, but rarely did it involve the kind of social
mobility or growth of internal markets that are said to have fueled industrialization in São Paulo.
In other words, it would seem that the factors often emphasized in the literature are not
entirely adequate to explain what made São Paulo so unique. Key elements like European
immigration, a lucrative export sector, or the transition to wage labor do not greatly differentiate
São Paulo from other parts of Latin America, nor would it seem that these alone could account
for such a sharp divergence in terms of economic development. While the dynamism of the early
coffee economy and the upward mobility of coffee workers certainly were important factors in
the state’s transformation, we still must account for what the underlying causes were for such
dynamism, and why it was unique to this one region of Latin America.
One important factor that may account for this difference is the development of
smallholder agriculture throughout large parts of São Paulo. Although it has often been
overlooked, this is something that has rarely occurred in other parts of Latin America and would
seem to set São Paulo apart from much the rest of the region. As millions of immigrants flooded
into southeast Brazil around the turn of the century, and the agriculture frontier continually
moved westward, there were important shifts in how land was allocated, and, therefore, how
agriculture came to be organized in this part of the country. Instead of being dominated by large
plantations and extensive cattle farms under the control of traditional landlords, much of western
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São Paulo and the surrounding states soon came to be dominated by independent smallholder
agriculture and dynamic land markets. This led to the emergence of what Mauricio Font (2010)
has called an “alternative agrarian economy” of small and medium family farms, which soon
replaced the traditional plantation system of the early coffee economy.
Various scholars have noted this important development in western São Paulo in the early
1900s (Milliet 1941, Holloway 1980, Monbeig 1984). But it was Font who first placed it at the
center of his account of São Paulo’s transformation. Font (1990, 2010) challenged earlier
accounts by arguing that what fueled industrialization was not the dynamism of the traditional
coffee economy or investment from the coffee elite, but rather the growth and prosperity of the
parallel economy of smallholder farmers that was emerging around the turn of the century.
According to him, it is to this sector that we can attribute much of the demand for manufactured
goods in the early 20th century, much of the production of raw materials for early industries, and
even much of the capital invested in new businesses (Font 2010, 89-121). And the timing and
character of industrial growth would appear to be more closely related to the expansion of this
“alternative agrarian economy” than the traditional plantation sector.
This argument is compelling, and it would seem to explain at least part of what was so
unique about São Paulo. The development of a large smallholder class of this type can better
account for the upward mobility of the immigrant labor force and the growth of a large internal
market for manufacturing. It can also help account for what made the coffee economy so much
more dynamic than other coffee exporters in the region, as smallholder farmers made up a
significant portion of total coffee production by the 1920s. As the 20th century progressed, this
sector continually expanded throughout São Paulo and into the surrounding states, providing a
constant source of growth and dynamism for the regional economy.

90

The smallholder economy may be an important part of the puzzle, but there still remain a
number of questions to be addressed. Central among them is how and why this distinct rural
economy emerged, and why it was so different from smallholder agriculture in other parts of
Latin America. In most Latin American countries, peasant agriculture and small family farms
occupy only a small portion of the total land area and are usually characterized by lowproductivity subsistence production. Even in regions where smallholders are more predominant,
such as the Andean regions of Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Colombia, they have seldom exhibited
the dynamism of São Paulo’s family farms, nor have they been able to expand and supplant the
more dominant plantation agriculture that surrounds them.1 In other words, it must be further
explained not only how this kind of alternative agrarian economy developed in São Paulo, but
also why it was so much more dynamic than smallholder agriculture in other parts of Latin
America.
In what follows, I argue that this key difference can be explained by the distinct
relationship to the land that developed in São Paulo’s agriculture from the early 20th century.
Unlike much the rest of Latin America, São Paulo’s rural economy came to be governed by
market processes and forms of land appropriation very similar to those that occurred in the
developed countries prior to their economic transformations. This included dynamic land
markets and widespread purchases of land on credit that created new property relations among
rural producers and forced landowners to adopt production strategies that maximized the output
and productivity of their landholdings. I argue that this was a central factor in the dynamism of
São Paulo’s economy in the early 20th century and would help fuel the transformation of its
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One exception is the pampas region of Argentina, which saw the development of a significant
segment of family farms in the early 20th century under circumstances similar to São Paulo.
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coffee economy away from the traditional plantation economy predominant throughout much the
rest of Latin America.

The early coffee economy
At the end of the 19th century, São Paulo’s large coffee plantations were fairly similar to
large plantations throughout much the rest of Latin America. Having transitioned away from
slavery to a free labor force during the second half of the century, these estates still functioned in
much the same way as before abolition. Laborers generally lived in former slaves’ quarters or
housing on the plantations and were afforded plots of land to produce their subsistence. The
plantations continued to be fairly self-sufficient, using large areas of land to raise draft animals,
to grow cotton for clothing and sugar for rum, and forest for fuel and construction materials.
Meanwhile, little was done to maintain the productivity of the land, such as fertilizing, hoeing, or
pruning the coffee trees, and land was often left abandoned when the soil was exhausted as the
coffee planters continually moved onto new land (Dean 1969, 24-49).
Government reports from the 1890s note this low-intensity, low-productivity nature of
production. State officials frequently pointed to the “carelessness in the treatment of coffee
groves” on most plantations, and the “unscrupulous selection of [coffee] varieties” and seeds. 2
The land was used to grow crops year after year “without receiving one atom of manure,” and
rudimentary methods and tools “give very low yields in comparison to those used in the United
States or Europe.”3 One report in 1893 assured the state’s agriculture was “in exactly the same
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Estação Agronômica de Campinas, Annual report, 1890, 35
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Instituto Agronômico do Estado de São Paulo em Campinas (Hereafter cited as IAESPC),
Annual report, 1892, 206-207
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conditions as before the abolition of slavery,” while another warned that if São Paulo did not
adopt intensive production and remained “with the extensive system of agriculture, our state will
be as poor as [less developed states like] Paraná or Santa Catarina.” 4
Yet it was essentially this type of agriculture that still characterized São Paulo’s
expanding frontier around the turn of the century. The booming coffee economy caused a rapid
expansion of coffee plantations into the interior of the state in the second half of the 19th century.
But the forms of land appropriation continued to be fairly similar to much the rest of the country.
Initially, much of the land in São Paulo was granted as sesmarias to wealthy and powerful
entrepreneurs, while large areas were also claimed through posse by influential landowners
(Dean 1969, 11). These were then divided up and sold off as demand for land on the frontier
increased. Merchants and land speculators from the city also got involved in acquiring title to
frontier land and then selling it to those looking to establish new plantations (Dean 1969, 14-15).
Though land was increasingly purchased on the market as the coffee frontier moved
inland, it did not produce major changes to the rural property relations. Without long-term credit
or the ability to use land as a source of collateral, most land purchases were cash transactions
without financing or mortgages (Dean 1969, 11). This meant that wealthy urban elites and large
coffee planters were still the dominant players in frontier expansion, and they maintained a
relationship to the land that did not depend on maximizing its productivity. Their wealth and
income from other economic activities in the cities, and their possession of numerous
landholdings around the state shielded them from the need to invest in improvements or increase
output and allowed them to abandon less fertile areas and leave land idle when market conditions
were not ideal.
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IEASPC, 1892, 206-207; IEASPC, 1893, 271
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One prominent coffee planter in the 1870s lamented the “extreme love of uncultivated
lands” among large landowners in the Riberão Preto area (Levi 1974, 166). According to him,
they “own[ed] thousands of alqueires” of prime coffee-growing land,5 but only used it for
extensive activities like cattle grazing and hunting (Levi 1974, 166). By the 1890s, state officials
noted that still less than half the land suited for coffee cultivation in São Paulo was actually
being utilized, and the reason was that there were still “vast landholdings bought in part as
objects of speculation, in part as reserves for the future.”6 There were also many old plantations
that had been abandoned despite not being “in any way in conditions for being abandoned.” If
these farms were “turned over to intensive farming, [they could see their value] rapidly increase
and will be much more valuable than land in the newer areas because they are closer to the sea.” 7
State officials understood that this kind of extensive land use was due to a certain
relationship between landowners and their land. As one agricultural report stated in 1892:
In São Paulo there are many people who call themselves planters, but never work
anything related to planting…. [they are] mere owner[s] of plantations and spend the
income from them… [but] not having any interest in agriculture, [they] live with their
whole family far from their farms and dedicate themselves to politics and sterile things. 8
Not depending on output from their agricultural holdings, plantation owners often did not invest
much of their profits back into agriculture, or even utilize their land effectively, instead investing
in urban businesses and other economic activities.
In many respects, this was fairly similar to other parts of Brazil at this time. Much like
sugar or cotton production in the northern states and along the coast, production growth in São
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The alqueire was a traditional unit of measurement in Brazil. Its exact area varied from one
region to the next, but in São Paulo was generally equivalent to about 2.4 hectares.
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Paulo was extensive rather than intensive, depending on bringing ever greater amounts of land
under production rather than increasing the productivity of existing plantations. When
productivity gains did occur on the plantations, they were largely due to increased yields from
moving onto more fertile lands on the frontier, and only occasionally due to improved
technology or methods in agriculture (Nichols 1970, 324; Dean 1969, 30-49). In other words,
had this plantation system remained intact, São Paulo’s economic evolution may have looked
fairly similar to other parts of Brazil where plantation systems predominated, or to other coffee
exporters in Latin America, where productivity growth was slow and little economic
diversification would occur for much of the 20th century.
But this plantation system did not remain intact, and important changes were already
underway by the turn of the century. A couple key factors that were catalysts for change were the
vast amount of unoccupied land beyond the frontier, and the continuous labor needs of the
expanding coffee economy. As the coffee plantations continually expanded into new areas of the
state in the late 19th century, this generated a continual need for more laborers to work the coffee
fields and led planters to seek immigrant labor to meet their needs. Meanwhile, the abundance of
land on the frontier caused millions of people who were fleeing from Europe, Japan, and other
parts of Brazil at this time to head to São Paulo in hope of acquiring land of their own. This
combination of factors set in motion a chain of events that would eventually transform much of
São Paulo’s countryside.

Immigrant labor
Both coffee planters and the state had their own reasons to promote immigration into São
Paulo. For the planters, it was all about labor. With the decline of the slave trade and the
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expansion of coffee plantations throughout the state, labor shortages were a chronic problem that
needed to be addressed. 9 For the state, on the other hand, it was viewed to be in its interests to
settle the vast interior of the country with European smallholders, as they were seen as more
productive than large plantations and could produce a variety of basic food crops that would
reduce dependence on imports. 10 However, state officials also recognized the urgency of
supplying the plantations with enough labor to keep production costs down and avoid negatively
impacting the dominant sector of the economy. 11
This led to a number of efforts by planters and state authorities to attract European
immigrants to São Paulo in the second half of the 19th century. The first efforts were undertaken
by individual planters in the 1850s, but largely failed when the immigrants fled the low wages
and slave-like working conditions.12 In the 1870s, the state began setting up settler “colonies”
which provided small plots of land to European and Brazilian farmers who would serve as
seasonal labor for the plantations.13 But the major influx of immigrants into São Paulo did not
really occur until the state began directly facilitating and organizing transportation from Europe.
With transport costs subsidized or paid in full by the state, tens of thousands of immigrants from
Italy, Spain, and Portugal began flooding into São Paulo in the 1880s (see Figure IX).
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Though there is some debate about the real extent of labor shortages, reports from the ministry
of agriculture from the 1890s until the 1920s repeatedly discuss the problem and how it might be
overcome.
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Figure IX: Total Immigrants into São Paulo, 1885-1929
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With the continual spread of coffee plantations across the state, it would be a challenge to
maintain enough immigration to meet the planters’ needs. Poor working conditions on the coffee
plantations had led some European governments to prohibit emigration to Brazil, while negative
reports back in Europe were affecting the state’s ability to maintain the flow of immigrants. In
1898, immigration into São Paulo suddenly declined, and was soon surpassed by the number of
emigrants leaving the state (Figure IX). In 1900, total emigrants out of São Paulo exceeded the
number of immigrants entering, and this occurred again in 1903 and 1904, creating a net outflow
of labor in those years. Many of these workers were heading on to Uruguay or Argentina in
hopes of finding better working conditions, while others were returning to their home countries.
State officials viewed the resulting labor shortages as “extremely grave” for the local
economy and insisted they could not be solved if “the conditions of our coffee industry do not
improve”.14 As a result, various efforts were made to ameliorate working conditions on the
plantations and to protect colonos from common abuses. In 1906, the state created the Agencia
Official de Colonização e Trabalho with the purpose of resolving disputes with planters and
protecting workers from unfair labor contracts. 15 Then, in 1912, the Patronato Agricola was
created, which had the explicit task of mediating in labor disputes and serving as arbiter on the
plantations.16 These efforts managed to guarantee a certain minimum standard for labor contracts
in agriculture, and gave workers an avenue for directing complaints against powerful landlords.
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Authorities also recognized that the primary reason most immigrants came to São Paulo
was to find land of their own, and if they could not do so they would likely go elsewhere after
finishing their labor contracts. As one official wrote in 1895:
Directing the flow of immigrants almost exclusively to the large plantations, as has been
the practice up to now, does not satisfy the need for colonization of our land, and the
colono that is placed on large agricultural properties, with no hope of someday becoming
a landowner…. continues to cast his gaze back on his homeland where he may be able to
acquire a piece of land with the fruits of his labor among us.17
This was recognized to be a major reason for the large outflow of laborers in first decade of the
20th century, and the primary cause of continual labor shortages. As the minister of agriculture
stated in 1904:
…the coffee planter is constantly searching for laborers to replace those who, after a few
years, having finished the last harvest and calculated their gains, go off in search of
realizing the most natural and just aspiration of a rural worker: to possess, for himself and
his family, a place where the plowing and sowing are for only his own benefit. 18
This made it necessary that “the possession of land be within reach of the colonos,” and
various ideas were explored to accomplish this, including renting out plots on the plantations,
and improving salaries to keep laborers from leaving.19 Officials also discussed offering land
concessions to private companies, including the railroad companies, so that they could divide up
and sell off plots along the sides of the railroads as they expanded out onto the frontier. 20 Two
years later, officials again insisted that the labor shortages would only be solved when
immigrants could access land:

17

SAESP, 1895, 35

18

SAESP, 1904, 133-134

19

SAESP, 1904, 134

20

SAESP, 1904, 112, 134
99

The problem will persist… as long as the service of settling the colono, by providing him
the ease to acquire land in a situation and in conditions in which it is directly cultivated
by him, does not reach the necessary development. 21
However, the eventual solution to this problem did not come from state efforts to
distribute land.22 Rather, it would arise out of the struggle by coffee workers for improved
working conditions on the plantations. Constant labor shortages and frequent strikes throughout
this period allowed workers to negotiate ever-improved conditions on the plantations, such as
higher wages and the right to grow cash crops between the coffee trees. 23 Meanwhile, state
organs like the Agencia Official de Colonização e Trabalho were helping assure that these gains
were respected by planters, and that the labor contracts signed by workers were enforced. This
resulted in ever-increasing income for coffee workers in the first decades of the 20th century,
allowing them to save up money, and, eventually, purchase land of their own.
By the second decade of the 20th century, waves of immigrant laborers were now moving
off the plantations to acquire land of their own on the frontier. At the same time, new waves of
immigrants were continually arriving from Europe and Japan to take their place on the
plantations. As a French geographer noted at the time:
The end of the harvest results in a general relocation of the agricultural workers. The
colonos are truly nomadic... It is no exaggeration to say that a third of all families
employed in coffee cultivation move [off the plantations] each year…(Denis 1909, cited
in Silva 1976, 54).
This left the plantations constantly plagued by labor shortages, as workers continually headed off
to frontier zones to become independent farmers. As the agricultural minister noted in 1917:
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The old coffee groves suffer from labor shortages because the colonos, getting good
results from their labor, go off in search of new areas where they establish themselves
with small flourishing farms.24
The minister noted that this was largely because workers had “earned a lot in recent years
with the cultivation of grains, cotton, tobacco, and beans.” Indeed, the freedom to plant other
crops on plantation land was a major source of income for coffee workers, a benefit that came as
part of the improved labor contracts in the first decades of the 20th century. By planting not only
subsistence crops on their own plots, but also cash crops between the coffee trees, they could
now supplement their wages by selling their production in nearby markets and towns.
In other words, the continual improvement in working conditions on the plantations was
what eventually led many immigrant laborers in São Paulo to be able to afford land of their own.
Constant labor shortages and the need to maintain the flow of immigration into São Paulo forced
planters and the state to accede to workers’ demands for better wages and other benefits like cash
crop production, and this allowed many workers to save up enough money to purchase their own
land. The result was a continuous cycle of immigrant laborers entering São Paulo, working on
the plantations for a period of years, and then heading off to become independent farmers on the
frontier. This created a new dynamic of land appropriation on the frontier, and new rural
property relations emerged among this growing class of farmers.

New rural property relations
By the second decade of the 20th century, smallholder agriculture had begun to take hold
throughout much of western São Paulo. While in the first decade of the century many colonos
were unable to obtain land, often leaving in search of it elsewhere, by the second decade land
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was being widely purchased in frontier zones by immigrant laborers, and the number of
immigrants leaving the state declined significantly (See Figure VIII). By 1923, data from the
agricultural ministry showed that foreigners—mostly Italians, but also Portuguese, Spanish and
Germans—now owned nearly 30 percent of all the coffee groves in the state, and that in many
western zones a majority of the coffee-groves were foreign-owned. Of the 158 municipalities
listed, there were 29, mostly in frontier zones, in which foreigners now owned 50 percent or
more of all coffee groves. Of the more than 32,000 coffee farms recorded that year, more than
13,000 belonged to foreigners.25
In other words, European immigrants were gaining widespread access to land on the
frontier by this time, and they were not the only ones. Growing contingents of Japanese and
Brazilian immigrants from other parts of the country were also heading into São Paulo in search
of land and other opportunities (See Figure VIII). The Japanese and native Brazilians would join
the waves of coffee workers working on the plantations for a number of years and then move off
to settle the more remote regions of the state. And as laborers continually headed to frontier
zones, the state was forced to continue promoting immigration from abroad to replace them. As
the agricultural minister noted in 1920:
It is through our coffee plantations that our state has been colonized, now extending to
the most remote areas, where only a few years ago all that existed were unpopulated
backlands. To replace the workers that leave the plantations to establish themselves on
their own, the state must permanently maintain subsidized immigration.26
This continual flow of immigrant and Brazilian laborers into frontier zones in search of
land created a new dynamic of land appropriation throughout much of São Paulo. Growing
demand meant that agricultural land began to be treated as a valuable commodity that could be
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sold for increasingly high prices. As early as 1905 there are numerous reports of large
landowners looking to sell their land to the state for use in colonization schemes. 27 Many
landowners were beginning to “foresee the good results” that could be obtained by dividing up
their land into small plots and selling it off: “There is now some interest growing on the part of
landowners for the colonization of their land under the same conditions and with the same
advantages offered by the government in the [state-sponsored] colonies.”28
Land prices on these colonization schemes give an idea of how land was becoming
valorized from the early 1900s. Whereas in 1901 and 1902 much of the land in rural and frontier
zones was valued at only 10 to 20 mil-réis per hectare, by 1905 plots were being offered to
settlers for between 70 and 100 mil-réis per hectare.29 In one case, 2,000 alqueires (4,800
hectares) of public lands in the frontier region of Ibitinga was valued at only 4 mil-réis per
hectare in 1901.30 Yet, by 1906 a private landowner in the same region was selling 2,500
alqueires (6,000 hectares) for about 33 mil-réis per hectare.31 In 1908, private owners working
with the state to divide up and sell their land were asking between 100 and 120 mil-réis per
hectare.32
By the end of the decade, it was reported that a “fantastic jump” in land prices had
occurred on the coffee frontier. According to one observer, “the increase in the price of land
surpassed every other measure... Outside of the terra roxa, the most fertile and desired land, the
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prices were lower but they were still ten times higher than in other parts of southern Brazil”
(Denis 1909, cited in Silva 1976, 72). In the coffee zone of Rio Claro, the average value of land
had reached 219 mil-réis per hectare by the 1920’s (Font 2010, 22). This was no longer a frontier
zone, yet many smallholders were acquiring lots here at this time. There was also a market
developing in the resale of plots on the state-sponsored colonies. Settlers who had initially
purchased the 20 to 30-hectare plots from the state for 50 to 75 mil-réis per hectare were by 1925
reselling them together with all improvements for 1,500 to 5,000 mil-réis per hectare.33
This immense valorization and commodification of land made it increasingly profitable
for landowners and other private interests to get involved in the colonization business. Not only
did many large landowners begin dividing up their land for sale to small farmers, but a number
of private colonization companies would also get involved purchasing large tracts of land along
the expanding railway network and selling them off in small plots. One of the first of these
companies was the San Paulo Land & Lumber Company, a company owned by British and
Brazilian investors that bought 15,600 hectares of frontier land in 1912 near the western town of
Baurú. The land was located along the Noroeste railroad line that had recently been extended out
toward the neighboring state of Mato Grosso (Monbeig 1984, 202). By 1922, local newspapers
were reporting that the company had sold more than 2,000 plots of land to immigrants from
Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, and Austria (Ramos and Martins 1961, 59).
In the years that followed, dozens of other Brazilian and foreign-owned companies began
doing the same throughout western São Paulo. By 1915, a number of Japanese firms got
involved in transporting families from Japan and selling plots of land to them in the southwestern
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part of the state.34 The various private railroads branching out throughout the state by this time
also got involved in selling off land to colonists along their growing rail networks. This process
would continue for much the rest of the 20th century as the frontier expanded out beyond São
Paulo’s borders.
The rural property relations that developed out of this process were fundamentally
distinct from those that had characterized the earlier plantation economy. While for much of the
19th century frontier land had been appropriated through various non-market mechanisms and the
informal dealings of powerful landowners, by the first decades of the 20th century it was
increasingly acquired through the market sale of individual plots to small farmers. Land
purchases on the various colonization schemes were typically done through mortgages, paid in
annual installments over a period of five or ten years.35 And plots were increasingly sold at
market prices, taking into account location, resources, and land quality.
This created a new relationship between landowners and the land throughout much of
western São Paulo. While in the earlier plantation economy many coffee planters and cattle
ranchers were under little pressure to invest in improvements or maximize the output of their
land, this new class of landowners on the frontier was under considerable pressure to do so.
Having paid market prices for their land, mortgaged over a number of years, and with few other
sources of income to rely on, these farmers were compelled to produce a certain level of
income from their land in order to make the mortgage payments and keep possession of it. While
the earlier large landowners and subsistence farmers could prioritize self-sufficiency and
minimize risk by diversifying production or relying on other sources of income, the new
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smallholder farmers would have to specialize production for the market and maximize the
productivity of their land.
By the 1910s, we begin to see descriptions of small farmers throughout much of western
São Paulo engaging in this kind of intensive agriculture. Though government reports do not offer
many details of this change, local descriptions from frontier zones repeatedly praise the more
productive cultivation and improved use of the land of the newly arrived smallholders. In 1915,
one new immigrant farm near the frontier town of Araraquara is described as “follow[ing] an
intensive and logically rational system in the truest sense” (Silveira 1915, 199). The cultivation
of various fruits and vegetables was “a true example of hard work and good taste,” with all plant
varieties being “carefully selected and studied” so that “only those with the best result” are used.
The “most modern instruments and methods” were employed on the farm with “rigorous
diligence and maximum care” (Silveira 1915, 199).
This contrasts greatly with many of the larger plantations described in this same region
around this same time. Most of these were older coffee plantations with anywhere from 500 to
1500 hectares, yet typically only using about half of their land area (Silveira 1915, 210-275).
Despite being located on some of the best terras roxas, these farms only planted a small portion
to crops, leaving the rest under extensive cattle grazing or completely idle. A 1904 report from
the nearby town of São Manuel lamented the “tremendous crisis” of the region’s agriculture due
to a lack of investment and poor farming techniques (Oliveira 1904, 179). The author called for a
“complete transformation” of how agricultural work was organized, including greater “initiative”
from planters, and the use of mechanization, fertilizers, and improved planting techniques
(Oliveira 1904, 180-183). Although the region enjoyed “extremely fertile land,” planters could
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not compete with farmers from the “old continent” who produced more cheaply and extracted
more output from their “old tired land” (Oliveira 1904, 182).
By the 1920s, the situation had changed considerably. In this same region there were now
“numerous small farms” in “promising and invidious conditions” (Caldeira 1928a, 209).
According to one observer, “the secret of the wealth of São Manuel” was to be found in the
“hundreds of small properties belonging to hard working, dedicated men, willing to make any
sacrifice...” (Caldeira 1928a, 209). Small immigrant farms now made up a significant portion of
all agricultural properties along the western frontier. In Araraquara, more than half of all the
farms now belonged to foreigners, and 33 percent of all the coffee trees were immigrant
owned.36 Further out on the frontier, in places like Taquaritinga and Santa Adelia, immigrants
now owned 60 to 70 percent of the coffee trees.37 It was from “these small farms [that] come the
best farmers” given their “willingness to use the best methods” and “all the modern processes of
fertilization” with “modern agricultural machinery” (Caldeira 1928a, 248, 252, 278). Unlike just
twenty years before, there were now “from all parts…demonstrations of the desire to carry out
innovations” (Caldeira 1928a, 205).
Similar observations were made throughout much the rest of western São Paulo. In
nearby Piratininga, there were now “innumerable properties that are relatively small, but of high
value once taken into account the superiority of their cultivation” (Caldeira 1928b, 202). These
new farmers were “conscious of the advantages of good equipment so that the product reaches
the desired level of perfection” (Caldeira 1928b, 109). And despite their small size, they used
“all the modern improvements” and made “important innovations” like “reducing the space
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generally used between coffee trees”, “employing plows, harrows, and other agricultural
implements” and building waterproof rain shelters for drying coffee beans (Caldeira 1928b, 109).
Though the smallest farmers often did not have the resources to adopt the latest technology, it
was noted that they used “fertilizers and other resources… to restore the tired soils” that hurt the
productivity of the old coffee plantations (Caldeira 1928b, 139).
This new class of farmers was also adopting production strategies that were quite distinct
from the old coffee elite. Whereas the older plantations had long used their land for various types
of production, and for many internal needs like pasture for work animals, forests for lumber, and
subsistence plots for food and clothing, most small and medium-sized farms were now
increasingly specializing their production for sale on the market and maximizing the output of
every last inch of their landholdings. The practice of leaving large areas of land unused or as
pasture and forest began to disappear as the frontier moved westward and a new class of
landowners took hold.
In 1928, a number of small farms are described as “specialized in coffee planting,” or
“almost exclusively dedicated to coffee cultivation” (Caldeira 1928b, 176; 1928a, 252). Though
many small farmers still maintained subsistence plots and areas of pasture for work animals, this
was kept to a minimum “for the natural reason of not wanting to occupy high quality land…with
things other than the planting of coffee” (Caldeira 1928a, 211). Smallholders were seen as
“seeking to economize as much as possible [their] excellent land…” and were observed “totally
cut[ting] down all the trees,” and only “reserv[ing] three alqueires for pasture” (Caldeira 1928b,
140). Some farms did “not have even a square foot that is not covered with excellent crops,” as
they “know how to take advantage of the totality of their land” (Caldeira 1928a, 264).
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The more intensive cultivation and improved methods of the small farms translated to
significantly higher productivity than the old plantation economy. In 1923, the agricultural
minister reported that yields on the state-sponsored colonies were about double that of the state
average that year.38 Areas that were a short time ago virtually “uncultivated and abandoned” had
been transformed into “gardens of coffee trees,” and by 1930 were “true centers of progress and
wealth.”39 The agricultural minister assured that it was their division into small plots that created
thousands of new landowners, and, with them, the wealth of these new towns. The large
landowners that had left these areas uncultivated did not seem to understand that “land left
uncultivated is dead capital,” and that the “smallholders are what generate wealth the fastest”. 40
The 1934 agricultural census allows for some basic comparisons between immigrant
smallholders and the more traditional landowners. As can be seen in Table II, smallholders in
general utilized their land much more effectively than larger farmers. Moreover, immigrants
generally cultivated a higher percentage of their total land area than their Brazilian counterparts.
Yields were considerably higher among immigrant smallholders with the exception of coffee,
where large producers still had superior yields. This was likely due to the fact that newer coffee
trees are less productive for the first five years, and immigrant farms would have had a larger
percentage of new trees. Perhaps most noteworthy is the fact that immigrant smallholder farms
were much more valuable than larger farms per unit of land area, and about twice as valuable as
the small farms of their Brazilian counterparts. This indicates that the new class of smallholders
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Table II: Immigrant and Brazilian farms by farm size in 1934
10 –
25 –
50 –
(hectares)
<5
5 – 10
25
50
200
Percent of farms
Brazilian
77
64
62
67
73
Immigrant
23
36
37
32
27

200 –
500

>500

All
farms

79
20

79
19

70
30

Percent of land area cultivated
Brazilians
52
30
Immigrants
61
48
All Farms
54
37

20
40
29

15
30
21

15
23
17

14
15
14

5
3
5

14
22
16

Per unit farm value (mil reis)
Brazilians
1222
716
Immigrants
2781
1236
All farms
1643
927

655
1151
840

604
1019
738

647
868
706

653
670
957

421
323
398

583
811
645

Coffee yields (arrobas /
alquiere)
Brazilians
69
Immigrants
85
All farms
76

85
101
95

93
106
100

104
101
103

113
108
112

119
111
117

103
101
102

Cotton yields (arrobas / alquiere)
Brazilians
148
149
Immigrants
164
157
All farms
152
153

148
158
153

146
152
149

158
157
158

159
158
159

151
149
150

151
158
153

Rice yields (sacks / alquiere)
Brazilians
58
53
Immigrants
67
62
All farms
61
58

52
68
60

54
59
56

55
58
56

54
62
55

56
44
52

55
62
57

74
90
84

Source: 1934 agricultural census, Estado de São Paulo (1936)

was investing considerably more capital per unit of land area into improvements and
infrastructure, a major factor in explaining their greater output.
This higher productivity in newly settled areas has often been seen as a product of the
higher fertility of land in western São Paulo, or cultural factors related to European immigration.
But it was more likely due to the new rural property relations that were taking hold across the
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frontier. After all, many large plantations also occupied areas of terras roxas, but did not exhibit
the same levels of productivity. And the statistics show that the largest immigrant-owned farms
were actually less productive than their Brazilian counterparts (see Table II), thus weakening
arguments about immigrants’ supposed cultural superiority. Indeed, many of the immigrants
acquiring land on the frontier by this time were from various non-European countries like Japan,
or from other parts of Brazil. The key difference was more likely that these new farmers had a
distinct relationship to the land, a product of the new market forms of land acquisition that
pushed them to maximize the productivity of their holdings.
Indeed, various first-hand descriptions note that the new farmers had “all of their
attention turned toward farming” and directed “all of their resources to obtaining the maximum
result…” (Caldeira 1928b, 178; 1928a, 170). The majority were “humble foreigners, coming
here with scarce resources,” and had “no other concern above that of their farming” (Caldeira
1928b, 128, 1928a, 232). This meant that they had to “throw themselves into the whirlwind of
agrarian life, expending energy and investing resources…” (Caldeira 1928a, 232; 1928b, 189). In
many cases, this led to “definitive and irremediable failure” when their crops did not prosper,
while others managed “through hard work and effort to triumph in the arduous struggle of
existence” (Caldeira 1928b, 189, 128).
By the 1930s, it was clear that large areas of São Paulo had been converted into dynamic
centers of smallholder agriculture. In 1935, one journalist took a trip through some of the
remotest areas of the state and reported a “titanic dynamism” in the small towns along the
frontier (Vilas Boas 1937, 4). “All the activity… including its good health and economic
development is due to the thousands of small landowners,” he wrote from one small town near
the border with Paraná (Vilas Boas 1937, 59). “[T]he difference is notable from the regions of
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large latifundio [estates],” where economic collapse “always results from a crisis in a specific
product” (Vilas Boas 1937, 60). Here, on the other hand, there was “an extreme will to organize,
plant, and cultivate,” and the production of a variety of crops like coffee, cotton and rice meant
that “the municipalities that have these small landowners... do not have the risk of a cataclysm in
one product” (Villas Boas 1937, 48, 124).
Indeed, many of the older regions of the state at this time were suffering from the coffee
crisis of 1929. A massive fall in world prices that year caused a deep crisis in the state’s coffee
sector, causing many large plantations to declare bankruptcy or paralyze production. The value
of São Paulo’s coffee exports declined by over 50 percent between 1929 and 1932, and prices
would remain low for several years to come (Holloway 1980, 176-177). Yet, while hundreds of
large plantations in the center of the state were closing down or being abandoned, in the frontier
zones there were thousands of small farms “all in notable progress,” and “exploited by small
farmers that after some years see their lands valorized and enriched from their hard work” (Vilas
Boas 1937, 46). Unlike the traditional plantation owners who could abandon coffee production
when prices were low and rely on other sources of income, these farmers were “preoccupied
[only] with coffee cultivation, in whose success lies all of their hope,” and had “no other concern
but the evolution and progress of [their] farm[s]” (Caldeira 1928b, 188,1928a, 302).
This flourishing new economy of smallholder agriculture would soon spill over São
Paulo’s borders into the surrounding region as well. By the early 1930s, the railroad networks
extending out from São Paulo were penetrating vast areas to the south and the west, and as the
railroads opened access to new areas, masses of small farmers “marched alongside…clearing
new farms, and cultivating the land” (Vilas Boas 1937, 22). Companies like the Companhia de
Terras Norte do Paraná and Companhia Viação São Paulo-Mato Grosso carried the
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colonization activities into the bordering states of Paraná and Mato Grosso, transforming large
areas of these states into flourishing centers of smallholder agriculture.
The march would also turn back toward the old plantation zones in the center of the state
as well. As plantations were abandoned or left idle due to the coffee crisis and the exhaustion of
their soil, private landowners and colonization companies began buying up old plantations in the
more traditional coffee zones, subdividing them into small plots, and selling them off to
smallholders. One of these companies known as the Companhia de Agricultura, Imigração e
Colonização sold some 150,000 hectares between 1928 and 1943 to a total of 3,715 small
farmers.41 Most of the land was in the central region of the state, acquired through the purchase
of dozens of large plantations from the traditional coffee elite.
In other words, this new kind of agriculture was rapidly expanding throughout much of
southern Brazil, and this would continue through much the rest of the 20th century. In the state of
São Paulo, immigrant farms increased considerably in both number and land area between 1920
and 1940 (Table III). While in 1920 immigrant farms had made up 29 percent of all farms in the
state and only 16 percent of the land, by 1940 they made up 32 percent of all farms and occupied
27 percent of the land. Small farms in general also made major gains, increasing from 74 to 88
percent of all farms, and from 15 to 28 percent of the land area. This occurred at the same time
that larger farms declined in importance, with the largest farms declining by 14 percent of their
land area, while small and medium farms rapidly increased their land area.

41

Arquivo Público do Estado de São Paulo, Secretaría da Agricultura, Codasp 002, 129-173
113

Table III: Landholdings in the state of São Paulo, 1920 to 1940
Farms

1920

1940

% change

Number
54245
22065

%
71
29

Area
9824482
1914458

%
84
16

Number
136256
64969

%
68
32

Area
9543629
3462656

%
73
27

Number
151
194

Area
-3
45

<100 ha

59600

74

2113707

15

222533

88

5191288

28

273

59

100-200 ha

9345

12

1344614

10

14848

6

2114048

11

59

36

200-1000 ha
1000-5000 ha

9977
1808

12
2

4199564
3555604

30
26

12855
2015

5
.8

5176954
3807738

28
20

29
11

19
7

>5000 ha

191

.2

2669780

19

207 .08

2289799

12

8

-14

252458 100 18579827 100

212

34

Brazilian
Immigrant

Total

80921 100 13883269 100

Source: Agricultural census data, MAIC (1924), IBGE (1950b)

Table IV: Landholdings in Paraná and Mato Grosso, 1940 to 1960
1940
Paraná

Number
<100 ha
53817
100-200 ha
5405
200-500 ha
3316

1960

% change

%
84
8
5

Area
1561650
756108
1015988

%
25
12
16

Number
252564
9363
4988

%
94
3
2

Area
5265273
1291998
1528408

%
46
11
13

Number
369
73
50

Area
237
71
50

500-1000 ha

981

2

684963

11

1216

.5

864221

8

24

26

>1000 ha

839

1

2233771

36

915

.3

2435034

21

9

9

64358

100

269046 100 11384934 100

318

82

Total
Mato
Grosso

6252480 100

1940

% change

1960

Number
2562

%
27

Area
83561

%
.5

Number
34437

%
70

Area
696744

%
2

Number

Area

1244

734

100-200 ha

1605

17

226842

1

2446

5

324279

1

52

43

200-500 ha

1760

19

591550

3

3516

7

1097481

4

100

86

500-1000 ha

1014

11

682560

4

2482

5

1670736

5

145

145

>1000 ha

2523

27 16489701

91

6010

12 27180633

88

138

65

48891 100 30969873 100

417

71

<100 ha

Total

9464 100 18074214 100

Source: Agricultural census data: IBGE 1951, 1952, 1967a, 1967b
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Similar processes would occur in the wider region over the next few decades as the
frontier expanded into neighboring states. From 1940 to 1960, farms smaller than 100 hectares
increased dramatically in Paraná and Mato Grosso, both in terms of number and land area (Table
IV). In Paraná, small farms increased from 25 to 46 percent of the land area and came to
represent 94 percent of all landholdings by 1960. Meanwhile, the largest farms declined in
relative importance over the same period, from 36 to 21 percent of the land area. In Mato Grosso,
small farms grew by a massive 734 percent in land area, and over 1200 percent in number of
farms between 1940 and 1960. However, large farms continued to dominate over 90 percent of
the land area, indicating that the expansion of smallholder agriculture had yet to penetrate large
areas of Mato Grosso by this time.
Nevertheless, it is clear that São Paulo and the surrounding region had undergone a major
transformation in agriculture in the first decades of the 20th century. Large areas that were once
dominated by traditional plantations, extensive grazing, and largely uncultivated land now came
to be characterized by an endless patchwork of thousands of small farmers. 42 This new class of
farmers was not only very distinct from the landholding class that had preceded them, but also
from other small farmers throughout much the rest of Latin America. As new forms of land
acquisition and rural property relations took hold across the frontier, it led to a new concern
for maximizing the productivity of the land, and new productive strategies were adopted by rural
producers. Rather than prioritizing subsistence and self-sufficiency, these new farmers began to
specialize their production for the market, dedicating most of their land to cash crops like coffee

42

This was less true in some of the traditional coffee zones in northern and eastern São Paulo
where large landholdings continued to predominate even after the influx of smallholders. On the
western frontier, small farms became dominant and expanded into the neighboring states, but
even here they did not completely displace large farms from the landscape, as can be seen in
Table III and IV.
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and cotton. They were also more highly capitalized, investing more resources into improved
methods, technology, and innovations.
This transformation of agriculture would lead to major gains in agricultural productivity
compared to other parts of the country and would provide an important stimulus for economic
diversification. Indeed, the new agrarian economy that emerged in the early 20th century was a
major factor in the nascent industrialization process occurring in the state of São Paulo at this
time. As we will see in Chapter 6, the large class of highly productive smallholder farmers
represented an important domestic market for local industries, as well as a major supplier of
industrial inputs. Increased agricultural productivity translated to higher wages, cheaper goods,
and greater revenue for local and state governments, all of which stimulated the growth and
diversification of the larger economy.
However, before examining the larger process of industrialization in and around São
Paulo, we first turn our analysis to the Northeast region of the country, where an entirely
different historical process was underway. In this second-largest region of the country, there was
a fundamentally distinct evolution of land appropriation and rural property relations from the
late-19th century, and this would have far-reaching consequences for the process of capital
accumulation and productivity growth in agriculture. In the next chapter, we analyze the reasons
for the Northeast’s distinct development path and show that the particular way that agriculture
came to be organized in this region is the key to understanding its relative underdevelopment.
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CHAPTER 5:
The Agrarian Roots of Underdevelopment in Northeast Brazil

The evolution of Brazil’s Northeast region in the 20th century would be quite different
from that of the Southeast region of the country. At the beginning of the century, the economy of
the Northeast was about the same size as that of the state of São Paulo. Yet, by the end of the
century, São Paulo’s economy was nearly three times larger, and industrial output would reach
five times that of the Northeast. While the Northeast accounted for about 20 percent of Brazil’s
industrial production at the beginning of the century, by 1940 this had declined to 12 percent,
and would reach as low as 6 percent by the 1960s. As the Southeast region was transformed into
the largest industrial center in Latin America, the Northeast region experienced little economic
diversification, and remained highly dependent on agricultural exports.
This distinct economic path would have major social consequences. With a population of
nearly 60 million people, the Northeast is larger than almost any other country in Latin America.
Yet, in per capita terms, it remains among the poorest. With a poverty rate of nearly 40 percent,
it is vastly poorer than Brazil’s more developed southern regions, which have poverty rates of
around 10 to 12 percent.1 The Northeast also has an infant mortality rate that is 20 points higher,
a life expectancy that is 4 years shorter, and an illiteracy rate that is about 25 points greater than
the southern regions of the country (IBGE 2015). All of this has led some to describe it as “the
largest concentration of poverty in the Western Hemisphere” (Frederico 1998).

1

The poverty rate is defined as the percent of the population with a total income of less than onehalf the national minimum wage (IBGE 2019).
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These grave social problems have led numerous scholars and policymakers to seek
answers to this “regional question” in Brazil. As the disparities became increasingly notable in
the 20th century, many of the explanations focused on the Northeast’s climate and geography as
the primary culprits, with droughts and low-quality soils seen as hindering economic
development. Meanwhile, others pointed to cultural factors and various characteristics of the
local population, such as low education, as potential causes (Barros 2011). However, most social
scientists now see the problem in terms of the national and international divisions of labor, and
the region’s integration into the global economy (Costa 2005, Santos et al 2012, Selwyn 2012).
This has resulted in a transfer of wealth out of the Northeast toward wealthier parts of the world
and has inhibited industrialization and the diversification of the economy away from primary
exports.
In this chapter, I argue that the above factors should actually be seen more as
consequences of the region’s underdevelopment rather than its causes. 2 I show that the root of
the region’s development problems is the particular rural economy that came to characterize it in
the 20th century. Unlike much of the developed world, modernized, high-productivity agriculture
never materialized in Brazil’s Northeast, and, as a result, the industrialization process was cut
short. I argue that this is due to the specific rural property relations that developed in agriculture,
a product of land appropriation by elites who were not subject to market pressures to increase
productivity. This led to an agricultural logic in which landowners preferred to minimize risk
rather than maximize the output of their land, and they did so through a capital-extensive logic of

Even the region’s climate and perceived geographic limitations can be largely seen as
consequences of underdevelopment rather than its causes. As explained below, many of these
limitations could be overcome with investment and the adoption of technology widely available
in other parts of the world.
2
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production. The end result was a stagnant agricultural sector characterized by low productivity
and limited possibilities for industrialization.
Utilizing various archival sources, I detail the historical development of rural property
relations and agricultural productive logic in the northeastern state of Pernambuco. I focus on the
large-scale sugar plantations that have long dominated the state and show how landowners’
predominant forms of land appropriation in the 19th and 20th centuries led to a certain productive
logic in agriculture that inhibited productivity growth. Statistics from Brazil’s national land
reform agency are used to show how this logic has continued up to the present day throughout
much of the region. I contend that it is the particular property relations—the particular
relationships between producers and their land—that is the key explanatory variable for the
region’s relative underdevelopment.

Climate, Culture, and Capitalism
The most common reasons offered for the Northeast’s development woes have to do with
its physical setting. The region’s geography and climate set it apart from much the rest of Brazil
in terms of rainfall and vegetation, and this has often been seen as the main problem affecting its
development. Along the Atlantic coast there is a narrow tropical plain that has excellent
conditions for cultivation of sugar cane and other crops. But as one moves inland, the climate
becomes drier and eventually turns into the semi-arid sertão, a vast desert-like area less suited
for cultivation and stricken by periodic droughts and floods. This area of the country was the
backdrop for repeated tragedies in the 19th and 20th centuries, with hundreds of thousands of its
residents succumbing to famine brought on by periodic dry spells, and millions more fleeing to
other regions of the country.
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In addition to the droughts, the region’s cultural and demographic makeup is another
common explanation for its underdevelopment. Given the long history of slavery and lack of
European immigration that occurred in the South, the northern regions of the country have long
been characterized by a greater African and Indigenous heritage and a large underclass of urban
and rural poor often seen as culturally inferior (Weinstein 2015). Thus, while the impact of
European culture is often seen as aiding development in the southern regions, its absence in the
northern regions has led many to view its demographic makeup as a potential cause for its
development problems.
Along these lines are a number of arguments about deficient human capital in the
Northeast. Though nowadays scholars cite historical rather than cultural factors as the root of the
problem, they still point to characteristics of the local population such as lower levels of
education, job skills, and work ethic. Barros (2011), for example, argues that the distinct
settlement and immigration patterns that characterized each region of Brazil in the 19 th and 20th
centuries were what led to the initial differences in levels of human capital, and these were
perpetuated over the years through poor education policy. The result was a higher proportion of
the lowest social strata in the Northeast and an overall lower per capita stock of human capital
which then translated to lower per capita GDP, lower productivity, and lower wages for workers.
Indeed, the fact that state and federal policies have long been controlled by wealthy elites
and designed for their benefit has meant that historically little has been done to improve the
conditions of the poor. National policies have tended to neglect education, and this left the
lowest social strata in the Northeast with little possibility for social mobility. Meanwhile, in the
southern regions of the country the influx of immigrants is said to have improved these regions’
human capital and left them with a smaller proportion of the poorest classes (Barros 2011). In
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this way, a gap emerged between the two regions in the early 20th century in terms of
demographics and human capital, and this has translated to the larger differences in their
economic development.
However, these arguments are problematic for a number of reasons, and most social
scientists would not accept culture or demographic makeup as sufficient explanations. As noted
in Chapter 1, cultural explanations tend to change radically over time according to the changing
economic fortunes of different groups, often reversing course once successful development
occurs. Moreover, while there is a greater African and Indigenous heritage in the Northeast, the
elite class that controls much of the economy has always been of European descent and heavily
influenced by European culture. Elites in the Northeast tend to be well-educated, often studying
abroad in Europe or the United States. Yet, despite this, they have seldom adopted the same
productive improvements or technical advances of their counterparts in southern Brazil. This
suggests that the economic differences are likely due more to the distinct context and historical
circumstances than education or cultural influences.
And while it is true that among the general population in the Northeast there are lower
levels of education and human capital, these are more likely to be a result of the region’s relative
underdevelopment than its cause. With limited diversification of the region’s economy in the 20 th
century, it is no surprise there would be a higher proportion of precarious workers and unskilled
labor concentrated in the rural and informal sectors. This factor alone would seem to explain the
relative lack of social mobility for much of the region’s poor, and, thereby, their lower levels of
human capital. Likewise, lower per capita income would be expected to translate to lower levels
of education through reduced tax revenues and other resources to invest in education, not to
mention the cultural capital inherited from parents of lower socioeconomic status. In other
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words, there are a number of reasons why the Northeast’s demographic makeup can be seen
more as a product of underdevelopment rather than its explanation.
As for the environmental problems such as the arid sertão, these do not provide very
convincing explanations either. This is because large areas of the Northeast are outside the sertão
region yet are still as poor or even poorer than the more arid zones. Two of the poorest states in
the Northeast—Maranhão and Alagoas—have virtually no sertão to speak of and receive
abundant rainfall. Yet these states suffer from even higher rates of poverty than their neighbors
with large areas of the semi-arid desert. Indeed, the coastal sugar cane zones which have
excellent conditions for agriculture are among the poorest parts of the region, often with even
lower GDP per capita than the drier inland areas.
Moreover, there are various parts of the developed world that actually receive less annual
rainfall than the Northeast’s sertão, such as Israel, California, and much of the western United
States. These places have managed to develop highly productive agriculture with the use of
innovations like dryland crops, groundwater wells, and irrigation. Yet these improvements have
seldom been adopted in the Northeast’s sertão, despite evidence that they could greatly increase
productivity.3 As much as 50 percent of the land area of the Northeast has groundwater reserves,
but little has been done to tap this important resource (Rebouças 1997). Thus, more important
than the mere existence of drought-stricken areas in the Northeast is the lack of investment and
adoption of techniques to remedy the climate-related problems.
Over the course of the 20th century, the Brazilian state made multiple attempts to resolve
the climate issues. One of the first attempts was known as the “hydraulic solution” and involved

3

In recent years, producers in some arid zones have reported major production increases after
adopting groundwater wells and dryland crops, but these methods have not been adopted by most
farmers.
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building hundreds of dams and reservoirs throughout the Northeast to facilitate irrigation. Other
policies included the creation of various state development agencies and banks that offered
technical assistance and low-cost credit for producers to invest in agricultural improvements. Yet
none of these managed to alter the productive logic of Northeast agriculture. Landowners seldom
used the reservoirs and dams for more intensive cultivation, preferring to dedicate their land to
cattle ranching or other extensive activities. 4 Meanwhile, state credits and subsidies were often
used to channel investment away into other economic activities rather than improve productivity
in agriculture.
These failures of the Brazilian state led many scholars to begin looking beyond the
region’s physical characteristics to deeper social and structural issues. Brazilian economist Celso
Furtado (1959) was one of the first to turn the focus away from the climate and point to the
specific social and economic structure of the Northeast—what he called the “Northeast
complex.” Furtado highlighted certain features of the social structure that he argued were a result
of the region’s colonial roots of slavery and plantation agriculture, such as monoculture farming,
slow technical change, and low productivity. He also cited the extreme concentration of land and
power that had survived relatively intact into the 20th century.
Furtado was also heavily influenced by the dependency school of thought, which placed
emphasis on the core-periphery dynamics of the world economy. From this perspective, the
specialization of peripheral areas in the export of primary goods was seen as the key to
understanding their limited development. The declining price of primary goods with respect to
manufactured goods meant that developing zones were forced to exchange an ever-greater

4

There are some exceptions, such as the São Francisco river valley, where irrigation is used for
intensive agriculture. But this region makes up only a small portion of the total land area in the
Northeast.
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amount of exported goods for the same quantity of imported manufactured goods from the
developed world. This caused a large outflow of resources from countries dependent on primary
goods toward the more developed countries and resulted in a continual transfer of surplus from
the periphery to the core.
This led Furtado and others to shift the focus away from the Northeast’s particular social
structure to the international division of labor. In the case of northeast Brazil, this argument took
on an extra element, since in addition to being on the periphery of the global economy, it was
also seen as having an internal core-periphery relationship with the more developed regions of
Brazil. Once industrialization was underway in the Southeast, protectionist policies to support
national industry created an even greater deterioration in the terms of trade, as the Northeast was
forced pay tariffs on imported manufactures and purchase high priced goods from Brazilian
industries in the South (Leff 1972). This is argued to have even further reduced the resources
available for capital accumulation, and thereby negatively affected the development process.
Many of the basic tenets of this perspective have been carried forward into contemporary
analysis of the Northeast. Scholars working from a world-systems or commodity chains
perspective still view the region’s insertion into the capitalist global economy as the predominant
factor in its development woes (Costa 2005, Santos et al 2012). The focus of these studies is
often the specific goods exported from the Northeast, such as sugar or fruit, and how they fit into
larger commodity chains organized on a global scale (Selwyn 2012). Local processes are seen as
being enmeshed in a certain position in the global economy, and this ostensibly conditions the
region’s development process by transferring surpluses away from the local economy toward
more developed parts of the world.
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Nevertheless, these dependency-inspired approaches have major shortcomings. Most
notably, they beg the question of why some societies have remained dependent on primary
goods, while others have been able to diversify their economies away from such dependence. By
focusing on commodity exports and global networks of production, these approaches cannot
explain why some countries or regions exporting the same commodities as the Northeast have
often had drastically different development outcomes. A number of comparisons could be made
here, such as Australia or California, both of which were major exporters of commodities like
sugar and fruit for much of the 19th century. Hawaii and Louisiana were also major sugar
producers, both with much higher levels of productivity and technical change than Northeast
Brazil. But perhaps the most obvious comparison is Southeast Brazil, which was also integrated
into the global economy as a primary exporter of agricultural goods like sugar and coffee.
Far from remaining dependent on primary exports, São Paulo saw its economy rapidly
industrialize and diversify away from primary dependence in the 20th century. This is a
fundamental question at the root of Brazil’s regional divide that cannot be adequately explained
by dependency and the focus on the global economy. Why did economic diversification occur in
the Southeast, but not in the Northeast, despite similar positions in the international division of
labor? What explains why São Paulo’s economy able to industrialize and develop away from
primary exports, while primary dependence in the Northeast ostensibly prevented it? To answer
this, the dependency approaches often evoke various internal factors, such as the size of local
markets and pre-existing disparities in per capita income, but they offer little explanation for how
those differences emerged in the first place.
In reality, a certain integration into the global economy can tell us surprisingly little about
the particular type of economy that would develop in each region of Brazil. Despite being
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similarly integrated into global markets, with similar commodity exports, the Northeast’s
agricultural sector has long been characterized by low productivity and slow technical change,
while in the Southeast highly dynamic agriculture developed from the early 20th century. The
two regions also developed quite distinct economic and social structures, with extreme
concentration of land and wealth in the Northeast, while a more egalitarian smallholder
agriculture emerged throughout much of the South and Southeast. These key differences had
very little to do with the national or international divisions of labor, or the specific commodities
exported in each place. In fact, the direction of causality is likely the opposite of what the
dependency approaches posit. It is more likely the local social structure and process of capital
accumulation that governed each region’s ability to industrialize and diversify away from
primary exports, thus determining their position in the division of labor.
In what follows, I show how the particular type of agricultural economy that emerged in
the Northeast is key to understanding its overall development trajectory. Through a close
analysis of the rural property relations that developed in Pernambuco’s sugar economy, we can
understand why local patterns of capital accumulation and technical change were less systematic
than in other parts of the country, and, therefore, why agricultural productivity growth was much
slower. Unlike in southern Brazil, where dynamic land markets and smallholder agriculture were
more predominant, in Northeastern states like Pernambuco processes of land settlement and
appropriation were dominated by wealthy elites and were characterized by various non-market
mechanisms throughout the 20th century. This translated to low rates of investment in agriculture,
and hindered industrialization and the diversification of the local economy.
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The traditional sugar economy
In 1999, a reporter for the British newspaper The Guardian visited one of the massive
sugar plantations that characterize the Northeast’s coastal plain (Bellos 1999). Upon arriving, he
noticed that the industry seemed to be “stuck in time”, as if little had changed over the last
hundred years. The sugar cane in the fields was still cut by hand by a large workforce that still
lived on the plantation. Much of the cane was then transported by a 1920s steam train to a sugar
mill at the center of the estate. Workers lived and worked in what he described as a “quasi-feudal
system,” where the landowner provided the workers and their families with basic housing, while
meager wages were paid to those who worked in the fields. “Here we keep things like they were
at the turn of the century,” the manager told him. “It will be like this for another 500 years”
(Bellos 1999).
This scene is typical of Pernambuco’s large sugar plantations. The landscape is
dominated by massive productive units that control the vast majority of the agricultural land and
have been slow to modernize in terms of technology and the labor regimes they employ. Most of
these enterprises trace their origins to the early 20th century, when there was a transition from the
animal and water-powered sugar mills (engenhos), to the more modern steam-driven factories
(usinas). But the families that own the plantations can generally be traced back to colonial times,
when they received land grants from colonial authorities and began to build their economic
empires. To this day, the majority of the usinas in the sugar-producing zone still belong to
families that descend from the colonial landowning class, and it is their history of land
appropriation and longstanding relationship to the land that explains the region’s productive
logic.
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The development of sugar cultivation in the state of Pernambuco began much as it did in
other regions of Brazil. From the beginning of the colonial period, plantations were set up by
European settlers wherever sugar cane and other cash crops could be planted and easily exported
to Europe. This meant colonization initially progressed along the coastal areas and river valleys
where waterways allowed access to the sea. Each sugar plantation typically had its own
rudimentary engenho, and slave labor was used to carry out the arduous work of harvesting the
fields, transporting, and milling the cane. This became the basic unit of production that would
spread throughout Pernambuco and much of the Northeast’s coastal areas from the 16 th to the
20th centuries.
The methods of land appropriation in Pernambuco were also very similar to other parts of
Brazil. As explained in Chapter 3, throughout the colonial period vast land grants known as
sesmarias were given by local officials to those interested in settling and cultivating the land.
The first of these were granted near the port city of Olinda and would slowly extend southward
as further territory was conquered from the natives. By the end of the 16th century, there were
more than sixty plantations with sugar mills spreading from Olinda south to Cabo de Santo
Agostinho (Dutra 1973, Petersen 1984). This would continue throughout the state until well into
the 19th century as the agricultural frontier expanded west and south along the coast. Meanwhile,
those who did not receive grants occupied unused or unclaimed land on the margins of the
plantations, using them for subsistence production and livestock grazing.
By the 19th century, there were some five hundred sugar plantations dotting the landscape
from Olinda south along the coast to what would eventually become the state of Alagoas. This
would increase to more than two thousand over the course of the 19th century, with some 1,700
of those possessing sugar mills (Eisenberg 1974, 123). Sesmarias continued to be granted
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throughout much of the 19th century to influential colonists and planters, and large plantations
increasingly came to dominate much of the best agricultural land. In 1850, just a handful of sugar
plantations of over 3,000 hectares occupied over 70 percent of all the land in the central sugar
producing region of Escada, while numerous non-sugar properties of under 200 hectares
occupied only a very small portion (Eisenberg 1974, 121-145).
The sesmaria system of land distribution not only led to the concentration of land in the
hands of a few, but also to an extreme concentration of power and influence for the landholding
elite. As land was conquered from local tribes and new areas were opened up for settlement,
Portuguese soldiers and colonists involved in the conquest were often rewarded not only with
land, but with positions of power and authority. Feudal titles like baron, count, or marquess were
granted to the most prominent landowners of a given region, and posts like police chief and
justices of the peace allowed them to dominate the judicial and administrative branches of
government. It was quite common for a given region to be dominated by a single family or group
of interrelated families whose members owned most of the land and also controlled most of the
local institutions such as the town council, the national guard, the judgeships, and state
representatives (Eisenberg 1974, 121-145, Petersen 1984).
This pattern of land settlement led to a social structure and productive logic in colonial
Pernambuco similar to that described in Chapter 3. With an almost feudal form of political and
economic control, the region’s sugar oligarchy had little reason to maximize the productivity of
their landholdings or make major improvements in production. Since agricultural land was
generally acquired at little cost to the owners, there was little market pressure on landowners to
make investments or improve productivity. Even in the 19th century, when land was increasingly
purchased on the market, it was seldom done through the use of loans and mortgages, and the
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concentration of power in the hands of the landholding elite made foreclosure and the seizure of
their assets an unlikely scenario (Eisenberg 1974, 72). As a result, landowners generally
preferred to minimize risk by channeling profits into savings or consumption, or into other
economic activities like commerce and real estate (Santos-Gareis 2003, 34-35).
Indeed, throughout the 19th century, Pernambuco’s sugar planters were widely recognized
for their extreme conservatism in terms of land use and methods of production. In 1816, a visitor
from France noted that most landowners in the state were only using about one-twentieth of their
total landholdings, leaving much of the rest completely idle or under extensive grazing (Rogers
2010, 36). By mid-century, Eisenberg (1974, 126) estimates that sugar planters in Pernambuco’s
costal region were using no more than one-fifth of all available land, even though by that time
they already owned and occupied the vast majority of it. Meanwhile, the use of basic
improvements like fertilizer, irrigation, and improved cane varieties were almost entirely
unknown in Pernambuco until well into the 20th century. In 1888, the French consul would report
that cane cultivation was still being practiced almost exactly “the same as it was one hundred
years ago”:
There is not the slightest progress to report, neither in the preparation of the soil, nor in
the employment of improved agricultural implements. Without a doubt, the day the
province’s landowners—in general very intelligent but also apathetic and conservative
men—wanted to modernize agriculture, they could easily raise current production by half
or even double (Perruci 1978, 112).
Ten years later, another French observer noted that cane cultivation was still very “rudimentary”:
“they do not fertilize, nor do they prepare the soil in the majority of the plantations, simply
abandoning exhausted land to move on [to virgin land]” (Diamante 1972, 40).
This would remain largely unchanged for many years to come. Though some
modernization would take place in the final decades of the 19th century in terms of labor regimes
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and milling technology, little would change in the overall productive logic. With the decline of
slavery, most plantations made a transition to live-in labor tenants known as moradores who
worked in exchange for plots of land to grow subsistence crops. Unlike Southeast Brazil, where
an expanding frontier created the need for imported labor, in Northeast Brazil there was a labor
surplus, and natural demographic growth meant the plantations’ labor needs could be met by the
local population. Thus, live-in laborers replaced slaves, and there would be no major waves of
immigration to Pernambuco around the turn of the century.
Meanwhile, in an attempt to modernize the sugar plantations, government incentives
around the turn of the century began encouraging landowners to adopt improved technologies
and methods of production, such as the steam-driven usinas. By 1910, around sixty plantations
had adopted the new technology and several more would do so over the next few decades
(Eisenberg 1974, 117). This change in milling technology would set off a new wave of land
appropriation that would greatly shape Pernambuco’s sugar zone for the rest of the 20th century.
Land became increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few, but the underlying property
relations remained unchanged.

Land appropriation in the 20th century
The transition from the engenho sugar mills of the colonial period to the modern usinas at
the beginning of the 20th century represented a significant change in Pernambuco’s sugar
industry. In the first few decades of the century, loans and financing from the state government
led many of Pernambuco’s wealthier and well-connected landowners to adopt the new
technology, and they began setting up the large steam driven mills on their plantations. The new
usineiros were usually former owners of engenhos and were often from the most prominent
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regional families that dominated each part of the state. Meanwhile, smaller landowners and those
without access to government financing generally did not adopt the new technology, continuing
with the old engenho mills throughout much of the 20th century (Santos-Gareis 2003, 34).
This created a sort of two-tier system in the sugar economy. A few dozen large
plantations with usinas were now surrounded by hundreds of smaller plantations that either sold
their production to the usinas or continued to mill their own cane with the old engenho
technology. Given that the larger, more efficient usinas had the capacity to process a much
greater amount of raw cane, this gave them an interest in acquiring ever greater amounts of land
to supply their mills. By controlling and cultivating much of the surrounding land, the usinas
could keep their mills busy throughout the year and reduce dependence on sales from the smaller
engenhos who were often unreliable.
This led to a new process of land appropriation in the first half of the 20th century. Once
the usinas were established across much of the sugar zone, they began absorbing many of the
smaller engenhos in their immediate orbit, usually through market purchases or as collection on
debts. Since the smaller plantations now sold much of their production to the usinas, they often
ended up indebted to the larger mills and were forced to forfeit land as payment. The regional
oligarchies also used their domination of local institutions and courts to pressure smaller farmers
to sell their land, or to simply abandon it when no legitimate title could be produced. By 1920,
some four hundred engenhos had already been absorbed by just forty-one large usinas (Reis
1977, 371).
Over time, this led to the massive productive units that came to characterize the region in
the second half of the 20th century. By continually absorbing and purchasing the smaller farms
around them, each usina came to own or control tens of thousands of hectares of the surrounding
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Table V: Landholdings in the state of Pernambuco, 1940 to 1960
1940
%
Area

%

Number

75685
40280
6119
877

61
33
5
.7

336356
1144256
1297409
589785

9
30
33
15

1000-5000

286

.2

434193

11

>5000 ha

9

.01

73790

2

Farms
<10 ha
10-100 ha
100-500 ha
500-1000 ha

Total

Number

123256

3875789

% change

1960
%
Area

%

Number

Area

199021
50627
8260
1234

77
19
3
.5

587487
1497378
1755105
840379

10
25
30
14

163
26
35
41

75
31
35
42

530

.2

877948

15

85

102

21 .01

366333

6

133

396

111

53

259693

5924630

Source: IBGE (1950c, 1966)

land. Though earlier statistics are unreliable, Table V provides a glimpse into this process at the
middle of the 20th century. In 1940, there were only 9 landholdings in Pernambuco of over five
thousand hectares, and 286 landholdings of over one thousand hectares. Yet, by 1960, this had
increased to 21 landholdings of over five thousand and 530 over one thousand hectares. The
percent of land area controlled by large holdings of over five hundred hectares increased from 28
percent in 1940 to 36 percent in 1960, while smaller holdings of less than one hundred hectares
declined from 39 percent to 35 percent of all land. 5
Meanwhile, there was a parallel development at the other end of the scale among the
smallest farms. Though small farms grew significantly in number, they did so in part by
subdividing into ever smaller plots. While in 1940 the average plot size of farms under 100
hectares was nearly 13 hectares, by 1960 it had decreased to only 8 hectares. For farms under 10

5

There are a number of reasons why agricultural censuses may not provide an accurate reflection
of reality. They often do not account for landowners who own multiple landholdings, and
therefore can underreport the real level of land concentration. Large landholders often attempt to
hide the real extent of their holdings by creating artificial divisions and by utilizing multiple
names or front companies. In addition, changing methodologies over the years led to large
changes in the total land area included in the census from one decade to the next. Data from the
1920 agricultural census, for example, could not be used because the total land area and land
distribution data is highly skewed and cannot be trusted.
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hectares the decline was from an average of about 4.5 hectares in 1940 to less than 3 hectares in
1960. This was part of longer process that took place throughout the 20th century. Demographic
growth and the dominance of large plantations meant small landowners were forced to
continually subdivide their plots, making it increasingly difficult to survive on subsistence
production alone. This was a major contributing factor to the mass exodus out of the countryside
over the course of the 20th century.
These developments led to a sharpening class conflict in the mid-20th century. This was
due not only to the gradual squeezing of the peasantry, but also from the usineiros’ slow
takeover of much of the land belonging to the traditional engenho landowning class. Rural
mobilization greatly intensified in the 1950s and 1960s with the formation of rural trade unions,
the Peasant Leagues, and the push for land reform led by popular leaders like Francisco Julião
(Pereira 1997). Meanwhile, constant complaints came from the smaller engenho owners who
called for greater state intervention against the abuses and continual expansion of the usinas.
All of this came to a head in the 1960s with the election of a state governor and state
representative in Pernambuco that were sympathetic to the peasants and their demands. Brazil’s
president at this time, João Goulart, was also supportive of a government-led land reform and
called for the expropriation and redistribution of all unproductive properties of over 600 hectares.
This obviously clashed with the interests of the powerful rural oligarchies in the countryside and
the conflict between them and the peasant organizations would reach a peak in 1964. When a
military coup removed Goulart and his allies from power, social movements in the cities and the
countryside were brutally repressed. Pernambuco’s state governor and state representative were
among the thousands of politicians and activists in Brazil forced into exile following the coup.
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Table VI: Landholdings in the state of Pernambuco, 1960 to 1980
1960
%
Area

%

Number

199021
50627
8260
1234

77
19
3
.5

587487
1497378
1755105
840379

10
25
30
14

1000-5000

530

.2

877948

15

>5000 ha

21

.01

366333

6

Farms
<10 ha
10-100 ha
100-500 ha
500-1000 ha

Total

Number

259693

5924630

% change

1980
%
Area

%

Number

Area

246686
71525
10154
1322

75
22
3
.4

706313
2043436
2053298
886024

11
31
31
13

24
41
23
7

20
36
17
5

495

.1

833348

13

-7

-5

16 .01

133373

2

-24

-64

27

12

330701

6655796

Source: IBGE (1966, 1983)

One important result of this was that the rural property relations that had developed in
Pernambuco’s sugar zone from the beginning of the 20th century became even further solidified.
The coup and the military dictatorship that followed meant there would be no chance of
meaningful land reform in the second half of the 20th century, and the concentration of land in
the hands of the usineiros would continue unabated. Unlike in Southeast Brazil, where dynamic
land markets and a growing agricultural frontier from the early 20th century caused the large
plantations to give way to a rapidly growing smallholder sector, in Northeast Brazil the large
plantations managed to maintain and solidify their dominance over the land in the second half of
the 20th century.
As can be seen in Table VI, land concentration in Pernambuco continued to be extreme
two decades after the coup. Though the largest properties slightly reduced their number and land
area after 1960, often dividing into smaller properties to avoid scrutiny from state authorities, the
overall picture changed very little. In 1980, only 3.5 percent of the landholdings still occupied
nearly 60 percent of all land, with the other 97 percent of farms occupying the remaining 40
percent. And while small farms of under 100 hectares slightly increased their total land area, they
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did so at the expense of plot size, continuing to subdivide into ever smaller plots. In terms of
total land distribution, 1980 still looked very much like 1940.

Rural Productive Logic
With the solidification of the rural property relations in Pernambuco’s sugar economy,
there would be little change in its overall productive logic in the second half of the 20th century.
Though the large usinas were more modern and efficient than the hundreds of engenhos once
scattered throughout the countryside, they were still only a partial modernization in many
respects. The adoption of the new milling technology took place only after it was bankrolled by
government grants and subsidies, requiring only limited investment from the landowners
themselves. And though the new milling technology was a major improvement on the industrial
side of production, little modernization took place on the agricultural side of production.
In the vast fields surrounding the modern plants, production techniques changed very
little over the course of the 20th century, and improvements were only sporadically adopted.
Officials and agronomists continually criticized the poor conditions on usina land, noting that it
“was still 50 years in the past,” and had “terribly low yields” compared to other parts of the
world. According to one official’s description in the 1940s:
Nothing changed, the planting was the worst possible, the methods were very traditional,
the land exhausted from continual production during the whole year. No one thought
seriously about returning to the soil any of what the exploitation during generations had
taken from it” (De Carli 1942, 61).
By the 1950s, productivity would increase slightly due to the adoption of new cane
varieties, but little else would change in terms of basic cultivation methods like fertilization and
irrigation. The fields were still cultivated and harvested entirely by hand, with most of the cut
cane transported to the mill on the backs of donkeys or in ox carts. Some of the larger usinas also
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had their own private train networks, but yields still averaged around 40 tons per hectare, the
same as nearly a century earlier.
Rather than investing in raising productivity, the usina owners continued to use their land
much like their engenho predecessors had—to channel wealth away from productivity into other
economic activities. In 1953, a geographer from the United States noted that there was a certain
“attitude” among the Northeast’s landowning class in which “long-term investments for the
purpose of increasing long-term profits” were not common (James 1953). Instead, “wealthy
people prefer to use surplus funds for non-productive purposes” and “speculative ventures,” and
“[do] not need to worry about long-term profits” (James 1953). Celso Furtado noted this same
thing a decade later during his time at the regional development agency (GTDN 1967).
According to Furtado, local elites preferred to spend their profits on exorbitant consumption
patterns and investments outside the region rather than reinvesting back into improvements.
They did this by continually acquiring loans and subsidies from the government and banks and
then investing them in other less risky businesses.
By the end of the century, scholars were still struggling to explain this logic of
investment and the continued use of antiquated methods. In 1998, an editorial in Pernambuco’s
main newspaper suggested there must be a “hidden conspiracy against modernization” among
Pernambuco’s sugar elite, as few landowners had adopted the most advanced techniques and
technologies and had little concern for improving productivity (Martins 1998, 31). The author
argued that the old excuses about climate or topology could not be believed, and that the failure
to invest was due to a “reverence for tradition”, or a “feeling of nostalgia” among the relatively
small group of interrelated families that controlled most of Pernambuco’s land (Martins 1998,
31). Indeed, references to the more conservative or “traditional” business strategies among
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landowners in the Northeast are still common in the literature, yet there is little explanation for
why such an investment logic has persisted for so long (Matos 2012).
Rather than pointing to a certain “attitude” or “feeling” among the elite, the best
explanation is the unchanging property relations over the course of the 20th century. Though the
large usinas were the product of a new wave of land appropriation in the 20th century, the actual
relationship between the landowners and the land was still not significantly different from that of
the old colonial elite. Most usineiros were descendants of the colonial landholding families,
often with considerable wealth and multiple economic activities both in the countryside and the
cities. This meant they seldom depended on maintaining a competitive level of output from the
land in order to remain solvent. Unlike the smallholder immigrants in southern Brazil who
depended on improving productivity and maximizing the output of their land, elite-dominated
land appropriation in the Northeast meant that there was little market compulsion to produce a
given level of income from the land, regardless of its market price.
This relationship to the land is similar to the distinction some scholars have made
between “market opportunities” versus “market imperatives” (Wood 2002, 6). Large landowners
in Pernambuco have long availed themselves of market opportunities by buying and selling land
and investing in various businesses. But they have seldom been subject to market imperatives
that would force them to maximize the productivity of their assets to maintain competitiveness.
As various scholars have noted, land in Northeast Brazil has long been used by elites as a
mechanism for acquiring and storing wealth that is then channeled back into other sectors of the
economy (Silva 1980, 254; Bicalho and Hoefle 1989, 1990). This is true not only in sugar
producing zones, but also with other crops like cotton, and especially with the extensive cattle
grazing predominant throughout much of the drier interior. The result is that the process of
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capital accumulation in agriculture has been cut short, leading to slow productivity growth,
despite constant efforts by the state to promote modernization.
This logic can be further illustrated by looking at a couple specific cases of large-scale
agricultural enterprises in the state of Pernambuco and their particular investment patterns. The
Usina Cucaú and Usina Petribú are two examples of large sugar mills that have dominated the
state’s sugar zone up to the present. A close look at their owners’ relationship to the land and
their specific productive logic reveals why there has been historically little investment in
technical change, and therefore slow growth in agricultural productivity.

Usina Cucaú
For much of the 20th century, the Usina Cucaú was one of Pernambuco’s largest and
most successful sugar mills. Its owners, the Queiroz Monteiro family, have long been prominent
in the state, and are direct descendants of the Lins family, one of the most influential families
from the colonial sugar oligarchy. The Lins lineage can be traced back to at least the early 19th
century, when Henrique Marques Lins and his father received numerous sesmarias in southeast
Pernambuco and set up sugar cane production there (Moura 1998, 43, 63). Over the next half
century, they dominated local political offices and continuously acquired more land, amassing a
considerable domain that included thirty different engenhos and two of the very first usinas in
the state (Eisenberg 1974, 131).
Records show that the Lins obtained subsidized loans from the government in the 1880s
to purchase the necessary equipment for their two steam mills, the Usina Massauassú and Usina
Ipojuca, a total of 800,000 milréis in all (Campos 2001, 44). There is no record whether these
loans were ever repaid, but landowner influence in local government and the economic
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importance of the sugar industry meant the state frequently forgave debts to mill owners
(Eisenberg 1974, 116; Andrade 1989, 30-37). This would also be the case throughout much of
the 20th century, when state and federal agencies like the Banco Agricola and Banco do Brasil
often did not enforce repayment of credits.
The Lins family would not take control of Usina Cucaú until the 1940s, when a grandson
of Henrique Marques Lins sold his share of the Usina Ipojuca and bought the company that
owned Cucaú (Monteiro 2010, 48). Originally founded in 1895 by a group of local landowners,
the Usina Cucaú began to buy up or otherwise appropriate much of the surrounding land, and,
like most of the usinas founded at this time, absorbed many of the surrounding engenhos to
ensure a greater supply of cane. According to agricultural census data, by the 1920s the company
already owned more than two dozen separate properties in the surrounding counties of Gameleira
and Rio Formoso (MAIC 1925, 107-110).
Though there is no indication of the initial size of Usina Cucaú, in 1913 it had a total
production of 70,000 tons of raw cane. Given average productivity at that time was around 30
tons per hectare, it must have had at least 2,000 hectares (5,000 acres) of land planted in cane
(Peres and Peres 1991, 139). By the 1940s, when Lins’ grandson Armando Queiroz Monteiro
took over, it was estimated to have around 12,000 hectares (30,000 acres) and had taken over
some 20 smaller engenhos (De Carli 1942, 57). The vast landholdings belonging to the usina
also contained some 280 houses for workers, and 65 kilometers of train tracks for transporting
cane (Peres and Cavalcanti 1933, 42). In the decades that followed, Queiroz Monteiro continued
to expand operations, receiving numerous loans from the government to invest in new
technology, and continually appropriating more of the surrounding land. By the 1970s, the usina
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had doubled in size to about 24,000 hectares (60,000 acres) and had taken control of some 40
engenhos across four different counties.6
Throughout this period of expansion, the Usina Cucaú received considerable financing
from both state and federal governments. Most of the financing came from the Instituto de
Açúcar e do Alcoól (IAA), which was founded in 1933 with the purpose subsidizing and
regulating the sugar industry. From the 1930s to the 1970s, there are records of at least 18
different loans from the IAA to Usina Cucaú, averaging about 3.6 million Cruzeiros
(US$65,000) each.7 In the 1950s and 1960s, the loans were granted on almost a yearly basis,
amounting to about 55 million Cruzeiros (US$750,000) in all during that period. 8
While many of these loans were used for updating and modernizing the industrial
technology of the usina, there are indications that the money was not always used as stipulated
by the loan agreements. In 1949, an IAA internal memo noted that “funds pertaining to the loan
made to the [Usina Cucaú] were not used for the preestablished purpose…” That purpose was to
buy equipment for an alcohol distillery, but no such investment had been made. 9 The loan in
question was for 3 million Cruzeiros (US$158,000) and had been paid directly to Queiroz
Monteiro earlier that year. But despite the IAA’s reservations, the flow of funds was not cut off,
and another loan of 3.5 million Cruzeiros was approved the following year. 10

6

Vistoria da Usina Cucaú, 21 July 1970, Arquivo Nacional, Instituto do Açúcar e do Alcoól
Collection, Caixa 2887/Código 142.6 (hereafter cited as IAA Caixa #/Código #)
7

IAA 0743, 3850, 0394, 2846, 2887, 2927, 4986, US dollar exchange rates were taken from
Officer (2018)
8

IAA 0743, 3850, 0394, 2846, 2887, 2927, 4986

9

IAA to Delegacia Regional, 24 October 1949, IAA 2852/142.6

10

IAA 2887/142.6
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It seems clear that the flow of resources from the IAA to Usina Cucaú was often diverted
toward other enterprises and investments rather than improving productivity. Though there were
periodic updates to the industrial equipment over the years, a number of important investments
that could have improved the overall productivity of the operations were completely neglected.
In 1973, a report by the IAA noted that the usina invested very little money in maintaining its
transportation network to and from the fields. This ended up causing major delays during
harvest, which raised the total costs of operations and significantly worsened the cane’s sucrose
content. The report concluded that the usina’s “industrial yields always remain very low, even
when taking into account the poor yields in this region”.11
This was even more true when it came to agricultural yields. The vast expanses of land
used by the usina to grow cane saw very little growth in productivity over the years, and this was
due to a lack of investment in simple improvements like irrigation, new crop varieties, and
mechanization. In 1935, an agronomist planted a small area of land on Usina Cucaú and showed
that with an improved variety of cane he could obtain twice the average yield of 30 tons per
hectare. Five years later, another experiment showed that yields could be increased to 85 tons per
hectare with the use of irrigation, and nearly 100 tons per hectare with the addition of fertilizer
(De Carli 1940, 61-73). Yet Usina Cucaú failed to adopt the improvements and irrigated only
about five percent of its total land. Average yield would remain between 35 to 40 tons per
hectare for several more decades.
In the 1950s, Queiroz Monteiro finally showed some interest in adopting irrigation and
began requesting financing for the necessary equipment. However, by the 1960s the total area
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IAA 0387/210.2, Relatório do Setor Industrial, 17 October 1973
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under irrigation had only increased to 800 hectares.12 The IAA recommended the company
conduct a survey of the soil conditions on its land and maximize output by catering
improvements to the varying conditions. Though much of the usina’s land was on hilly terrain
that made mechanization difficult, at least 6,000 hectares were suitable for mechanical harvesters
and tractors.13 Also, a river running through the property could greatly facilitate irrigation, and
the use of plows and chemical fertilizers on less fertile soils could greatly increase yields.
Nevertheless, Usina Cucaú did not invest in any of these improvements and limited itself to the
adoption of new cane varieties. By the 1970s, yields had still not reached even 50 tons per
hectare,14 while irrigated land in other parts of the country had surpassed 100 tons per hectare
and reached as high as 170 tons in other parts of the world.15
Some have suggested that this lack of investment was due to the inability of landowners
in the Northeast to turn a profit in the sugar business (Hartzmark 2014). Environmental
constraints like hilly terrain and poor soil fertility are said to have limited their ability to raise
yields, and this made it virtually impossible to be profitable in the face of more efficient
competition. But this argument is dubious, as there were clearly a number of basic investments
the Queiroz Monteiro family could have made to improve productivity, and they obviously had
the resources to do so as evidenced by the continual expansion of their landholdings and business
interests.
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IAA 2852/142.6, Ata da 27a Sessão, 17 March 1960,

13

IAA 744/212.1, Relatório do Setor Agronômico, 26 September 1973
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IAA 744/212.1, Relatório do Setor Agronômico, 26 September 1973

“Progressos da agro-indústria canavieira alagoana,” Brasil Açucareiro 59(5), 1962: 191; “Pista
de projeto para aperfeiçoamento industrial do bagaço de cana em Pernambuco,” Brasil
Açucareiro 50(4), 1957: 268
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Indeed, rather than making the simple investments suggested by IAA and others to raise
yields, Queiroz Monteiro and his sons began investing in an array of other businesses and
industries. By the 1960s, the family had purchased three car dealerships and two metal industries
in the capital city of Recife, and in the 1970s they acquired two more sugar mills in other parts of
the state (Monteiro 2010, 166). By the 1990s, they had built an extensive empire throughout
Pernambuco, with an array of businesses that included real estate companies, pharmacies, banks,
and even a local newspaper. Meanwhile, average yields on the usina still hovered around 50 tons
per hectare.
By the 2000s, Usina Cucaú had expanded to over 33,000 hectares, or almost 130 square
miles of land, including a total of 77 engenhos in all (Moura 1998, 229). Yet, according to one
report, only 18,000 of the 33,000 hectares were used to grow cane, with the rest sitting idle or
used to graze cattle (CGEE 2008, 53). The owners eventually mechanized a small portion of
their operations (3,000 hectares), but the vast majority of the planting and harvesting was still
done by hand by some two thousand rural workers using teams of oxen and donkeys. By 2008,
average yields had reportedly increased to 65 tons per hectare, yet federal land reform agency
records showed that nearly 75 percent of the landholdings still did not meet the minimum
productivity requirements, and were declared “unproductive”. 16 Much like the landowners and
engenhos of the colonial period, the Queiroz Monteiro family continually channeled their profits
and resources away from agriculture into other economic activities, while leaving their vast
landholdings with few improvements or investments.
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Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária (INCRA), Sistema Nacional de Cadastro
Rural
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Usina Petribú
About 100km north of Usina Cucaú is another of Pernambuco’s most important sugar
mills, the Usina Petribú. This usina has followed a similar path to that of Usina Cucaú, and like
most of the sugar mills that dominate the Northeast’s coastal plain, Usina Petribú is controlled by
another prominent lineage from the colonial sugar oligarchy, the Cavalcanti Albuquerque family.
This family got its start in the 18th century, when João Cavalcanti de Albuquerque received a
series of sesmarias northwest of Recife and built an engenho there (Mendonça 1997, 21). Like
the Lins family, the Cavalcantis controlled local political power in their region, and over time
amassed a considerable amount of land along the Capibaribe river. In 1910, the eighth generation
of the family founded the Usina Petribú on one of the many engenhos they had acquired over the
years.
Like Cucaú, Usina Petribú received numerous loans from state and federal governments
from the early 20th century on. However, unlike Cucaú, the owners of Petribú did not grow much
of their own cane, preferring to rent out most of their land to sharecroppers. This only
accentuated a lack of investment in the land, as tenants employed traditional methods of
cultivation, while turning over 25 to 30 percent of their total production to the usina. Company
records from the 1920s list some twenty different tenants on Petribú land, each using primitive
implements like hoes, scythes, and donkeys to harvest and transport the cane (Campos 2001,
104).
By the 1930s, Usina Petribú was processing some 30,000 tons of cane per year, meaning
it probably had at least 1,000 hectares (2,500 acres) of land planted in cane. The usina also had
its own network of around 30 kilometers of railroad tracks, along with 32 railcars and 3
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locomotives.17 In addition to the sugar mill, an alcohol distillery was installed on the property,
and the usina began transporting alcohol by railroad to Recife. The owners also purchased land
for cattle ranching and dairy production, products that they sold in nearby towns and cities
(Campos 2001, 114).
This diversification into other economic activities was a way for the Cavalcantis to
minimize risk and secure other sources of income without depending exclusively on their sugar
operations.18 This was clearly demonstrated in 1931, when Usina Petribú began to have financial
problems. Having taken out several loans in the years before, by the early 1930s the Cavalcantis
found themselves without enough circulating capital to make the loan payments and were
threatened with foreclosure by a major trading house in Recife. However, by renting out portions
of their cattle lands, and selling dairy products in the cities, they were able to secure enough
capital to pay their debts and avoid default (Campos 2001, 113-114).
This showed the logic and reasoning behind investing in multiple business ventures. By
diversifying their investments, they could ignore the need to improve productivity or increase
output and could avoid making the costly and risky investments required to modernize their
agricultural production. With multiple sources of income, any shortfalls in their agricultural
output could be covered with the proceeds of other business activities. This strategy would
continue in the years to come as the usina passed from one generation of the family to the next.
By the 1940s, the tenth generation of the family began to invest in various urban
businesses, opening a textile factory in Rio de Janeiro. They also continued to expand their
landholdings throughout Pernambuco. By 1942, the usina had grown to a land area of 3,981
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18

In 1911, João Cavalcanti de Albuquerque changed the family name to Petribú. To avoid
confusion, we have continued referring to the family as the Cavalcantis throughout.
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hectares (9,837 acres) (De Carli 1942, 57). Yet productivity still remained dismally low. With a
total production that year of 49,000 tons, average productivity was only around 20 tons per
hectare depending on how much of the land was actually planted in cane. 19 Meanwhile,
experiments conducted on a nearby usina showed that yields could average between 65 to 70
tons per hectare with the use of irrigation and fertilizer.20
Productivity would remain low at Usina Petribú throughout the 1950s and 1960s, even
though the owners received multiple loans from the IAA and Banco do Brasil. Records show that
from 1954 to 1976, the Usina Petribú was loaned some 58 million Cruzeiros (US$6.5 million) to
be paid back in yearly installments. Yet, by the end of this 22-year period, the IAA was still
calling on the usina and its sharecroppers to “adopt more modern and rational practices to raise
productivity,” such as “good varieties of cane…adequate fertilization and modernized
harvesting.”21 Despite massive financing from the state, agricultural productivity in 1977 had
only increased to about 22 tons per hectare, and only marginal improvements had been adopted
in the technology and methods of cultivation.22
Instead of investing in improving the productivity of their agricultural land, Petribú’s
owners did just as Cucaú’s had, they constructed an economic empire by channeling their profits
into a wide range of other economic activities. By the 1960s, the family had opened an animal
feed industry in nearby Carpina and expanded into chicken and egg farming (Mendonça 1997,
85). By the 1990s, the family got involved in real estate and construction, and constructed a
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luxury hotel in Recife. They also purchased another major sugar mill, the Usina São José, in the
northern part of the state (Mendonça 1997, 90).
By the 2000’s, the Usina Petribú was said to have amassed around 10,000 hectares
(25,000 acres) of land northwest of Recife, and with the purchase of Usina São José came to
control a total land area of nearly 30,000 hectares (74,000 acres). Much of the land remained
unimproved, but there were some new investments underway. In 2006, irrigation was
implemented on 7,000 hectares or 23 percent of the land (CGEE 2008, 58). Various options for
mechanized harvesting were also being explored but had yet to be implemented. Average
productivity reportedly had reached 67 tons per hectare, a significant improvement from the
1970s (CGEE 2008, 25, 58). However, some 3600 laborers still worked in the fields, with
hundreds of oxen and donkeys to plow and harvest the cane. Average productivity was still well
below the 90 tons per hectare common in other regions of Brazil.
Moreover, a good portion of Petribú’s land still remained completely unutilized and
virtually abandoned. In 2000, the national land reform agency (INCRA) found that several of the
usina’s landholdings were sitting idle and not being used for cultivation. 23 As a result, INCRA
began the legal proceedings to expropriate these properties and turn them over to land reform
purposes. Meanwhile, INCRA records showed that only about 75 percent of the total land area
belonging to the family was being used for cane cultivation, with an average productivity of only
57 tons per hectare.24 The rest of the land was being used for cattle grazing or simply left
uncultivated.

INCRA Assentamentos, 541402442/9801, “Vistoria do Imovel Rural/Engenho Sitio I,”;
541402441/9830, “Vistoria do Imovel Rural/Engenho Sitio II”
23

24

INCRA, Sistema Nacional de Cadastro Rural
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In other words, the low-investment productive logic of Petribú’s owners remained
relatively unchanged at the end of the 20th century. Despite a number of modernizations and
improvements in technology from the early engenhos, the family still did relatively little to
maximize the productivity of their landholdings and maintained production strategies marked by
relatively few improvements in agriculture. This remains true throughout much of northeast
Brazil well into the 21st century, as outdated technology and methods continue to be used and
large areas of fertile land sit uncultivated.

Agricultural Productivity
The productive logic of the two cases above is fairly representative of the large-scale
agricultural enterprises that dominate much of Northeast Brazil. In fact, the Usina Cucaú and
Usina Petribú are both considered to be among the more modernized and productive sugar mills
in the state of Pernambuco (Hartzmark 2014, 121). In other parts of the state, and in neighboring
states like Paraíba and Alagoas, there are many large-scale operations that are much less
modernized and productive. And in the drier interior of these states, land use and agricultural
investment are even less intensive, with large areas of land completely unutilized.
According to data from the national land reform agency (INCRA), the problem of
unproductive land was still fairly generalized throughout this region at the beginning of the 21 st
century. In Pernambuco, large landholdings of around 1000 hectares occupied nearly 40 percent
of all the land in the sugar zone in 2010, and over 70 percent of this land was considered
“unproductive” by federal parameters. 25 This means that the land was either left completely idle,
or that it was below the minimum level of productivity requirements established by the federal

25

INCRA, Sistema Nacional de Cadastro Rural
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Table VII: Large unproductive farms in Brazil by state, 2010
Number of large
Total area
unproductive farms
unproductive
(hectares)
Northeast
Alagoas
346
244416
Bahia
6375
13878862
Ceará
785
1115674
Maranhão
3005
9753987
Paraiba
713
997016
Pernambuco
887
922394
Piaui
2335
7656120
Rio Grande do Norte
568
813689
Sergipe
268
182794

Percent of land
unproductive
on large farms
48.2
78.0
75.5
87.5
85.0
76.2
93.2
77.2
65.5

Southeast
Espirito Santo
Minas Gerais
Rio de Janeiro
São Paulo

414
6005
804
4679

751554
7494510
464725
3109307

55.8
52.1
44.9
33.8

South
Paraná
Rio Grande do Sul
Santa Catarina

2854
2452
1833

2250422
1825926
1212568

34.9
22.8
51.9

Source: INCRA, Sistema Nacional de Cadastro Rural

government. And this does not capture the true extent of land concentration in this area, given
that many of the usinas own or control dozens of large landholdings that are recorded as separate
properties. 26
The same is true in the surrounding states that make up the Northeast region. As can be
seen in Table VII, anywhere from 48 percent (Alagoas) to 93 percent (Piauí) of all land
belonging to large landowners in these states was considered to be “unproductive” in 2010. This

26

Like agricultural census data, these statistics are also likely to underestimate the real
concentration of land ownership as they often do not capture the control of multiple landholdings
by the same person or company.
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contrasts with southern states like São Paulo, Mato Grosso do Sul, or Paraná, where only 20 to
35 percent of the land was considered unproductive. And this is according to federal productivity
standards that are less stringent in the Northeast than in other parts of the country, meaning the
differences are likely even greater than revealed by these numbers.
The problem of unproductive land not only affects the largest farms, but also a substantial
portion of small and medium farms as well. As shown in Table VIII, in Pernambuco’s sugar zone
more than sixty percent of all land on medium farms is also unproductive. This is not surprising
given that many of the medium-sized landowners have similar relationships to the land as the
large usinas. Studies have shown that for a significant portion of these producers, agriculture is
not their main economic activity, but rather is used as a portfolio investment and to channel
credits into other urban-based activities (Bicalho and Hoefle 1990). This is especially true as one
moves in from the coastal sugar zone to the cattle-farms of the agreste and sertão. Land owned
by speculative urban capital is used for extensive cattle ranches that are used mostly as a store of
wealth and source of income that can be invested in more lucrative endeavors in the city
(Rodrigues and Rollo 2000a, 40-48, Bicalho and Hoefle 1989).
Meanwhile, small and minifundio farms in the Northeast also suffer from low
productivity, though they are generally more productive than their larger counterparts. This can
be explained as a product of the property relations that developed historically among
Table VIII: Distribution of agricultural land in eastern Pernambuco, 2010
Landholdings
%
Area
% Unproductive
Large
1,258
1 1,407,499 38.4
993,302
Medium
4,097
3.2
737,454 20.2
468,227
Small
15,778 12.4 1,518,048
21
382,980
Minifundio
106,392 83.4
748,709 20.4
-Total
127,525
100 3,663,001
100
1,844,510
Note: Data is for the Agreste and Zona da Mata regions of Pernambuco, area in hectares
Source: INCRA, Sistema Nacional de Cadastro Rural
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%
70.5
63.5
25.2
-50.4

Table IX: Percent of farms that utilize modern technology, 2006
Tractors Soil preparation Fertilizer Pesticides Irrigation
North
Northeast
Southeast
South
Center-West

6
12
25
36
19

14
38
41
71
33

9
18
49
69
23

15
21
28
63
77

2
6
12
5
5

Source: IBGE (2009a)

smallholders here. Unlike in southern Brazil, small landholdings in the Northeast were generally
appropriated outside of any market mechanisms, often by peasants who squatted on land without
title or clear boundaries. This led to small landholdings seldom being accepted by banks as
collateral on loans, thereby restricting the landholders’ ability to make investments. It also led to
a risk-adverse logic in which small producers have tended to avoid investing in modern inputs
like fertilizers and irrigation, despite their potential for greatly increasing productivity
(Rodrigues and Rollo 2000b, 23-32).
According to one recent study, most small farmers in the Northeast are “very cautious,
often not wanting to take out new loans, and, as a result, do not make new investments in
productive improvements” (Rodrigues and Rollo 2000b, 23). Instead of maximizing the
productivity of their land, “many small producers opt for crops with low production costs that
require a lower level of investment and less risk, such as mandioc, yams, bananas, and fruits”
(Rodrigues and Rollo 2000b, 23). These crops are used primarily as subsistence goods to feed
the farmer and family, with only surpluses being sold on the market. This is similar to the
situation described in Chapter 2 for small farmers throughout much of the Global South.
Both large and small farms in the Northeast also continue to use very rudimentary
processes of production. As can be seen in Table IX, producers in the northern regions have
much lower rates of adoption of modern methods and technology than their counterparts in other
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Table X: Agricultural productivity by major regions of Brazil, 2006
Landholdings Total production Labor force Productivity
(R$1000 )
(R$/worker)
North
412,935
9,141,737
1,655,649
5,522
Northeast
2,225,605
29,218,651
7,699,138
3,795
Southeast
797,846
52,879,410
3,283,049
16,107
South
938,446
43,926,142
2,920,445
15,041
Center-West
264,043
28,820,355
1,009,924
28,537
Total
4,638,875
163,986,295 16,568,205
9,898
Source: IBGE (2009a)

parts of the country. Even when it comes to basic improvements like tractors, soil preparation or
irrigation, farms in the northern regions are only about half as likely as farms in the southern and
central regions of the country to adopt these improvements, and only a small minority utilize
basic inputs like fertilizer. The same is true for a number of other agricultural implements and
machinery included in the agricultural census, such as plows, harrowers, harvesters, and
reapers.27
All of this has translated to the Northeast having significantly lower levels of labor
productivity in agriculture than other regions of the country. As shown in Table X, the
Northeast’s total output per worker in 2006 was less than one-fourth what it is in the Southeast
region of the country, and less than one-seventh of that of the agricultural powerhouse Center-

27

There have emerged some pockets of modernized agriculture in recent decades, but only to a
limited extent. The expansion of irrigation projects in the São Francisco river valley, for
example, have led to areas of high productivity sugar cane and fruit production, and mechanized
grain farming has emerged in recent years on the cerrado plains of Bahia, Piauí, and Maranhão.
Some small farmers in the sertão have also shown the possibilities of greatly increasing output
through irrigation with drilled wells, opening the possibility that the semi-arid desert region
could become a center of capital-intensive agriculture. However, these inroads of high
productivity are still very small in relation to the whole, taking up only a very small portion of
the total land area of the Northeast. For example, in the São Francisco valley the total amount of
irrigated land does not reach even 1 million hectares, whereas the total agricultural land area of
the Northeast region is around 75 million hectares.
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West. Compared to the level of productivity for Brazil as a whole, the Northeast has little more
than one-third of the national average. The only other region that is comparable is the North,
which has been shaped by similar historical processes of land appropriation and plantation
agriculture.
As we will see in Chapter 6, this divergence goes back to at least the early 20 th century,
when agricultural productivity began to grow more rapidly in São Paulo than in other parts of the
country. Important differences in the agrarian economies in each region were already evident by
the first decades of the 20th century, and they would continue to grow larger over time. While in
São Paulo changes to the rural property relations spurred a new productive logic in agriculture,
the consolidation of non-market property relations in the Northeast hindered productivity growth.
As will be explained in the next chapter, this greatly impacted the regional processes of
industrialization.
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CHAPTER 6:
The Regional Concentration of Industrialization

Industrial investment in Brazil did not become significant until the end of the 19th
century, with the largest increase in the first decades of the 20th century. By the 1920s,
industrialization was well underway, and manufacturing became the leading growth sector of the
economy by the 1930s. Though this was later than much of the developed world, it was
considerably earlier and more intense than much the rest of Latin America. Rapid industrial
growth transformed the state of São Paulo into a regional economic powerhouse, and it would
remain the dynamic center of the industrialization process throughout the 20th century.
Why did industrialization happen at this time? And why was it so concentrated in only
one part of the country? Some scholars argue that the timing had to do with the occurrence of
various external shocks to the economy, such as World War I and the Great Depression of 1929.
These events interrupted the flow of imports to Brazil and opened space for the growth of
domestic industries. Meanwhile, scholars generally agree that industrialization centered in the
Southeast region due to the more lucrative coffee economy and the boom in agricultural exports
that centered in this region. The expansion of the agricultural economy led to increasing income
per capita among the local population, and this increased the size of internal markets for
manufactured goods.
However, these accounts are not entirely adequate for explaining the timing and location
of industrialization. Depending on the circumstances, external shocks like wars and recessions
can also lead to decreases in industrial investment in a country rather than industrial growth. And
commodity booms like that experienced by Southeast Brazil have seldom led to sustained
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increases in per capita income, much less rapid industrialization. Indeed, they often have the
opposite effect. For sustained increases in per capita income to occur it is necessary to have
increases in output per capita, or labor productivity, which then leads to growing internal
markets for consumer goods. How this occurs can seldom be explained by commodity booms or
external shocks to the economy.
In this chapter, I present an alternative interpretation of Brazilian industrialization based
on the regional differences in agricultural productivity. I argue that it was the more rapid
productivity growth in São Paulo and the surrounding region that fueled the growth in per capita
income, and therefore the expansion of the domestic market. This can explain not only the
location of Brazil’s industrialization process in and around the state of São Paulo, but also its
timing in the first decades of the 20th century. Though data from this period are scarce, statistics
gleaned from early agricultural and industrial censuses provide strong support for this alternative
account.1

Debating the origins
Suzigan (2000) divides the various interpretations of Brazilian industrialization into four
main groups: 1) the theory of “adverse shocks”; 2) the expansion of agricultural exports; 3) the
late development of capitalism; and 4) state-sponsored industrialization. Though we will not go
into each of these here, industrialization is argued to have originated from one of these four

1

As noted in Chapter 5, there are a number of reasons why census data may not be an accurate
depiction of reality. This is true for both agricultural and industrial censuses, and especially for
those from the early 20th century which were carried out with more rudimentary methods. Yet,
these censuses are some of the only sources of economic data from this period and can be used to
obtain an understanding of general trends and patterns. Moreover, any biases inherent to their
methodology would likely be present across all regions of the country, and therefore would not
invalidate regional comparisons.
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factors. While some argue that external shocks like World War I and the Great Depression were
what sparked industrial growth, others contend that the coffee economy and expansion of
agricultural exports were more important. Meanwhile, others see industrialization as a natural
result of the development of capitalist relations in Brazil having begun first in agriculture with
the transition to wage labor. Still others argue that state protections and industrial policy were the
primary catalysts.
Each of these factors likely played a role, but none of them can adequately explain the
origins of Brazil’s industrialization. While it is true that external shocks like World War I
provided some amount of protection to domestic industries, these have often had more negative
than positive impacts on industrial investment. Scholars have shown that investment actually
declined significantly in Brazil during World War I, and growth slowed to considerably less than
the pre-war average (Suzigan 2000, 56, 83). Meanwhile, the transition to more capitalistic labor
regimes around the turn of the century also happened across much the rest of Latin America, yet
it seldom led to major processes of industrialization (Duncan and Rutledge 1977). As for state
intervention, it was actually quite limited in the first decades of the 20th century with deliberate
industrial policy not emerging until several decades later (Suzigan 2000, 41).
The one factor that cannot be disputed is the coffee boom in the Southeast region and the
major expansion of agricultural exports around the turn of the 20th century. As described in
Chapter 4, from the 1880s to the 1920s, São Paulo’s coffee economy expanded greatly, with
coffee exports increasing by some 300 percent and high coffee prices generating a massive influx
of wealth into the country. Some argue that this stimulated industrialization both through the
increased income per capita among the local population, as well as through the investment of
capital from the coffee elite into new industries (Dean 1969, Silva 1976, Cano 1990). As greater
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income per capita generated greater demand for consumer and manufactured goods, a number of
industries sprang up to supply them, and a number of capital goods industries eventually
emerged to produce industrial inputs as well.
However, the coffee boom by itself is also inadequate for explaining the timing or
location of industrialization. As noted in Chapter 4, there were other commodity booms in Latin
America around this same time, but these did not lead to sustained increases in per capita income
or large-scale processes of industrialization. Other countries like Colombia, Venezuela, and
Costa Rica were also major coffee exporters, yet they did not experience anything like São
Paulo’s industrial growth in the early 20th century. Meanwhile, coffee prices were not
particularly high in the first decade of the 20th century when industrial growth took off, and they
fell considerably after 1929. Thus, the coffee boom alone cannot account for the growth in per
capita income or the take-off in industrial investment.
Moreover, commodity booms generally do not lead to major increases in industrial
investment. In fact, much of the literature on commodity booms argues that they tend to have the
opposite effect, with mechanisms like Dutch disease leading to a decline in investment outside
the booming sector and negative impacts on other sectors of the economy (Corden and Neary
1982). Unless there are advancements in technology and improved efficiency, any temporary rise
in per capita income is not likely to be maintained over the long term and will eventually return
to previous levels with the fall in commodity prices. Domestic markets for consumer goods and
industrial inputs will contract along with the decline in income, causing investment to fall off.
On the whole, long-term and sustained growth in per capita income is unlikely to occur in
an economy unless there also is an increase in output per capita, or productivity growth. This
raises gross domestic product on a per capita basis, producing a greater economic surplus and
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creating the conditions for higher wages. As explained in Chapter 2, economic development in
the developed countries involved qualitative changes in the production process, such as
improvements in methods and technology that allowed for greater efficiency and, thereby,
greater output per worker. In southeast Brazil, a similar process occurred in the first decades of
the 20th century, with agricultural productivity increasing to a much higher level than in other
parts of the country. This was not the result of a commodity boom or external shocks to the
economy, but rather was due to the greater investment from São Paulo’s growing smallholder
sector.

Agricultural productivity
At the end of the 19th century, agricultural productivity was fairly similar in northeast and
southeast Brazil. Though there is little data from this period, it has often been argued that
agricultural yields were the same or even higher in the Northeast until the early 20 th century. The
agricultural census of 1920 lists production per hectare statistics for a number of crops and the
regional differences are minimal (MAIC 1924, XIX-XXXIV). While the southeastern states held
a slight lead in goods like coffee, corn, and rice, the northeastern states did better in cotton and
cacao, and the two were nearly identical in several others.
The lack of any significant difference in yields has led some to argue that agriculture
played little role in the regional divergences that began to emerge around this time (Deutsch
1994, 150-155; Nichols 1970). These arguments often see agricultural modernization as
occurring much later as a response to the industrialization process already underway. As urban
and industrial development progressed in and around São Paulo, it facilitated a modernization of
agriculture by absorbing labor from the countryside, creating demand for food and consumer
goods, and generating a flow of capital into the surrounding farms. As a result, by the mid-20th
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Figure X: Labor productivity in agriculture for major regions of Brazil, 1900-1960
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century, agricultural productivity began to benefit from the industrialization process that had
begun several decades earlier.
However, this argument can only be maintained if we focus only on the productivity of
land, or agricultural yields. When we look instead at the productivity of labor, or total output per
worker, we find a very different story. Agricultural output per worker can be calculated on a
regional level by dividing the total value of agricultural production in each state by the total
number of people employed in agriculture that year, and then adjusting for inflation. Though
there is no data on this from the 19th century, agricultural censuses from the early 20th century
allow for calculation beginning in 1900 in São Paulo, and from 1920 for the rest of the country.
As shown in Figure X, there was in fact fairly rapid agricultural productivity growth in
the state of São Paulo in the first decades of the 20th century. Labor productivity nearly doubled
between 1900 and 1920, growing at nearly 3 percent per year during this period, and quickly
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pulling away from much the rest of the country. By 1920, the state of São Paulo had a level of
labor productivity that was nearly twice the national average and more than three times higher
than the Northeast region. By 1960, São Paulo had reached nearly three times the national
average and four times the productivity of the Northeast.
Meanwhile, in much the rest of the country productivity stagnated. Though there is no
data on the real productivity of other parts of the country before 1920, the pre-1920 trajectories
have been estimated based on their post-1920 growth rates. From 1920 to 1960, labor
productivity in the Northeast region grew by only about twenty-five percent over the whole
period, or about 0.5 percent per year. In the southernmost states it was equally slow, while in the
western and northernmost regions productivity growth was slightly faster. All were far inferior to
what occurred in São Paulo in the first half of the 20th century.2
In other words, the census data seem to confirm our argument about what was happening
in terms of agricultural productivity growth in the various regions of the country. Unlike other
accounts that see agricultural modernization as occurring later as a result of industrialization, it is
clear from this data that productivity in São Paulo was already increasing fairly rapidly before
and during the industrialization process, while remaining relatively stagnant in other parts of the
country. This supports the argument made in Chapter 4 that the changes occurring on São
Paulo’s coffee frontier at this time were leading to a distinct productive logic in agriculture.
The data also confirm that there was greater investment and capital accumulation in São
Paulo’s agriculture at this time. The 1920 census contains data for each state of Brazil on a

2

It is unlikely that productivity grew any faster before 1920. Unlike in São Paulo, there was little
change occurring in these regions’ agricultural sectors at this time. Though in the Northeast
many of the largest sugar plantations were updating their milling technology in the first decades
of the century, it would have little impact on productivity in the fields (see Chapter 5).
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Table XI: Investment in agriculture in major regions of Brazil, 1920
Farm value Improvements Machinery Percent of land
per hectare per hectare
per hectare cultivated
(milreis)
(milreis)
(milreis)
(%)
North
15
3.6
0.32
0.6
Northeast
48
11.3
1.46
3.4
Center-West
11
1.7
0.13
0.3
Southeast
119
22
4.43
8.9
-São Paulo
204
38.3
8.56
14.3
South
92
12.5
2.16
4.0
All Brazil
60
10.9
1.87
0.8
Source: MAIC (1924)

number of variables, including the percent of land that was cultivated, the total value of farms,
and the value of improvements and machinery used in production. As shown in Table IX, the
state of São Paulo greatly surpassed the rest of the country in all of these areas. The value of
farms was more than three times higher in São Paulo than the national average, and more than
four times higher than the Northeast region. This is due in part to higher land values in this part
of the country, which would have driven up the total value of farms. But it is also the result of
higher levels of investment.
As can be seen, investment in improvements and machinery in São Paulo stood far above
the rest of the country in 1920. In total value of farm improvements, São Paulo had nearly four
times the national average, and more than three times the Northeast region. With respect to
agricultural machinery, Paulista farms invested nearly five times the national average in
machinery, and nearly six times as much as the Northeast. This means that farmers were
channeling far more investment back into their farms than in other regions of the country,
especially in labor-saving improvements like machinery. This is also supported by the percent of
land cultivated in São Paulo, which was considerably higher than the rest of the country.
In other words, there was clearly a higher rate of capital accumulation taking place in
Paulista agriculture in the first decades of the 20th century. Labor productivity was increasing at a
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much faster rate than in the rest of the country, and this was driven by greater investment in farm
improvements and labor-saving machinery. This, in turn, would lead to higher per capita income
among rural producers, making it a key factor in the expansion of domestic markets for industry.
The more dynamic agriculture in this part of the country would also generate a number of
linkages to other sectors of the economy and become a major catalyst for industrial growth.

Industrial growth in São Paulo
The above trends in agricultural productivity provide a more plausible explanation for
both the timing and location of Brazil’s industrialization process. Scholars generally agree that
industrial growth did not take off until the end of the 19th century, increasing most significantly
in the first decades of the 20th century. This coincides with the changes in rural property relations
and rising productivity that were occurring in São Paulo around this time. It also explains why
the vast majority of industrial growth would occur in and around the state of São Paulo, as this
was the only region in which major changes in the agrarian economy were taking place.

Figure XI: Manufacturing investment in Brazil, 1855-1935
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Figure XII: Manufacturing firms founded in Brazil and São Paulo, 1870-1919
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Given the lack of official data from this period, Suzigan (2000) has estimated industrial
investment based on the value of industrial imports to Brazil from its major suppliers abroad. As
shown in Figure XI, there was a brief increase in industrial investment in the 1880s and 1890s,
probably as a result of the Encilhamento, an economic bubble created by increased money
supply and credit. This was also the period in which the large influx of immigration into the
southern parts of the country began, which likely stimulated various industries. However, the
largest increases did not occur until after 1900, when immigration had fallen and changes in
Paulista agriculture were starting to take place. This increase was interrupted in 1914, when
World War I brought a sharp decline in industrial imports. After the war, investment would shoot
back up, lasting throughout the 1920s until the Great Depression caused another temporary fall.
Additional measures of industrial growth can be gleaned from census data on the number
of industrial firms founded in each period. As can be seen in Figure XII, the total number of new
industrial firms first began increasing in the 1880s. But it was not until the 20th century that there
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was a real explosion of new industries, with thousands of new firms popping up after 1900. The
process was concentrated in São Paulo, with the state making up over 30 percent of all new
industries founded in those years. By 1920, there were a total of 4,145 industrial firms in São
Paulo, and 13,336 nationally (MAIC 1927b). This was up from just 314 firms in 1907, and only
2,988 nationwide. In the 13 years between 1907 and 1920, the total value of industrial production
in Brazil more than quadrupled, and in São Paulo it increased nearly ten-fold (MAIC 1927b).
This explosive growth was likely fueled by the increasing agricultural productivity that
was occurring in São Paulo at this time. Productivity growth in agriculture would have
stimulated industrialization in a number of ways, including by increasing the size of the internal
market for manufactured goods, by generating forward and backward linkages to various
agriculture-related industries, and through increased government revenues invested in other
sectors of the economy. 3 Indeed, there is evidence that all of these were occurring as a result of
the changes on São Paulo’s coffee frontier and the emergence of smallholder agriculture.
In the case of the expanding internal market, Font (2010, 94-96) argues that there were
few other possible sources for growing demand outside of the smallholder sector. On the large
coffee plantations in the center of the state, workers were paid only partially through wage
income, giving them limited possibilities for consumption. Any surpluses that coffee workers
acquired usually went into savings with the goal of eventually purchasing land of their own.
Meanwhile, the total number of laborers on the plantations increased by only about 13 percent
between 1890 and 1913 and remained relatively stable thereafter until the 1920s.

3

Hirschman (1984) categorizes these as consumption linkages, production linkages, and fiscal
linkages
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Major urban centers were likely not the main source of increasing demand either, as their
proportion of the state’s total population barely increased between 1900 and 1920. By 1920, the
city of São Paulo still made up only 12.6 percent of the state’s total population, and the vast
majority of Brazil’s population was still living in the countryside at this time (Font 2010, 95).
Agriculture was the primary occupation of nearly 70 percent of those who declared a profession
in the 1920 census, and most of the immigration during this period was still destined to rural
parts of the country, primarily in São Paulo (MAIC 1930, Holloway 1980, 180). As shown in
Chapter 4, there was a continual growth of the smallholding class throughout western São Paulo
and into neighboring states that would continue for many years to come.
Therefore, given the predominantly rural population, increasing productivity in the
agricultural sector would have had major impacts on the larger economy. A rise in income and
profits among this largest segment of the population would result in increased disposable income
among farmers and increasing demand for various consumer goods. It also would have created
demand for various farm-related inputs and services.
In fact, the sectors with the fastest growth during this period were those producing goods
consumed by small farmers, such as clothing, shoes, food, and construction materials (MAIC
1927b). While there were only nine shoe factories in São Paulo in 1907, by 1920 this had
increased to over 500 (MAIC 1927b). The number of cloth factories also quadrupled from 28 to
112 over the same period, while beverage manufacturers went from 57 to 230 (MAIC 1927b). Of
the 696 ceramics factories registered in 1920, only 57 of them were founded before 1900, while
over 500 were founded after 1910. And of the 1,267 food industries, 80 percent of them were
founded after 1905 (MAIC 1927b). Other consumer goods that saw major increases were soap,
candles, glass, cigars, wagons, and paint.
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Contemporary observers noted that much of this new business activity was due to the
thousands of small farmers who were now spending their earnings in town and cities along the
frontier. As one observer wrote from western São Paulo:
“The existence of so many small farms and ranches results in a great benefit: the greater
quantity of landowners, all bearers of wealth, bring to the urban centers their quota of
efficient cooperation for the development of the town…” (Caldeira 1928b, 202).

Manoel Vilas Boas, a journalist traveling through the frontier in the 1930s, noted that much of
the newly formed commercial activity in these zones was directed to the coffee farms, with
numerous industries producing items like bricks, mattresses, baskets, pastas, soap, vinegar, and
bullets (Vilas Boas 1937, 121). In one town, there were 12 ceramic factories that “working every
day could not meet the demand for all the bricks needed by the [local] constructions” (Vilas Boas
1937, 13).
This increased business activity seemed to happen more in areas dominated by
smallholders than in the more traditional coffee regions. In places where small farmers
dominated there was greater “division of the wealth,” and “more individual interests than [in
areas with] large landholdings” (Vilas Boas 1937, 14, 60). This translated to a larger consumer
class to purchase good produced by industries in the cities and towns. The “influence of the
small farmers” was so great that it “amazes not only Paulistas who are accustomed to booms of
this sort, but any foreigner who might come to see the evolution [of these frontier towns]” (Vilas
Boas 1937, 15).
Industrial growth was not only due to the increased spending and consumption generated
by the new smallholding class, but also from the various forward and backward linkages being
created from their growing agricultural production. By the 1920s, there were a variety of
enterprises across the frontier involved in processing crops and supplying farm inputs to local
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farms. Though most of the frontier zones specialized in coffee production, many small farmers
also produced other goods like cotton, rice, corn, and livestock, and these were stimulating the
growth of a number of industries both upstream and downstream.
According to census data, the capital invested in farm-related sectors like grain mills,
vegetable oils, fertilizers, and leather tanning more than tripled between 1907 and 1920 (MAIC
1927b). Other sectors like cotton spinning, lard production, wagon building, butter, and cheese
production more than doubled (MAIC 1927b). Meanwhile, the constant clearing of trees from
frontier land stimulated massive growth in wood-related industries like sawmills, paper,
cardboard, and furniture, increasing production by over five-fold altogether. Various
metalworking industries were also sprouting up, producing agricultural inputs like farm
implements, milling machinery, and transportation. Marson (2015) shows that many of the
earliest foundries and machine factories were founded in frontier cities to supply local industries
and agriculture with repairs and replacement parts for their equipment.
Vilas Boas (1937, 102) noted that the increased output of various crops along the frontier
was leading to investment in new industries there, including “machines for processing rice and
coffee, brick factories, ceramic factories… and, notably, machines for farming”. In one
southwestern town “the increasing intensity of cotton cultivation… led a group of capitalists to
become interested in setting up a cotton mill” (Vilas Boas 1937, 61). In another there were
already “more than ten cotton mills, including a number of cotton gins,” one with a modern
hydraulic press “to serve the surrounding zones.” In the northwestern town of Catanduva, there
were now “33 coffee mills, 18 for rice, 5 for cotton, [and] 3 for corn” while in another there were
“8 mechanic workshops, 5 wagon workshops, 6 sawmills, 12 ceramics shops, 12 coffee mills,
and 3 cotton mills” (Vilas Boas 1937, 15, 121). Further north in the town of Lins there were
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“mills for processing cotton, coffee, and rice, and agricultural machinery factories” (Vilas Boas
1937, 26).
There were also major fiscal benefits associated with smallholder agriculture. Taxes paid
by farmers were transferred to other sectors of the economy through public investments, and this
stimulated growth outside the agricultural sector. Where small farms predominated, “[t]he
division of land has benefits in taxation and in overall production… both in monetary terms and
in terms of the diversity of production” (Vilas Boas 1937, 48). The abundant harvests of
thousands of small farmers meant “the municipal revenues increase[d]”, and this left local
governments with greater resources to invest in things like public services, roads, and urban
infrastructure like water and sewage (Vilas Boas 1937, 62). Where before there were “beat up
roads, full of potholes” and everything was “left to abandon, without maintenance,” there were
now “modernized highways,” “improved streets,” new infrastructure (Vilas Boas 1937, 132133).
In other words, the feverish activity of thousands of small farmers on São Paulo’s frontier
was stimulating industrial growth in a number of ways. Their greater productivity and investment
led to massive growth in those sectors most closely connected to the smallholder economy,
generating forward and backward linkages across the economy. To contemporary observers like
Vilas Boas, it was clear that “small farmers undoubtedly bring progress to a city much faster than
the latifundios” (1937, 14).

Regional concentration
The argument that industrialization concentrated in certain areas due to the underlying
agrarian dynamics is supported by statistical analysis. A comparison of Brazil’s 21 states shows
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that there was a link between agricultural productivity and industrialization from early on in the
development process. The level of industrialization in each state can be calculated based on the
per capita value of manufacturing in 1920, as well as the total capital invested in manufacturing,
both available in the 1920 industrial census. Labor productivity in agriculture was calculated
using the same method as Figure X above.
As shown in Figure XIII, there is a strong positive correlation between agricultural
productivity and industrialization, indicating a fairly strong relationship between the two
variables. For the most part, states with higher productivity in agriculture were also more
industrialized by 1920, both in terms of manufacturing production per capita and total capital
invested per capita. The most highly industrialized states were São Paulo and Rio Grande do Sul,
both of which had undergone major processes of immigration and the development of
smallholder agriculture. Meanwhile, the states at the bottom of the scale are mostly from the
North and Northeast regions of the country, where latifundist, elite-dominated agriculture
continued to prevail, and little productivity growth had occurred since the 19th century.
The relationship to agricultural productivity can be explained in part by the fact that
industrial investment tends to concentrate in areas where there are larger consumer markets for
manufactured goods (Krugman 1980). Where agricultural productivity was higher, it would have
translated to higher income for farmers and rural workers, therefore creating greater consumer
demand from the rural population in these states. Industries would be more likely to locate their
operations near these centers of demand, both to achieve economies of scale and to minimize the
costs of transporting production to market. In addition, industries that relied on inputs from
agriculture or other industries would tend to locate near their major suppliers.
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Figure XIII: Agricultural productivity and industrialization in Brazilian states, 1920
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This same logic also explains the outliers in the data. Rio de Janeiro, for example, stands
out for its relatively high level of industrialization, surpassing several states with higher levels of
agricultural productivity. However, this would be expected given that the state was home to the
nation’s capital and major port city, giving it a large urban population and broad consumer
market. Thus, more industry was located in this state despite its relatively lower level of
agricultural productivity.
The same could be said for why relatively little industry was located in less-populated
states like Paraná, Goiás and Mato Grosso. Despite relatively higher levels of agricultural
productivity, these states would not have been attractive locations for industrial investment given
their small populations and remoteness from the nation’s major consumer markets. Thus,
relatively little industry would find it attractive to locate there.
The clear leader of the industrialization process by this time was the state of São Paulo,
and industrial growth would concentrate here from this point forward. Its higher level of
agricultural productivity and growing rural and urban populations gave São Paulo the largest and
fastest growing consumer market in the country, and it would continue to pull away from the rest
of the country in terms of industrial output. While the state accounted for just 16 percent of all
industrial production in 1907, by 1920 this had increased to over 30 percent, and by 1960 it
surpassed 55 percent (Rattner 1972, 36). Meanwhile, Rio de Janeiro accounted for about 33
percent of all industry in 1907, yet by the 1960s this had declined to less than 10 percent (Rattner
1972, 36).
Compared to the Northeast, São Paulo’s growth was even more remarkable. In 1907, the
state had a total industrial production that was only about one-fifth greater than the Northeast
region. Yet, by 1920 it had increased to more than two and a half times greater, and by 1960 was
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nearly seven times greater (See Figure XIV). In per capita terms, manufacturing output in São
Paulo was more than six times that of the Northeast in 1940 and would reach more than eleven
times higher by 1960 (IBGE 2009b).
As we have seen, this process began with the growth of agricultural related industries and
consumer goods directed largely at São Paulo’s rural sector. However, by the 1920s this began to
change as the industrialization process diversified away from a reliance on agriculture. By the
end of the decade, there was a considerable market in São Paulo not only for consumer goods but
also for a number of industrial inputs needed by the growing industrial sector. As a result,
investment began to shift toward the production of intermediate and capital goods like cement,
iron, chemicals, and industrial equipment. More sophisticated consumer goods also began to be
produced, such as silk, rayon, rubber, electronics, cosmetics, and pharmaceuticals (Suzigan 2000,
261-361).

Figure XIV: Manufacturing output in São Paulo and Northeast Brazil, 1920-1960
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Over the next few decades, there was massive growth of industrial activity in São Paulo.
By the 1940s, major steel plants and hydroelectric power plants were inaugurated, and in the
1950s the production of a variety of consumer and capital goods greatly expanded. Auto parts,
petrochemicals, machines, and processed food all saw significant growth, and by the 1960s the
country’s first auto factory was opened in the state of São Paulo. There was also a domestic ship
building industry, and in the 1970s an aircraft industry and high-tech electronics industries were
established. By the 1980s, industry made up more than one-third of the country’s gross domestic
product, and for the first time in history manufactures exports surpassed the value of primary
good exports (IBGE 2009b). This represented an almost complete transformation of the
country’s economy from one dependent on primary exports, to one resembling a modern
industrialized nation.
The same did not occur in rest of the country. While São Paulo underwent a rapid and
far-reaching industrialization process, other regions of the country experienced comparatively
little industrial growth. If São Paulo’s development was rooted in the changing agrarian economy
that emerged in the first decades of the 20th century, in other regions similar changes did not
occur, and this limited the possibilities for industrial growth. In the Northeast region, agricultural
productivity growth was especially slow, and this was a major factor behind its relatively
lackluster industrialization process.

Industrial growth in the Northeast
At the beginning of the 20th century, the Northeast was not that far behind the state of São
Paulo in terms of industrial development. In 1907, total industrial output in the northeastern
states was about 33 percent less than the state of São Paulo, and industrial investment was only
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about 19 percent less (MAIC 1927b). The total population of the Northeast was considerably
larger at that time, meaning that in per capita terms the differences were greater. But in terms of
total output and investment, the Northeast was not considerably less industrialized.
In fact, the widespread cultivation of cotton in the Northeast meant it was an early center
of textile and clothing production. Many of the nation’s first cotton mills and textile factories
were set up in the states of Bahia, Alagoas, and Pernambuco, and by 1907 a total of 45 textile
factories existed in the region compared to only 28 in the state of São Paulo (MAIC 1927b).
There were also 23 shoe factories in northeastern states, compared to only nine in São Paulo at
that time (MAIC 1927b). With a total population of around 7 million people, the Northeast was
the second largest region in the country, only slightly behind the Southeast region with 8 million
(IBGE 2009b). This meant that all else being equal, the Northeast would have represented a
considerable consumer market for domestic industries.
However, as we have seen, things were not equal, and agricultural productivity was
considerably lower in the Northeast from the beginning of the 20th century. This meant that the
average income of rural workers would have also been lower, and food costs considerably
higher, thus negatively impacting the size of the consumer market. In addition, the concentration
of land ownership and persistence of various non-wage labor systems on the plantations meant
that much of the population had little disposable income. Unlike in Southeast Brazil, there was
no independent smallholder class to stimulate agrarian change and drive productivity growth.
Thus, even though there was considerable industrial growth in the Northeast in the first
decades of the 20th century, it was far less than what occurred in São Paulo. From 1907 to 1920,
total industrial investment in the Northeast increased by 158 percent, while in São Paulo it
increased by 354 percent (MAIC 1927b). In terms of the total value of production, the Northeast
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saw an increase of 425 percent over that period, while São Paulo saw an increase of 790 percent
(MAIC 1927b). By 1920, 5 more textile plants opened in the Northeast, bringing the regional
total to 50. However, in that same period 84 new plants opened in the state of São Paulo and a
total of 125 in the Southeast region as a whole, bringing its total to 238 (MAIC 1927b). Sectors
in which the Northeast once held a lead, such as cotton milling, textiles, shoes, and cigars, were
quickly surpassed by the rapid industrial growth of the Southeast.
By the 1930s, the Northeast had only about one-third of the industrial output of São
Paulo, and about one-fourth the total investment (IBGE 1950a). While in São Paulo the number
of industrial establishments increased by over ten thousand from 1920 to 1940, in the
northeastern states it increased by only about half that number (IBGE 1950a). There was also
little diversification into capital goods or more complex consumer goods in the Northeast as had
occurred in São Paulo. The industrial base remained heavily concentrated in sectors like textiles
and food processing, with almost no investment in more advanced sectors like metalworking and
machinery. By 1940, metalworking and machinery did not even surpass 2 percent of all
industrial investment, while in São Paulo it already made up nearly 14 percent (IBGE 1950a).
These differences would continue to accentuate over the course of the 20th century. By
the 1950s, the Northeast only had about one-fifth the industrial output of São Paulo, and only
about one-tenth in per capita terms. By the 1960s, the disparities between the regions became so
large that the federal government began to intervene to address the problem. The regional
development agency SUDENE was formed in 1959 to promote investment and stimulate growth
in the Northeast, and in the 1970s federal tax incentives were adopted to encourage investment
and attract industries to the region. This led to significant growth in sectors like construction, soft
drinks, shoes, and other consumer goods, and the regional disparities were somewhat reduced.
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In the second half of the century, industrial output grew faster in the Northeast than in
São Paulo, causing a slight convergence between the two regions. As a result of federal
subsidies, a number of industries began to relocate to the Northeast and open new factories there.
Meanwhile, industrial growth in São Paulo began to decline after 1980 when the region began to
experience a period of deindustrialization. But given the underlying conditions in agriculture and
weak demand in the Northeast, many of the newly relocated industries could not achieve
economies of scale and would not survive. Even with the subsidies, many industries were still
uncompetitive against “imports” from the Southeast, as local markets continued to be
characterized by low levels of consumption and purchasing power. This also meant that there
were still insufficient incentives for many of the more advanced capital-intensive industries to
relocate to the region (Brandão 2004, 19-35).
By the end of the century, the disparities between the regions were still considerable. As
shown in Table III, when measured in per capita terms the Northeast remains vastly less
industrialized than the rest of the country. Though it is still the second most populous region in
Brazil, its total manufacturing output is still only a small fraction of the South and Southeast
regions, and only about one and a half times greater than the less-populated Center-West region.
In per capita terms, it is even further behind, with less the one-fourth the level of industrialization
of the South and Southeast, and less than half that of the Center-West. The only comparable
Table XII: Manufacturing value added (MVA) by regions of Brazil, 2012

North
Northeast
Southeast
South
Center-West
Total

Total value added
(R$1,000,000)
20,008
44,646
282,677
106,024
29,140
482,494

Population
16,318,163
53,907,144
81,565,983
27,731,644
14,423,952
193,946,886

Source: IBGE (2017)
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MVA Per capita
1,226
828
3,466
3,823
2,020
2,488

region is the North which also exhibits low agricultural productivity relative to the rest of the
country. These low levels of industrialization translate to the higher levels of unemployment, and
thereby exacerbate the poverty and poor social indicators that characterize the region.
In other words, the large regional differences in terms of industrialization and economic
development that characterize contemporary Brazil can be understood largely in terms of the
distinct processes of agrarian change that occurred across the country in the 20 th century. In the
Southeast, São Paulo underwent an industrialization process that was unprecedented in Latin
America. By the end of the 20th century, it was not only the most industrialized region of Brazil,
but also one of the most industrialized regions anywhere in the developing world. This was due
in large part to the changes in agriculture and the new agricultural economy that emerged prior to
industrialization, which stimulated rapid growth in productivity and expanded markets for
manufactured goods.
In the Northeast, on the other hand, industrialization was far less impressive, and it seems
clear that one of the key causes was its lower level of productivity in agriculture. The persistence
of latifundist, elite-dominated property relations throughout the 20th century prevented rapid
growth in agricultural productivity, thus blocking one of the key drivers of increased income and
consumer spending among the local population. Lacking this important stimulus from the
countryside, the industrialization process played out much as it did in other parts of Latin
America, with an industrial sector heavily concentrated in basic consumer goods, and little
diversification into more advanced capital goods industries. This left the region trailing behind in
terms of industrial growth and economic dynamism, and overly dependent on the same
agricultural exports that have dominated the region for centuries.
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This is the root of uneven development in Brazil. The major differences in agricultural
and industrial growth were not products of external factors like world markets or particular
commodity exports, nor does it appear that they were the product of cultural or institutional
factors. The key difference is to be found in the way agricultural production came to be
organized in each place, the product of distinct histories of land settlement and appropriation,
and the economic incentives they created for investment in agriculture.
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CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study has been to demonstrate the importance of agrarian dynamics in
understanding uneven processes of economic development. The different forms that agriculture
has taken in different parts of world can go a long way toward explaining the large divide in
development outcomes across the globe, and this has often been overlooked in the development
literature. Where rural producers are compelled to invest in improvements and maximize the
productivity of the land, it results in an important stimulus to the rest of the economy in terms of
industrialization and economic diversification. However, where rural producers are not subject to
market pressures to maximize productivity, and where they employ productive strategies that
minimize risk, it can result in low agricultural productivity and reduced economic and industrial
growth. These differences in productive logic are shaped by the distinct ways that land has been
occupied and appropriated in different places, and the resulting relationships between producers
and the land.
In the case of Brazil, we have seen how the different forms that agriculture took in the
northern and southern regions of the country had major consequences for the subsequent
development of each region. While in Northeast Brazil much of the land was acquired by
political and economic elites through various non-market mechanisms or outside any market
constraints, in the Southeast it was smallholder farmers purchasing land in dynamic land markets
that came to dominate the landscape from the early 20th century. These distinct patterns of land
settlement led to distinct productive logics in agriculture, and this greatly impacted how
industrialization and economic development took place over the course of the 20th century.
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This agrarian basis of uneven development in Brazil is similar to processes of uneven
development in other parts of the world. Those places where more dynamic agriculture has
emerged are also where processes of industrialization have tended to concentrate, both in
developed and developing countries. Meanwhile, in less developed zones, low-productivity
agriculture still prevails throughout the countryside, and low-intensity plantation agriculture is
common across large parts of Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Even in areas where smallholder
agriculture predominates, it tends to be low-productivity subsistence farming, with little use of
modern inputs and technologies. This presents important barriers for industrial growth in these
regions.
As shown in Chapter 1, even the most advanced countries in the developing world are far
behind the wealthy nations in terms of industrialization. In most cases, per capita manufacturing
is only a fraction of what it is in the developed world, and this makes it impossible for these
countries to provide formal employment or livable wages for large segments of their populations.
Weak demand from the agricultural sector and narrow domestic markets place limits on
industrial growth, leaving developing countries with truncated and underdeveloped
manufacturing sectors and few prospects for the deepening of the industrialization process. The
result is an undiversified economy, with high levels of poverty and many of the related social
problems that plague the developing world.
These problems are unlikely to be resolved without a transformation of the agricultural
sector in these countries. In most developing countries, there are few other sectors of the
economy with the capacity to generate strong linkages to industry or stimulate the growth of
domestic markets for manufactured goods. In the Global North, structural transformation was in
virtually every case preceded by important changes in agriculture that spurred industrialization
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and facilitated the diversification of the economy. However, in the Global South, the same kinds
of land appropriation and rural property relations have seldom emerged, and rural producers use
vast areas for low-intensity or subsistence agriculture. The result is that agricultural productivity
is very low throughout much of the developing world, and, in most cases, continues to fall
further behind the developed world.
But if ransforming agriculture may spur development in the Global South, there are
widely diverging views on how it might be done. For much of the 20th century, leftist political
and social movements made land reform a central tenet of their platforms and called for the
expropriation of large landholdings and redistribution of land to the landless. Many saw the
dissolution of rural elites and the modernization of agriculture as essential elements for economic
development, and leftist governments often carried out land reforms upon coming to power.
Meanwhile, more centrist and neoliberal political forces have tended to advocate for less state
intervention and greater penetration of market forces in agriculture as the answer to low
productivity. The many failures of state interventions in the Global South, including many failed
land reforms, are seen as proof that state-led approaches are not feasible and market-based
approaches are the only viable alternative.
Nevertheless, both state-led and market-based approaches have important shortcomings.
As shown in this study, one of the central factors in agricultural transformation are the
productive strategies adopted by producers in the countryside, which condition whether
investment is channeled into improvements in productivity. The evidence reviewed here
indicates that the adoption of certain productive strategies depends on the particular relationships
between producers and the land—the rural property relations—which emerge out of historical
processes of land occupation and class struggle. In most cases, neither state-led nor market-based
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programs of land reform have been effective at altering the prevailing property relations in the
countryside, and, therefore, have generally failed to induce new production strategies among
farmers.
In the case of state-led reforms, this is because market mechanisms have often been
intentionally avoided or prohibited by the governments carrying out the reforms. Since the
objective of state-led reforms is to redistribute land and to combat concentrated ownership,
market sales and purchases are often seen as a barrier to landownership for the poor, and as a
potential avenue for land to become re-concentrated in the hands of the wealthy. For this reason,
in these kinds of reforms land has usually been granted to recipients for free or very cheap, or
under lenient terms of payment. In addition, it is often prohibited for reform land to be sold by its
recipients or used as collateral for credits and loans.
The result is that in most cases state-led land reforms have not facilitated the functioning
of land markets or the emergence of market-based property relations. With land recipients paying
little for the land, and under little market pressure to maximize its output, they have seldom
engaged in commercial or intensive agriculture. Instead, most land recipients prefer to farm
much as they did before, using reform land for subsistence production or low-intensity farming,
often as a supplement to other sources of income. Even when recipients have no other assets,
they often prefer to avoid the risks involved with commercial agriculture and prioritize their own
subsistence. Moreover, because the land cannot be used as collateral, the credit markets needed
to make investments can be difficult to access. Therefore, state-led land reforms have generally
resulted in low-productivity smallholder agriculture with few linkages to industry or other
sectors of the economy.
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This can be seen in various land reform projects throughout Latin America, including in
Brazil with the Landless Workers’ Movement (MST) as well as the most recent land reform in
Venezuela at the beginning of the 21st century. In both cases, large unproductive landholdings
were occupied and squatted on by landless workers, and this was used to pressure state
authorities to redistribute land that was being underutilized by its owners. As a result of this
process, the MST is now said to have around 2,000 permanent settlements in Brazil and some 1.5
million members across the country. In Venezuela, some 8 million hectares or about a quarter of
all agricultural land was expropriated between 2001 and 2013, most of it redistributed to small
farmers, cooperatives, or state-owned companies (Hernandez 2013a).
These state-led reforms have generally failed to produce improvements in agricultural
productivity, and in many cases have had the opposite result. In Venezuela, total agricultural
output dropped considerably after the Chavez government’s wave of expropriations, contributing
to the widespread food shortages that began to plague the country from 2012. In many cases, the
large landholdings that were once underutilized by wealthy landowners became even less
productive after the expropriation and redistribution of the land. Small farmers turned the land
over to subsistence production, while state companies and cooperatives failed to make new
investments or even maintain previous levels of production (Hernandez 2013b). Food production
has not recovered nearly a decade later.
The same is true with many of the MST settlements in Brazil. In some regions, as much
as one-fourth of all land recipients either abandon their plots outright or attempt to sell or rent
them on the black market (Silva 2011). Those who stay on the land tend to engage in subsistence
agriculture, with little investment in modern methods and technology. In the Northeast, some of
the largest land expropriation and resettlement projects have been noted for their failure to create

184

viable commercial agriculture or increase productivity above previous levels (Moura 1998, 16).
Though these projects have the benefit of dividing up large plantations and providing plots of
land to landless farmers, they do not generally produce changes in the productive strategies of
agricultural producers, which is what is needed to stimulate the development process.
Meanwhile, the record is not much better when it comes to market-based reforms. To
correct some of the problems of the state-led reforms, the market approaches often call for
changes to the laws governing land markets, such as allowing the sale and rental of reform land,
the removal of restrictions on size limits of landholdings, and the registration and titling of all
landholdings so that they can be used as collateral in credit transactions. By improving land
markets and the formalization of property rights in the countryside, market reforms seek to
promote the redistribution of land through voluntary market transactions between large lowproductivity landowners and more productive small farmers. Financing schemes are often
included as a way to facilitate these kinds of transactions.
However, despite the efforts to improve the functioning of land markets, market-based
reforms have seldom altered the underlying property relations in the countryside (Lahiff et al
2007, Penciakova 2010). The formalization of property rights by granting titles and facilitating
market transactions does not fundamentally change the relationship of rural producers to the
land, which is shaped more by how the land was acquired and by whom. Wealthy landowners
often prefer to not sell their land and continue to use it as a portfolio investment and store of
value, channeling profits out of agriculture into other economic activities. Meanwhile, small
farmers continue to prioritize subsistence production, as having title and access to credit markets
does not change their preference to avoid the risks involved with collateralizing their land and
engaging in commercial agriculture.
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Thus, where market-based reforms have been carried out it is often the case that the rural
poor are unable to purchase much land from large landowners (Penciakova 2010). Elites’ use of
the land as an investment or store of value means they are often willing to sell only at very
inflated prices. This forces small farmers to purchase lower quality or unproductive lands that
cannot produce enough to make them commercially viable or even sufficient for subsistence. In
addition, access to credit continues to be a problem as both governments and the private sector
tend to provide insufficient financing to small farmers. In other words, these kinds of reforms
have seldom been successful in facilitating competitive land markets or forcing a transition to
market-based property relations. The promises from neoliberal reformers that greater market
forces will transform agriculture in developing countries have not come to fruition.
A more effective strategy might be one that combines elements from both market and
state-led approaches to correct the shortcomings of each approach. This kind of mixed program
of reform would be one in which the state purchases or expropriates large and unproductive
landholdings, while market mechanisms are used to redistribute land to reform recipients.
Special emphasis would be placed on reform land being divided into commercially viable plots,
and then sold on the market at prices that reflect the production potential of the land. Public or
private forms of credit would need to be provided both in the purchasing of the land, as well as in
the acquisition of modern technology and inputs, so that reform recipients could engage in
intensive commercial agriculture. Strict terms of payment would then compel recipients to
channel investment into maximizing productivity in order to make loan payments and remain
solvent.
There have been some examples of this kind of reform in Latin America. During the
expansion of São Paulo’s coffee economy, the state government organized dozens of settler
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colonies for immigrant and Brazilian farmers as a way to facilitate smallholder agriculture. 1
These were often established on idle land purchased from the large coffee plantations or donated
by landowners hoping to attract seasonal laborers. State authorities then carried out the work of
demarcating the land into small plots, constructing housing and necessary infrastructure, and
selling the plots to incoming settlers on short or long-term credit. The farmers made yearly
payments on the land by engaging in commercial agriculture and selling their production on the
market. Those who could not make the annual payments risked losing their land to foreclosure.
State officials expressed great satisfaction with the progress of these colonies, and
productivity numbers were considerably higher than the more traditional parts of the state. 2
Indeed, the surrounding areas where many of the colonies were established were turned into
flourishing centers of smallholder agriculture in the years that followed.3 Of course, with a
smallholder class of farmers already forming in many parts of São Paulo, the chances of success
were probably more favorable than they otherwise would have been. Those settlers who were not
successful or who did not wish to farm the land could easily sell their land to others given the
high demand at that time. And those who sold generally did so to a new wave of incoming
settlers, so it did not lead to a re-concentration of land ownership as it might have in other
contexts. Functioning land markets allowed the more successful farmers to acquire more land for
their farms, while the less successful farmers could sell out to other aspiring settlers.

The annual reports from São Paulo’s Secretary of Agriculture from 1895 to 1930 discuss these
“nucleos coloniais” in detail from the point of their initial establishment to their overall evolution
as agricultural centers.
1

2

SASP, 1923, 126-127

3

SASP, 1923, 126-127
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Another interesting example comes from Venezuela in the 1950s. In this case, a military
dictatorship organized a colonization project in the western part of the country with the purpose
of implanting “modern” agriculture into the Venezuelan heartland (Llambi 1988, 72-101). The
plan was to create a class of small to medium-sized commercial farmers that would use modern
methods and technology to produce crops like corn, wheat, rice and sesame. To facilitate this, the
state expropriated large areas of land in the state of Portuguesa and turned it over to the Ministry
of Agriculture.4 State officials then cleared and demarcated the land, and constructed housing,
roads, and other necessary infrastructure like silos and irrigation. Individual plots of land were
sold to Venezuelan and immigrant farmers through 20-year mortgages, and farming equipment
and machinery were also provided on credit. Farmers were given training on how to utilize the
modern machinery and production methods, and the state was heavily involved both in providing
inputs as well as purchasing farmers’ production.
All indications are that the project was successful in introducing higher productivity
agriculture to the region. Much like the state-run colonies in São Paulo, settlers were allowed to
sell their plots as well as purchase additional land when needed. Most of the farms specialized in
mechanized corn and rice production, with sesame and soybeans also being produced. At first,
much of the production was channeled into agro-industries and food processing plants in the
central region of the country. By the 1970s, the production of these crops reached record levels,
and productivity began to rise even as the surrounding areas continued under rudimentary
subsistence agriculture and extensive grazing. By the end of the 20th century, the region came to

4

It should be noted that at least some of this land was already occupied by subsistence peasants.
These peasants were offered the opportunity of participating in the reform program by
purchasing plots of land on credit. When they refused to pay for the land that they were already
using, the state forcibly removed them and took control of their plots.
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be known as the “granary of Venezuela,” and a number of food processing industries arose in the
nearby cities of Acarigua and Guanare.
These kinds of land reform projects have important lessons for how agriculture might be
transformed in developing countries. The mixture of state intervention and market mechanisms
make them more likely than other approaches to alter the prevailing productive strategies in the
countryside and increase productivity. They also are more likely than the market-based
approaches to redistribute land and create a new class of commercial farmers. Because the land is
sold at market prices and not redistributed at discounted or highly inflated rates, it facilitates the
functioning of land markets and pushes farmers to engage in commercial agriculture to avoid
losing their land to foreclosure. This kind of reform is also more financially sustainable for the
state to carry out, as unproductive land that is divided into plots can be sold off at market prices,
bringing considerable funds into state coffers. Also, by replacing low productivity agriculture
with intensive commercial farming, the state could expect to see considerable increases in tax
revenue in the years after the reform.
Of course, success would ultimately depend on whether the reform results in a new class
of small and medium-sized farmers engaging in capital-intensive agriculture. To that end, special
care would need to be given to vetting land purchasers to assure they are aspiring farmers and
not speculators or rural elites looking to re-concentrate land in their hands. The state might need
to periodically intervene in land markets to avoid undesirable land sales or poor land utilization.
There would also need to be assurance that farmers have access to the necessary technology and
inputs for high productivity agriculture, and accessible markets for selling their production.
Finally, foreclosures would need to be enforced for farmers who do not produce the land
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effectively or who fail to make regular payments. This would facilitate the proper functioning of
land markets and the weeding out of low productivity farming.
The end goal would be to create a rural economy similar to the one that transformed São
Paulo and the surrounding region in the first half of the 20th century. This may seem like a tall
order, as few countries today share the same context or conditions as São Paulo did. But with
considerable state intervention it should be possible to reshape the rural landscape in that
direction. Few countries today have a large influx of immigrants looking to purchase land and
engage in smallholder agriculture, a crucial factor in São Paulo’s transformation. But most
developing countries do have a vast and ever-growing population in both rural and urban areas in
search of economic opportunities. With the right incentives and training, this population could be
turned into a new class of commercial farmers in the countryside.
Meanwhile, some argue that modern technologies and economies of scale have ruled out
the viability of small farms to compete with modern mega farms. However, in most developing
countries small farmers still have higher levels of productivity than large farms, and large
landowners control vast areas of land that are almost completely unutilized. In a mixed reform,
state officials would have control over the size of the plots to be demarcated and sold, and
therefore could assure that they are of a size large enough to use the most efficient technology
and methods of production. Not only would this assure that the new farms could survive, but by
increasing the number of small to medium commercial farmers it would greatly increase
agricultural productivity overall.
Whether or not agriculture can be transformed along these lines, its role in shaping
uneven processes of economic development should not be underestimated. Much of the
literature has viewed low productivity agriculture as more of a consequence of
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underdevelopment rather than a cause, and this has meant that the local dynamics of agrarian
production are often left unexamined. The precise causes of low intensity or low productivity
agriculture in the Global South are not well understood, and regional differences are commonly
seen as a result of external factors, such as climate, geography, or global economic forces. The
internal productive logic of rural society is seldom given the attention it deserves.
The aim of this study has been to show that understanding these differences in internal
productive logic are essential to understanding the large development differences around the
world. The example of Brazil shows that the underlying differences in how agriculture has come
to be organized in different places can result in drastically different development outcomes. This
is likely the case in many other parts of the world as well. However, further research is needed to
understand the local contexts and factors of agrarian change in each place. Greater research into
the internal dynamics of rural society in the developing world can help us better understand not
only the agrarian roots of uneven development around the world, but also its potential solutions.
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